ANC policy anarchy – its leaders are too weak to lead, or too weak to take over

Protesters expressing their view of President Jacob Zuma’s government ahead of the ANC National Policy Conference.
Siphiwe Sibeko/Reuters

Disputed resolutions, deferred decisions and policy uncertainty were the prime bequests of the policy conference of South Africa’s governing African National Congress to the troubled organisation. Hot on the heels of these incongruities were opaque proposals on how the ANC will act on wobbly state institutions that need to implement policy, and porous pitches on improved ethics and integrity.

Even more, the proceedings confirmed that the ANC leadership is in stalemate. Leadership is in transition and factional leaders lack the authority to steer policy in directions that will address the country’s massive delivery backlog.

To the question: is President Jacob Zuma leading the ANC onto a path of implosion, the verdict is a sad but unambiguous “yes”. The conference confirmed that the president and his faction are not letting go – neither of their ambitions to determine Zuma’s successor, nor of their efforts to make “radical economic transformation” their platform.

The conference confirmed that the ANC recognises that the cancer of corruption and capture afflicts it badly. Yet the organisation remains stunted in finding ways to deal with it.

While the conference opted for unity, it’s a unity that precludes cutting out the cancer because it’s embedded in a faction that’s not budging. It will do everything in its power to retain power. That includes gambling with the conference’s policy outcomes.

The policy conference was, in effect, a six-day war over policy. Factional forces manoeuvred relentlessly to secure influence and power. The epitome of this deep factionalism was that Zuma in his closing address put forward a “power-sharing” proposal. His intervention tried to influence delegates to campaign for sharing the top ANC leadership positions. But the president’s factional interests meant that his proposal carried little weight.

Affected by the succession campaign, the overall outcome was approximate policy anarchy. It was directed by leaders who were either too weak to lead or too weak to take over.

Stalemate state of the ANC

The national policy conference , held every five years, is the ANC’s precursor to the December national elective conference that also adopts the final policy resolutions to supplement or substitute previous policy.

The character of the conference itself revealed a great deal about the indecisive and stalemate state of the current ANC. Unlike previous ones, there was no reliable stream of reports containing draft resolutions. And it failed to deliver consensual recommendations on crucial matters.

Several of the media briefings were delayed or rushed due to ongoing contests – some rhetorical, some ideological – between factions in commissions. The Secretary General’s report, which mentioned the problem of how Zuma has allowed the Indian-born Gupta family to wield undue and corrupting influence, was tabled. But it was immediately discredited by the pro-Zuma faction.

Some media briefings, like the pivotal report and proposed resolutions on legislature and governance – which presumably put the spotlight on issues of corruption, capture, and lack of cadre capacity – never happened. The briefing on organisational renewal was largely made up of a shopping list of issues that had been discussed. Very little else.

Policy certainty was a mirage. The best indicators of future policy were to be found in the subtly changing balance of forces in the succession contest for national ANC leadership. This was the price that the ANC and its factions paid for its short-term goal of unity.

The factional struggle was clearest around the battle over the terminology of “radical economic transformation”. Under this umbrella lay issues such as land expropriation, the mining charter and the role of the Reserve Bank. Where resolutions on these matters materialised, such as “monopoly capitalism” winning vis-à-vis “white monopoly capitalism”, the battle was merely deferred. The reported losers proclaimed that party branches, and thereafter the December conference, would be the next battleground.

Share of contested positions

Previous ANC policy conferences have also had their fair share of contested positions. Five years ago the fight between whether South Africa finds itself in a “second transition” or in the “second phase of the transition to a democratic society” was resolved.

Ten years ago the divisive question was whether then president Thabo Mbeki could contest for a third term as ANC president. Opposing factions compromised, deciding that the ANC president should “preferably” only run for two terms. This was followed by the Polokwane national conference at which Mbeki lost to Zuma as party leader.

If the ANC still has the power to self-correct – or ensure that its centre holds – it certainly didn’t show at this recent policy conference. The need to be radical and ensure equity and justice were conflated with the opportunistic appropriation of “radical economic transformation” for factional succession and continued capturist control of the South African state.

