Joe Slovo Park residents torch MyCiTi bus after shacks demolished

Land occupation followed removal of school classrooms

By Barbara Maregele
26 June 2017

Parent Noxolo Mayeki, seen here standing on the site left vacant at Khozi Primary, says her seven-year-old is also not in school. Photo: Barbara Maregele.

It has been two weeks since the Western Cape Education Department (WCED) removed prefabricated classrooms from an unregistered school – Khozi Primary – in Joe Slovo Park, Milnerton.
Since then, people took the opportunity to erect shacks on the vacant land which belongs to the City of Cape Town.
On Sunday afternoon, a group of protesters torched a MyCiTi bus after the City’s Anti-Land Invasion Unit demolished about 20 shacks.
The City has condemned the attack in a statement, saying that “the bus driver thankfully escaped unharmed” and that attacks on the City’s public transport system limited its financial resources. “Destroying what has already been achieved deprives the communities who are dependent on public transport. The MyCiTi buses operating along Route 261 are being deviated until further notice,” the City said.

Overcrowded school

Meanwhile, Marconi Beam Primary, the only primary school in Joe Slovo Park, has been dealing with overcrowded classes – with 47 learners per classroom, according to school principal Bukelwa Plaatjies.
“We have taken in most of the children who were at that school [Khozi] as the Department’s plan B. I understand the parents’ frustrations and their reasons for wanting another school. Every year, my school is overcrowded and there are kids who remain on the waiting list until the following year,” said Plaatjies.
On 7 June, dozens of parents demonstrated outside Khozi Primary when the education department, with the help of private security, removed several prefabricated classrooms.
That same evening, Plaatjies’ office was torched. The blaze gutted her office and destroyed important information about learners.
In May GroundUp reported that the school, which accommodated nearly 400 learners, was opened by the community after children were turned away from Marconi Beam. Parents wanted the school registered, and for the WCED to provide essentials such as chairs, desks, and crayons. But the Department said its lease on the land had ended and the mobile classrooms were needed at other schools.
Thabisa Dyantyi lives in a one-room shack with her five-year-old daughter, a road away from Marconi Primary. Her daughter used to go to Khozi, but has now been at home for the past two weeks.
“There is no space for Grade R at Marconi, and I don’t have money to send her to a school in Dunoon. I can’t send her back to creche so she’ll have to stay at home for the rest of the year if the [WCED] doesn’t find her a space,” she said.
Another parent, Noxolo Mayeki, said her seven-year-old Liyema, is also not in school. “Since Khozi, my child had a place to go to and learn during the day. Now, he just plays outside,” she said.
Mayeki said Marconi had taken in some of the learners, but she was not prepared to send Liyema to an overcrowded school. “I won’t endorse children going to that school because it’s already so full. How can they learn like that?” she asked.
Plaatjies said the education department had given three mobile classrooms to accommodate Khozi’s learners at Marconi Beam and Tygerhof Primary [also in Milnerton], but some parents were opposed to this. “Some parents waited until the day the classrooms were removed to bring their children to Marconi. A week ago, we accommodated almost all of those learners. At least now the learners are settling in and we are working out ways to make this work,” she said.

Education department responds

WCED spokesman Paddy Attwell acknowledged that Marconi “was under pressure.” Attwell said that their district offices had arranged for the Khozi learners to be placed at Marconi Beam, Tygerhof, Silverleaf and Du Noon primary schools.
“Unfortunately, certain parents have ignored guidelines that officials provided on where to place learners. Some parents have ignored requests to move children into mobile classrooms at Marconi Beam,” he said.
Attwell said that at the request of Minister Debbie Schäfer, officials met with community representatives on Friday morning to investigate the need for another school in the area.

Vacant City land where the classrooms once stood. Photo: Barbara Maregele

---

Published originally on GroundUp .

---

How a South African company turned constraints into global strengths

SAB’s resilience has allowed it to become a key player globally.
Shutterstock

On 28 September 2016, the shareholders of South African born international brewer, SABMiller, approved the company’s acquisition by Anheuser-Busch InBev for $104 billion (R1.5 trillion). The deal paved the way for the creation of what is now by far the world’s largest brewing company.

For a company that started out selling beer to miners in Johannesburg during the gold rush of the late 1800s, it’s been quite a journey. But how did a brewing company from a developing country rise to compete with the multinational brewing behemoths from the developed world?

A series of interviews with senior executives and managers who presided over the growth of what was then South African Breweries’ (SAB) rapid expansion during and after the 1990s are revealing. After building up a monopoly-like position in the beer market in South Africa, the company went in search of new markets. It used its experience in South Africa in its entry strategies abroad.