A compromise position of “radical socioeconomic transformation” – a long-standing and considered to be sufficient pivot of the ANC’s ideological stance – was announced but rejected by those supporting the president, including some of the so-called Premier League members (a group of provincial party leaders) and the party’s youth and women’s leagues.

This policy conference will be remembered for an ANC in disarray, plagued with internal dissent. It was a policy conference with ambiguous, unresolved policy stances. It ended without a definitive positioning on reconnecting the party with South African citizens and voters. This was the price the ANC paid to keep two powerful factions in the same broad church.

Chances are that the conference exacerbated rather than ameliorated the credibility of the ANC in the eyes of voters. The best hope for this haplessly acting ANC at this stage is not self-correction, but that opposition parties will make mistakes that surpass its own.

Susan Booysen, Professor in the Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Nuclear and coal lobbies threaten to scupper renewables in South Africa

Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown citing cost as a reason to stop the last phase of renewables.
Flickr/GovernmentZA

South African power utility Eskom recently repeated that it will not conclude supply contracts with the developers of new renewable energy power stations. These developers were selected under a programme to facilitate private sector involvement in the building of medium-sized renewable energy power stations.

The programme has won plaudits for its success in facilitating the establishment of multiple solar and wind farms in record time. But Eskom is once again stalling.

The power utility’s stand threatens the viability of the entire renewable energy sector in the country. It’s hostility also defies logic given that the whole world is embracing renewable energy as key to a clean energy future and combating climate change.

So what lies behind the opposition?

The answer lies in the fact that two powerful lobbies are at work in South Africa. One is pro-coal, the other pro-nuclear. This has made the success of the renewable energy projects a target for attacks from interested parties in both. Disrupting the renewable energy sector would ensure that the coal sector remains dominant. And that, over time, it is gradually displaced by nuclear.

The lobby groups attached to coal and nuclear appear to have had powerful allies on the state utility’s board. There is mounting evidence that they have been furthering the interests of a group linked to the Gupta family. It in turn has been accused of capturing state entities to further its own ends, as well as those of President Jacob Zuma, his family and allies.

It has also been widely argued that the massively expensive proposed nuclear build is being driven by the same interest groups.

The battle over renewables is therefore closely linked to a wider political confrontation over control of key aspects of the South African economy.

Eskom’s flawed argument

The renewables dispute centres on the state utility’s refusal to endorse 1121 MW of new renewable energy. This translates to about 1% of Eskom’s current generated electricity, given that renewable energy supply is intermittent. This additional renewable energy would make up 5% of the total renewable energy generating capacity projected by 2030.

Eskom accepts the need to expand its generating potential in the long term. The additional contribution from renewables is well within its broader expansion targets. And tariffs on the energy from renewable sources would be almost half of the estimated cost of new coal and new nuclear power.

The Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown has been disingenuous in citing cost as a reason to stop the last phase of renewables. The higher costs she recently quoted were presumably those associated with the first round of renewable energy projects. These contracts were concluded in 2012 and prices for renewables have come down considerably since.

For its part Eskom has pointed to the oversupply of electricity as the reason for its objection. But elsewhere it has trumpeted the need for more nuclear power. It can’t have it both ways.

Powerful forces at play

Until two years ago Eskom was seen as a neutral player committed to effectively provide electric power in the best interests of the country. It threw its weight behind previous power procurement plans.

But that all changed in 2015 after Brian Molefe was appointed CEO.

Molefe and his successor Matshela Koko are both linked to the controversial Gupta family. Their names featured in the Public Protector’s State of Capture report as well as in a bulk leak of emails which implicated the Guptas and other leading figures in the state capture network.

Molefe and Koko played a pivotal role in helping the Guptas purchase a coal mine – the Optimum mine – and to secure a lucrative coal supply contract with Eskom. Both are also strongly pro-nuclear. They have also gone on record to argue that renewable energy is too expensive.

Eskom has furthermore listed renewables as the reason for planning to shut down four coal power plants. In reality, these old plants had already been destined for closure in anticipation of the imminent additional power supply expected from two new coal plants - Medupi and Kusile.