SAB’s path reflects the differences between multinationals from developed and emerging markets in terms of location choices, sequencing, time horizons and motivation.

A two-phased expansion path emerges to explain the remarkable success story. The first pillar to SAB’s international expansion was a focus on developing markets. Coming from a developing country itself, the company would cope better with emerging market conditions than brewers from the developed world. These ventures became a powerful base for SAB to take on developed markets.

The second was to expand into developed countries. This became necessary as it became clear the company was over exposed to emerging markets.

The first phase of expansion

After a few early forays into South Africa’s neighbouring countries prior to 1993, SAB executives realised that the company could exploit its knowledge of institutional shortcomings in its home country. It would use this experience to adapt more easily than its competitors to conditions in developing countries.

And so began the first part of its internationalisation strategy: a rapid expansion into emerging markets worldwide.

Through a series of acquisitions and joint ventures throughout the 1990s, SAB gained a foothold in various countries in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. Although many were geographically distant (like Hungary, Czech Republic, China and India), they echoed South Africa in terms of their socioeconomic development. Eastern Europe, for example, was still emerging from political reform in the wake of communism, and infrastructural, institutional and economic weaknesses persisted.

By expanding into countries that shared socioeconomic characteristics with South Africa, SAB was able to make use of its experience to turn a perceived drawback – institutional weakness – into a strength. As one respondent explained:

To be quite frank, we actually accepted that we would live with the political risk and poor institutions. We didn’t really shy away from high-risk countries unless, of course, there was a raging civil war that we would have to wait to subside.

Once it had established this expansion plan, SAB diversified into developed markets such as Italy and the US. As one interviewee put it:

Investors became sceptical of companies whose only business was in emerging markets.

In 2002 it took a step closer to consolidating its position as a multinational brewing giant when it acquired US-based Miller Brewing Company. It became SABMiller.

Turning weakness into strength

The advantages that SAB gained from its experience in its home country are many. One was employee aptitude.

SAB employees had built up an extraordinary resilience, flexibility and entrepreneurial spirit through their exposure to the unsteady South African environment of the 1980s. As one executive said:

They survived labour trouble, survived interest rates at 25%, inflation at 16% to 17%, survived political disorder, political violence… That toughened you, toughened us.

This robustness, combined with an ability to connect with many different cultures, gave the company a valuable flexibility in its risk, location and investment choices.

Another strength was its ability to turn around neglected breweries and businesses. The experience it gained in South Africa, with its large rural population and pockets of poor infrastructure, meant that finding innovative ways to overcome challenges was embedded in the company’s DNA.

Another advantage the company gained was brand development and marketing ability. SAB was developed into a major operation without reliance on strong, globally-recognised brands. Using its home experience the company took brands it acquired in distant countries and built them into powerful national brands.

These became a base from which it launched into premium brands such as Grolsch and Peroni through acquisitions. This offset being over-invested in domestic brands.

SAB also had a philosophical edge over many competitors. It’s risk appetite was much bigger. By comparison a company like Anheuser-Busch had a conservative approach to risk and international expansion.

For example, Anheuser-Busch didn’t react to the rapidly changing global brewer consolidation until it was too late. And when it did, it realised that it had little emerging market experience.

This weakness meant that in 2008 Anheuser-Busch was unable to avoid a hostile takeover by InBev. This gave rise to AB Inbev, then the world’s largest brewer. AB Inbev, in turn, was compelled to make an offer for SABMiller to acquire complementary emerging market presence.

SABMiller’s long journey from the mine heaps of Johannesburg to global brewing colossus may appear to have come to an abrupt end after its acquisition by Anheuser-Busch InbevAB Inbev in 2016. But what’s clear is that its extraordinarily successful approach continues to hold many lessons for aspiring global companies from the developing world.

_This piece was adapted from an academic article by John Luiz, Dustin Stringfellow and Anthea Jefthas that first appeared in the February 2017 issue of Global Strategy Journal, Volume 7, Issue 1 (83-103).
_

John Luiz, Professor of International Business Strategy & Emerging Markets, Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Can we predict political uprisings?

Forecasting political unrest is a challenging task, especially in this era of post-truth and opinion polls.

Several studies by economists such as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler in 1998 and 2002 describe how economic indicators, such as slow income growth and natural resource dependence, can explain political upheaval. More specifically, low per capita income has been a significant trigger of civil unrest.

Economists James Fearon and David Laitin have also followed this hypothesis, showing how specific factors played an important role in Chad, Sudan and Somalia in outbreaks of political violence.

According to the International Country Risk Guide index, the internal political stability of Sudan fell by 15% in 2014, compared to the previous year. This decrease was after a reduction of its per capita income growth rate from 12% in 2012 to 2% in 2013.

By contrast, when the income per capita growth increased in 1997 compared to 1996, the score for political stability in Sudan increased by more than 100% in 1998. Political stability across any given year seems to be a function of income growth in the previous one.

When economics lie

But as the World Bank admitted, “economic indicators failed to predict Arab Spring”.

Usual economic performance indicators, such as gross domestic product, trade, foreign direct investment, showed higher economic development and globalisation of the Arab Spring countries over a decade. Yet, in 2010, the region witnessed unprecedented uprisings that caused the collapse of regimes such as those in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.



In our 2016 study we used data for more than 100 countries for the 1984–2012 period. We wanted to look at criteria other than economics to better understand the rise of political upheavals.

We found out and quantified how corruption is a destabilising factor when youth (15-24 years old) exceeds 20% of adult population.

Let’s examine the two main components of the study: demographics and corruption.

Young and angry

The importance of demographics and its impact on political stability has been studied for years.

In his 1996 book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, US academic Samuel P. Huntington explained how youth are agents of change.

Several examples can be found throughout the early 2000s. Young people were particularly active in Yugoslavia’s Bulldozer Revolution, (2000), Georgia’s Rose Revolution (2003), the Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (2004), the Iranian Green Movement of the post-2009 presidential election, and finally during the Arab Spring (since 2011).

But a bulk of population being under 25 years old in a given country does not necessarily lead to revolution. It’s when leaders of such countries deceive and fail their younger citizens through systematic corruption, for instance, that the risk of upheaval is much higher.

Enter corruption

Political corruption allows non-democratic leaders to build political support through networks of dependency, extending the duration of their regimes.

A 2014 study by political scientists Natasha Neudorfer and Ulrike Theuerkauf, suggests the contrastability effects of corruption: the beneficiaries increase their income while a larger portion of the population feels the inequality as economic growth and investment stagnate. It particularly affects the youth population who are not yet inserted in the system and have fewer economic opportunities.

Autocratic corrupt states also allocate a larger portion of their budget to military and security fores, under-spending on education and health. This situation might stimulate youth adhesion to anti-establishment movements, including radical ones.

According to NIgerian scholar Freedom C. Onuoha, political corruption is behind the formation and durability of terrorist groups in Iraq, Syria and Nigeria. These groups succeeded in attracting the marginalised parts of the population that are mainly from the youth bulge.

But corruption alone, like age, is not creating political unrest. A combination of the right amount of youth within the overall population suffering from corruption is necessary.

The case of Iran

A good example is Iran. The country experienced one of the most significant political changes of the 20th century when the 1979 Islamic Revolution ended its monarchy and has been thriving on oil revenues since.

Oil revenue-dependency was less than 1% of total economy from 1970 to 1973. Substantial increase in oil prices from the mid-1970s led to a massive increase in the Iranian economy’s dependency on it – from 0.3% in 1973 to 31% in 1974 according to the World Bank.

In 2009, youth protested for months in support of the reformist Mousavi, creating the ‘Green Movement’.
Ahmed Jadallah/Reuters

Based on my calculations of the World Bank’s Health Nutrition and Population Statistics, the share of 15 to 24-year-olds among the overall adult population has been higher than 20% from 1960-2016 (with an exception of 19% in 2016).

For this time period, we observed a continuous increase in the youth bulge in Iran from 33% in 1970 to approximately 36% (one of the highest in Iran’s demographic history) in 1979 (World Bank Population Estimates and Projections, 2017).

With oil income growing along with a diversity of activities linked to its production and circulation, corruption – for which we do not have data before 1985 – has emerged as a way of life.

In 1997-98, the share of Iranians aged between 15 and 24 in the adult population reached 36% (World Bank Population Estimates and Projections, 2017). At the same time, Iranian politics experienced a significant change with the presidential election of Mohammad Khatami whose main support base was the youth.

Incidentally we observed that Khatami’s government was one of the most factionalised period of politics in Iran with frequent political crisis. In 2004, The New York Times noted that :

During his tenure, President Khatami complained that ‘a crisis every nine days’ made it hard to get anything accomplished.

This did not lead to a revolution but civil unrest has regularly affected political life including in 2009. World Bank Population Estimates and Projections show that the share of youth in Iran will drop to 11% by 2050, reducing the political risk of demographics in the presence of corruption in the future.