It’s suspicious that one of the power stations facing closure, Hendrina, is supplied by coal from the Optimum mine. The effect of stalling renewable power expansion could force the extension of Hendrina’s life span.

Brown is in the process of restructuring the Eskom board after Molefe departed, Koko was suspended and the chairperson of the board resigned. Although there are signs that the minister is aware that she has been misled by the Eskom board on other matters, she doesn’t seem to believe this is true when it comes to renewables, repeating recently the view that it’s too expensive.

Brown’s counterpart in the energy portfolio, Nkhensani Kubayi, has displayed little sympathy for the renewable energy sector, also making far-fetched and easily disprovable claims that the initial solar and wind power stations have resulted in zero jobs. Renewable energy is in fact estimated to eventually generate over 100 000 jobs in South Africa.

Kubayi has also shown that she’s highly receptive to the nuclear lobby. Visiting a nuclear industry fair in Russia in the middle of June she expressed concern that the judicial disqualification of the existing nuclear cooperation agreement damaged relations with that country.

It has been convincingly argued that South Africa can’t afford the nuclear option in the current economic environment.

The immediate future

The global ascendancy of renewables and their particular pertinence in South African climatic conditions may even make coal and nuclear energy technologies obsolete in the distant future. Ultimately South Africa won’t be able to buck international trends. That means that, in the longer term, the future of renewables in South Africa remains bright.

Hartmut Winkler, Professor of Physics, University of Johannesburg

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

South Africa's youth speak out on the high cost of finding work

Young people understand the value of education but find fees prohibitively high in a context of widespread unemployment and low incomes.
REUTERS/Mark Wessels

The voices of the youth are often neglected in discussions about the problems they encounter in finding work. Unemployment is one of the biggest challenges young people face globally. But the absence of young voices on the subject stands in the way of understanding and solving the problem.

Youth unemployment in South Africa is a problem – and it appears to be getting worse. Between 2009 and 2014, the share of 15- to 34-year-old youth in the working population of the country fell from 42.6% to 39.8%. And in the first quarter of 2016, the unemployment rate (including only active job-seekers) for 15- to 24-year-olds was about 55% – up 5% on the previous year.

The Centre for Social Development in Africa at the University of Johannesburg conducted research among employed and unemployed 18- to 25-year-olds in five of South Africa’s nine provinces. It focused on their experiences of unemployment, employment and job-seeking.

The research, to be published soon, will hopefully amplify the voices of youth and thereby inform more realistic interventions to combat a serious developmental problem. Youth insights point to issues that are rarely considered in policy making circles. Three are highlighted in this article:

• the problem of accessing higher education;
• the costs of looking for work; and
• exploitation.

Higher education

Young people understand the value of education, particularly higher education. But, as recent student protests have shown, the cost of a university education is prohibitively high in a context of widespread unemployment and low incomes.

As one of the survey respondents, from Orange Farm in the Gauteng province, said:

Without skills you are nothing, matric [South Africa’s school-leaving certificate] is nothing, so that’s why I am here now because I do not have skills.

When students were awarded bursaries or loans by the National Student Financial Aid Scheme to attend university, it was common for these only to be paid out months after the academic year had started. But costs like transport, books, and registration and residence fees had to be covered immediately. Because their families were not in a position to support them financially, such students were at risk of dropping out of university.

The costs of finding work

Youth face many more immediate challenges in their search for work, including the costs of looking for work and filling out applications.

There are no functional job centres where relevant, up to date information about job openings and job advice can be found. Most youth find this information on the internet or in newspapers. They also often have to use the internet and computers for job applications. Few have these resources at home, so they are forced to use (sometimes distant) internet cafés.

In addition, many employers demand paper applications, which entails the costs of printing, copying, certification and postage.

A Cape Town respondent spoke of the cost:

It was in June or May this year I applied for a job, right, but the cost was to go to the post office to post those application forms. I think it cost me, like, R23. It was an envelope, a brown envelope plus photocopies. I think it was R50 with transport to town.

The general finding is that these job-seeking resources and services are inordinately expensive for people without regular income, and this limits the frequency with which they apply for positions.

In addition, young black South Africans typically live far from where jobs are located. This makes it expensive to travel to interviews or apply for jobs in person. A return trip is in the region of R30-R40 (about US$2-$2.63). For working people, this may mean spending more than a third of their monthly income on travel. For those hunting work, the costs are prohibitive.

Exploitative practices

A third and particularly disturbing finding is the exploitation of work-seekers’ vulnerability. Respondents repeatedly spoke of fraudsters advertising nonexistent jobs, soliciting payments for processing applications or for pre-job training.

These often large payments are made to what appear to be legitimate and professional employers or agencies advertising on the internet, in newspapers or by text message.

According to a respondent from the North West province,

I also got a message. Last year. That guy told me, at least give me R2,500 and I will give you a job at the mine. I said, “Wow! I’ll see what I can do …’

When applications are made in person, gatekeepers like human resources managers and secretaries frequently solicit bribes to ensure applications are considered rather than discarded:

Where are you going to get money to bribe this person? You are not working, you are looking for a job and you are expected to pay before even getting your name in the company’s books … Where are you expected to get the money from? You don’t have the bribe money, you are out. – East London respondent

Several young women and men also spoke of being asked to perform sexual favours to improve their chances of securing a job. A respondent from Johannesburg said: ”… there was a guy there and he said I am cute and if am willing to do some little things for him he can definitely give me a job.“

The need for intervention

The costs of looking for work often lead to the perverse outcome where job-seekers, having fallen into debt to meet these costs, find themselves worse off than before and even unable to pay for basics like food. Many respondents told us of tensions and strained relationships and, less frequently, trouble with moneylenders.

While young job-seekers were mostly not deterred from trying to find work, these obstacles point to the need for sustained, local-level and accessible interventions – informed by young people. Some feasible interventions include:

• universities and financial support agencies improving the efficiency of their administrative operations to ensure prospective students are paid loans and grants timeously;
• employers simplifying the job application process. They could, for example, stop demanding onerous documentation like hard copies;
• government (and others) opening accessible and functional job centres where authentic information can be accessed at a low cost. These should include subsidised application-related resources like access to the internet, printers and certification facilities;
• job-seekers being able to access publicly-funded travel subsidies; and
• law enforcement agencies cracking down on job fraudsters and extortionists.

Zoheb Khan, Researcher, University of Johannesburg

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

North Korea's regime is brutal and terrifying. Here's what you can do

On July 4, 2017, America's Independence Day, the North Korean regime sent a message which was designed to strike fear into the hearts of revelling Westerners. The launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, actively taunting America, is a sign that Pyongyang's cruel despot is one step closer to being a genuine nuclear threat.

 

North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un salutes troops in a military parade.Reuters

Two weeks earlier, in Cincinnati, the student Otto Warmbier died in hospital. He had visited North Korea in January 2016 on a legal visa arranged by a Beijing-based travel agency. On departure he was detained, tried, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison for 'stealing' a political poster. Otto Warmbier was not seen again until his release last week in a comatose condition. He died on June 16.

These headlines provide glimpses into one of the world's most evil regimes, but they only scratch the surface of a far deeper problem. Moments when the brutality of the North Korean regime enter the Western public imagination remind us of the torrid conditions suffered daily by North Korean citizens.

Kim Jong-Un, the leader of the country, is a despot who stands accused of crimes against humanity and should be called before the International Criminal Court.

Gulags and concentration camps should have no place in the 21st century. Yet the North Korean regime has imprisoned between 100,000 and 200,000 political prisoners and consigned them to prison camps where they are subjected to slave labour and torture. Hundreds of testimonies of escapees tell of prisoners forced to scavenge for rats and snakes because prison rations are so poor.

Four years ago the United Nations established a commission of inquiry to investigate North Korea's human rights record. They found that 'the gravity, scale and nature' of the human rights violations in North Korea 'reveal a State that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world': a state where 'crimes against humanity' including extermination, murder, enslavement and torture are committed with impunity.