Additional factors

Using cases such as the Iranian one, we tried to understand how corruption and youth could lead to crisis.

We also took into account other drivers of conflict such as inequality, economic growth, investment rate, inflation, government spending, military spending, oil rents, trade, education, fertility rate, and democracy.

We controlled for specific differences between the countries we studied, such as geography, geopolitical situation, cultural and historical heritage, and religion. International attention and intervention of external powers were also taken into account. And we included events such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2003 Iraq war.

Table 1 illustrates the marginal effect of corruption on internal stability at different levels of youth bulge.
Mohammad Reza

Figure 1 illustrates the marginal effect of corruption on internal stability at different levels of youth bulge.
Mohammad Reza Farzanegan

Based on our main results, Table 1 and Figure 1 show average marginal effects of corruption on political stability at different levels of youth bulge. We are 90% confident that a youth bulge beyond 20% of adult population, on average, combined with high levels of corruption can significantly destabilise political systems within specific countries when other factors described above also taken into account. We are 99% confident about a youth bulge beyond 30% levels.

Our results can help explain the risk of internal conflict and the possible time window for it happening. They could guide policy makers and international organisations in allocating their anti-corruption budget better, taking into account the demographic structure of societies and the risk of political instability.

Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, Professor of Economics of the Middle East, University of Marburg

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

It's hard to get rid of the governor of a central bank. Here's why

South Africa’s former finance minister Pravin Gordhan chats with Lesetja Kganyago, governor of the country’s Reserve Bank.
Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko

With the continued harassment of South Africa’s Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, it has become patently clear that no institution will be spared in the wave of state capture that is sweeping through the country.

The finance ministry has been at the centre of this wave for nearly a year. The latest move against Gordhan comes against a backdrop of efforts to wrest control of this particular portfolio. The most spectacular was President Jacob Zuma’s decision in December 2015 to fire then Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene and replace him with someone more agreeable to his plans.

That plan backfired. President Zuma had no option but to reappoint Gordhan, the previous Minister of Finance. But Gordhan is now back in the firing line after refusing to give ground to Zuma on some crucial issues. Rumours persist that the finance minister is about to be fired or charged – possibly even arrested – by the elite police unit, the Hawks.

Is the Governor of the SA Reserve Bank next? This consideration comes on the back of political attacks directed at the country’s central bank by senior members of the governing African National Congress (ANC) aligned with Zuma.

The Deputy Secretary General of the ANC Jessie Duarte has raised questions about the central bank’s role. She is suggesting that the bank serves partisan interests because it has private shareholders.

It has also emerged that Mosebenzi Zwane, the Minister of Mineral Resources, tabled a working paper to the Cabinet recommending that the power to issue banking licences should be taken away from the SA Reserve Bank and given to the minister of finance.

But can the Governor be removed as easily as a minister of finance? My reading of the SA Reserve Bank Act is that the answer is no. The current legislation makes no provision for the President to dismiss the central bank governor.

Holding central bankers to account

Central banks’ governors need security of tenure once appointed. Security of tenure allows them the opportunity to conduct monetary policy in the interests of the whole country without fear of dismissal.

Imagine a scenario in which a central bank governor was dismissed every time he or she took a monetary policy decision that the government disliked - for example by raising interest rates. This would render the job unworkable.

Because of this, the appointment of central bank governors has been designed to ensure that they can get on with their mandate without political interference.

The Governor of the SA Reserve Bank is appointed by the President of the Republic after consultation with the Minister of Finance and the Board of the South African Reserve Bank. Appointments are for an initial five years. Once the first term is served, the President can reappoint the Governor for an unlimited number of further terms, each of a maximum period of five years.

So much for the appointment. What about getting rid of a governor?

The SA Reserve Bank Act lists conduct that will render the Governor unsuitable to complete any term of appointment. Other than on these grounds, no provision is made for the dismissal of the Governor.

So how would a governor would be removed if he or she was considered to be unsuitable for office? This is open to some debate, but it seems that there might be at least two possibilities:

• The government (including Parliament) or any other party can take legal action to have the governor declared unfit to hold office. The governor and his deputies serve as directors of the central bank. As such they are bound by rules which demand that they remain fit and proper to serve. The act sets out in some detail what fit and proper entails. It includes avoiding conflicts of interest between personal interests and the interests of the central bank and not working for a bank. If the incumbent falls short of any of these requirements, there is recourse to taking legal action against them.
• Parliament can amend the South African Reserve Bank Act to give the President power to dismiss the Governor.

My understanding is therefore that the President cannot simply remove the Governor of the SA Reserve Bank. It would require - at a minimum - legal action or a parliamentary process.