For Christians and other religious minorities, the situation is particularly bleak. Christian Solidarity Worldwide's 2016 report, Total Denial: Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief in North Korea, highlights the fact that freedom of religion or belief is non-existent and it is a political crime to practise Christianity: 'Christians usually practise their faith in secret. If discovered they are subject to detention and then likely taken to prison camps; crimes against them in these camps include extra-judicial killing, extermination, enslavement/forced labour ... torture, ... and other inhumane acts.' The official ideology of the Kim regime, known as 'juche', is comparable to a religious belief and is the foundation of North Korea's repression of religious freedom, since any growth of religious teachings would conflict with loyalty to the god-like Supreme Leader.

What can we do in the face of such a bleak situation? Our response must be innovative and make the most of every opportunity to defend human rights, promote democracy and hold the regime to account.

On July 6 2017 the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, said that the US would table a new resolution against Pyongyang at the United Nations and was even considering military action. The United States and their allies must ensure that human rights concerns remain at the heart of their negotiations with North Korea. The United Nations Security Council should refer Kim Jong-Un to the International Criminal Court so that he can be held accountable for his actions.

However, our actions must go beyond big-picture diplomacy. A great famine in the 1990s, which killed hundreds of thousands of people, has led to a total restructuring of the North Korean economy in recent years. The old communist economy collapsed and has been replaced by hundreds of informal capitalist markets which are technically illegal but form the backbone of North Korea's restructured economic system.

These major changes have not stopped atrocities against the North Korean people. Prison camps, arbitrary executions and torture persist, as Otto Warmbier's case so brutally exposes. However, it presents new opportunities. The economy is now less easily controlled than it was in its old communist form: this means that information which previously was blocked by the regime is increasingly entering the country by the back door. Beyond Parallel recently surveyed 36 North Koreans based inside the country. The survey was not randomly sampled and therefore percentages should be considered with caution, but people from all parts of the country participated and 33/36 of the respondents used foreign media at least once a month.

In recent years there has been unprecedented access to foreign information in one of the world's most closed countries. Many defectors claim that watching South Korean dramas or listening to the radio while living in North Korea influenced their decision to leave. Recognising this, the BBC has set up a Korean language radio broadcast into North Korea, hoping to shatter the lies propagated by the regime. If nations around the world unite to fund more innovative projects like this, who knows what may happen? A generation may rise up in North Korea, reject the regime's propaganda and call for change.

And if you're not involved in full-time advocacy? You can do two things: speak up and pray. Your voice matters to your Member of Parliament, so make sure that they know that their constituents care about the suffering of North Koreans and want them to take action. And your prayers matter to God, so pray that he protects those suffering under the violent hand of the Kim regime, pray for innovative advocacy strategies, and pray ultimately that Kim's regime would fall and be held accountable.

Johnny Patterson is a researcher with Christian Solidarity Worldwide's East Asia Team.

Benedict Rogers is East Asia Team Leader at Christian Solidarity Worldwide and co-founder of the International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea.

Source

How the Vietnamese cult of heroes promotes nationalism in politics

Kiep Bac temple, Vietnam, where people worship the hero Saint Tran.
T.H.H HOANG, Author provided

The Vietnamese government is trying to pass a new law on religion that will separate the nation’s many cults authorised and unauthorised. The move illustrates the government’s control over private cults and how it uses them for its own benefit.

The worship of Trần Hưng Đạo, a legendary warrior-turned-saint, is a good example of the way the Vietnamese authorities use religious figures to push their nationalistic agenda.

The cult of heroes

Government controls on religion have existed throughout Vietnamese history. Tensions over religion arose during communist rule but, since 1986 (along with economic and political reforms), the government has enhanced its legitimacy and power by approving popular cults, in the same way dynasties in the past did.

Vietnam differs from other Southeast Asian countries in that there’s a particular devotion to heroes in its political culture and religious system. Among the Kinh – the main ethnic group in Vietnam – Buddhism, Daoism and Christianity have co-existed alongside traditional religions and beliefs that often involve hero cults.

Cao Dai temple in Tay Ninh, Vietnam.
Welsh-anni/Wikimedia, CC BY-ND

This kind of worship grew and has remained strong because of Vietnam’s history of invasions. Since 938, when the country freed itself from 1,000 years of rule from the Chinese, heroes from different eras – including from former feudal dynasties and the recent communist period – have been worshipped.