Central banks with shareholders

Duarte’s main point of contention is that South Africa’s central bank has private shareholders which means that it cannot act independently. This is not true.

South Africa isn’t the only country with a central bank owned by private shareholders. While most central banks in the world are publicly owned, there are a handful that aren’t. These include Belgium, Greece, Japan, Switzerland and Turkey. In the case of the US and Italy, only shareholding by commercial banks is allowed.

In none of these instances is there evidence that private ownership affects the institutions’ independence. In fact, it can be argued that a private ownership structure adds to the transparency and accountability of central banks. For example, the SA Reserve Bank publishes a comprehensive annual report for distribution to shareholders. In addition it has to hold an annual ordinary general meeting of shareholders at which the Governor responds to questions about the business of the central bank and the conduct of monetary policy.

The link that Duarte tries to make between the central bank’s shareholding and its approach to exchange rate policy simply does not exist. The SA Reserve Bank made this point clearly in a statement it issued shortly after Duarte’s salvo. This points out that shareholders play no role in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy.

On its approach to exchange rate policy, South Africa’s central bank takes a stance similar to most central banks in the world: namely, that any attempt to influence the value of a currency by intervening in the market is futile. China is an exception to this rule. It has a controlled economy and has substantial foreign currency reserves with which to support the yuan in the open market.

The SA Reserve Bank serves the best interests of all South Africans. The Governer’s security of tenure supports the efforts of the central bank to contain inflation. At the same time a structure of private shareholders in the central bank helps to improve monetary policy transparency.

Jannie Rossouw, Head of School of Economic & Business Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

South Africans don't know much about science. Why this is a problem

Most South Africans don’t visit places where they can learn about science such as zoos and museums.
Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko

From the microchips in smart phones to the largest jumbo jets, science and technology influences the way people interact with the world around them. It brings them closer to friends and family, enhances health care, secures assets and keeps the world moving forward.

Traditionally, people have turned to science for certainty and confirmation. But in a sea of social media and allegations of fake news, it has become increasingly harder for people to distinguish fact from fiction. As a result, science’s authoritative place in society is being questioned more and more. This has the ability to erode the value and importance of science and technology in general.

One way to tackle this is to monitor people’s understanding of the scientific areas that are trending to establish what their understanding of science is.

We set out to measure South Africa’s understanding of science by conducting a survey looking at how much people know about different areas of science, what their attitudes are, what interests them and how they get their information.

Not surprisingly people know more about areas of science that influence them directly. Personal health, for example, takes precedence over astronomy. But at least 40% of the people we asked had no interest in any area in science. And few people are doing activities where they could learn about science.

Unless these gaps are bridged, South Africans will not see the value that science and technology adds to their daily lives. And the country will not be able to use the power of science to find innovative solutions to its problems.

Where the interests lie

To measure how people understood science, we did six exercises with our respondents.

In one, for example, we gave them nine true or false questions to see how much they knew about science. In another exercise we asked them which areas of science they were more interested in. We gave them a list of sevens areas:

• technology and the internet
• climate change
• economics
• politics
• energy
• astronomy, and
• medical science

The respondents were more interested in areas such as technology and the internet but less in climate change, economics and energy.

Although most of the respondents had a positive attitude to science, nearly 40% were ambivalent. This is concerning because it means they could be open to questioning valid science in the future.

We also wanted to know how people learnt about science. We gave people 11 options of places they could find information about science. Radio (69.4%) was the primary source of information, followed by free-to-air TV (65.0%) and word of mouth. Surprisingly, online-based information sources like social media, blogs, institutional websites and news websites were at the bottom of their list of information sources.

A scientific way of thinking

Science should be considered as a systematic way of thinking to build knowledge and test experience through factual observation. Not just as a career or qualification.

Rüdiger Laugksch from the University of Cape Town, a researcher in scientific literacy and education in South Africa, argues that improving scientific literacy in South Africa is important for three reasons.

Firstly, it will lead to the country having a pool of people who can drive innovative and smart ways of doing things.

Secondly, it will mean that citizens will have a certain level of proficiency in science and technology. This will help them to make knowledge-driven decisions.

Thirdly, scientific literacy can help people make informed and effective decisions about public policy and nation building.

The products of science – like knowledge, technologies and innovations – can all close the gaps in development and infrastructure. But first, South Africa needs to get to the point of valuing and understanding the contribution science makes to daily life.

Dr Saahier Parker, Chief Researcher at the Centre for Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators, Human Sciences Research Council

This article was originally published on The Conversation.