These heroes are honoured as saints or gods and are worshipped in temples and shrines. They form a sacred and spiritual bond between the past and the present.

Although atheism dominated the country during the communist era, many still believe in the existence of souls. Heroes connect people to the world of the dead and of ancestors, which are a regular feature of local cults.

According to French historian Benoît de Tréglodé, more than 60% of the gods worshipped in rural areas and villages are those who once fought in wars to protect the country.

These heroes’ images have played an important role in maintaining power through various Vietnamese dynasties, each of which paid attention to building and maintaining temples to such heroes in order to secure the people’s support.

The making of a national hero

Among Vietnamese heroes, Trần Hưng Đạo is the most popular nationwide. He is regarded as a war hero from the 13th century Trần Dynasty. According to legend, he successfully defeated invaders from the Mongol Empire. People developed a cult of Trần and propagated legends about his life.

In the 20th century, he re-emerged as a symbol of resistance against French colonial power and then against Americans during the Vietnam War.

Trần Hưng Đạo is the only figure in Vietnam to be the head of a wide religious sect that includes his family members and even his close army generals. People refer to him as thần (genie) thánh (deity).

Ritual to the family of Trần in Kiếp Bạc temple.
T.H.H HOANG, Author provided

Trần’s powers soon became limitless. He would not only defeat enemies but also eliminate diseases and evil spirits. Ceremonies are conducted for pregnant women and newborn babies in his name, organised by mediums and their disciples, to cure diseases.

The medium asks Saint Trần and the gods in his family to possess him. His cheeks are then pierced by steel sticks. He is suspended from a ceiling or stage until his face turns red enough to scare away evil spirits from the sick, and his tongue is slit to collect blood to make amulets against disease.

A public ceremony in which mediums pierce themselves to scare away evil spirits.

Political use of cults

In the feudal period, the cult received royal support. But by the early 20th century, worship rituals and medium possession were considered superstitions by both Confucians and Vietnamese intellectuals and the practices were condemned. But the French colonial administration supported the cults to divert people’s attention.

During the 1986 Doi Moi reforms, which opened Vietnam to industrialisation while retaining a protected economy, these practices became more prevalent than ever, pushed by a government that saw them as a powerful political tool to glorify the nation while opening it to new markets.

Trần Hưng Đạo statue in Kiep Bac temple (Hai Duong).
T.H.H HOANG

The worship of Saint Trần became widely accepted. Civil servants and high administration functionaries were invited to festivals and death anniversaries. Ancient pagodas, temples and shrines that had been closed during the hardline communist rule of the 1960s were reopened and restored. And people were able to visit worship places freely and purchase sacrificial and religious items, such as joss paper.

Village festivals were held and people started to search for their lost ancestors’ graves. These monuments, which were once considered feudal governors’ ruling instruments became national cultural heritage once more.

Possession as intangible heritage?

Today, Trần Hưng Đạo is present in many different forms in the daily lives of Vietnamese people. Roads and streets are named after him; sculptures grace parks and transport interchanges.

Children learn about him in textbooks alongside stories of the Trần Dynasty. And his places of worship have become tourist attractions.

But the practice of medium possession is still a controversial topic and is not recignised by the authorities.

‘Four palaces’ (the four spirits) of Vietnam beliefs have been translated into lively popular culture.

Many argue that the cult of Saint Trần has become a part of Vietnam’s national intangible heritage and goes with medium possession practices found in the religion of Four Palaces. In this Vietnamese cosmology, spirits – old and new – are governed by the Mother Goddess.

Trần Hưng Đạo remains alive in Vietnam but his powers are challenged by more recent heroes such as president Hồ Chí Minh and general Võ Nguyên Giáp, a military commander who led Vietnamese forces against the US and the French.

Could Saint Tran be one day forgotten and replaced by other, more manageable nationalistic heroes?

Thi Hong Ha Hoang, Researcher, Université Paris Nanterre – Université Paris Lumières

This article was originally published on The Conversation.