What the UK election means for Brexit and America

How each U.K. party leader would drive Brexit is the key issue on voters’ minds.
AP Photo/Matt Dunham

Despite the many distractions of a full news cycle, it’s time to start paying closer attention to Thursday’s elections in the U.K.

Much has changed since U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May stunned the world in April by calling for snap elections. For starters, after the two recent terrorist attacks on British soil, security has joined Brexit, health care and the economy as a central issue facing U.K. voters. In addition, May’s closest rival, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn – seen as a long shot back then – has succeeded in tightening the race. While May’s Tories look set to hold onto their parliamentary majority, they will likely receive a much slimmer mandate than they had hoped.

But by and large, the most important issue continues to be Brexit, as the latest surveys show. And whichever party wins on June 8 will determine how Britain – the world’s fifth-largest economy – defines its economic future, with significant consequences for the United States. For me, a political scientist by trade, this may be the most important election since I began following British politics while studying there in the late 1990s.

A floral tribute in the London Bridge area following the attack in London on June 5.
AP Photo/Alastair Grant

A tale of two Brexits

In a much-contested vote last June, the U.K. committed itself to leaving the European Union, the deeply integrated bloc of 28 countries that it joined back in 1973. Though the winners of this election are unlikely to reverse Brexit, they would have the power to negotiate the important details surrounding the departure.

May, who supported remaining in the EU during the referendum, has promised to respect the people’s will by negotiating a “hard Brexit.” She is willing to sacrifice privileged British access to the European single market in order to ensure the country’s control over its borders. For May and the Conservatives, if Britain is going to leave Europe, it should do so fully.

On the other hand, if Labour manages an unexpected victory, we might see a “soft Brexit,” one that preserves more mobility across the U.K.’s borders and more connections with the continent. Under Labour, British negotiators would probably push for continued preferential access to the single market. They could be forced by Brussels, in exchange, to accept limitations on border control as well as certain European regulations.

Back in April, polls suggested that the Conservatives would win in a landslide, taking dozens of additional seats in the House of Commons. The latest polling averages, however, show that their lead has narrowed to under 7 percentage points over the Labour Party from about 18 points in April.

Only the Liberal Democrats oppose Brexit and, were they to stun the country and win, might put the brakes on the process. With polls putting them at under 10 percent, that seems highly unlikely.

An open question is what happens to the ‘special relationship’ after Brexit. It will depend on who’s in charge of it.
AP Photo/Matt Dunham

What this means for the US

While it seems nearly certain that Britain will leave the European Union some time in the next few years, the choice between a “hard” or a “soft” Brexit is still up in the air. How will this choice affect the United States?

One argument is that a “hard” British withdrawal from the EU would be a good thing for America. Without a special relationship with Europe, some say, Britain may come to prize its “special relationship” with the United States even more. It may reorient both its economy and its military strategy in a more American direction.

Beyond that, the withdrawal of Britain from the EU, whether “hard” or “soft,” would finally kill the idea that the euro (which the U.K. might have eventually adopted) will someday supplant the dollar as the world’s dominant currency, good news for America’s international economic influence.

While both of these effects may be real, Brexit would also have some serious drawbacks for the United States. For one thing, many American businesses depend on the U.K. as an entryway into the European market. Britain is an English-speaking country with a similar business culture to the U.S., but one that nevertheless has full access to the EU. This will change with a hard Brexit.

American financial and legal firms with large operations in London are already preparing for Brexit, and many will likely shift at least some of their operations to the continent. Other American companies may follow, especially if Brexit is hard and results in a reimposition of trade barriers. The costs of these adjustments will, of course, be more serious for the U.K. than for the U.S., but they could nevertheless be significant for American companies.

On the currency front, while Brexit will likely reinforce the special role of the dollar, it may also weaken U.S. exports to Europe in the short run. In combination with the euro crisis, the prospect of British withdrawal has strengthened the dollar mightily against both the pound and the euro, making U.S. exports more expensive.

May with European Council President Donald Tusk at 10 Downing Street. Negotiating a breakup with Europe will be one of the toughest tasks for the next PM.
AP Photo/ Dan Kitwood

The future of Europe

Other potential problems for the U.S. transcend immediate economic concerns. Because the British government often shares the American perspective on economic and security issues, its absence from the EU will likely reduce American influence in Europe.

More seriously, Brexit could lead Scotland or Northern Ireland, both strongly pro-European, to threaten the territorial integrity of the U.K. The Scottish National Party is again calling for an independence referendum, and there are renewed demands in Northern Ireland to merge with the Irish Republic.

On the European continent itself, Brexit could threaten the cohesiveness of the EU, though this is not a likely outcome given the recent elections in France and the Netherlands in which pro-EU candidates won.

In any case, the instability that Brexit has introduced into Britain and Europe risks weakening America’s most important liberal allies in the face of resurgent threats around the world.

All of this fallout, while probably to some degree inevitable, would be exacerbated with a harder Brexit. It would also be worsened by drawn-out negotiations that extend the current uncertainty into the indefinite future.

In the final analysis, this election and its aftermath will help determine whether Britain and Europe can quickly return to the economic prosperity and stability of the recent past.

Charles Hankla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State University

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Rise of 'anti-politics' produces surprise result in the UK election – and it's playing a role in Australia, too

Theresa May’s gamble on calling an early election has not paid off.
Reuters/Toby Melville

A little over a week before the 2017 UK general election, the improbable occurred. A poll indicated that Prime Minister Theresa May could lose the Conservative majority. The shadow of a hung parliament was cast over the UK parliament again. It was a claim credible enough to the markets for the sterling to drop. Most political analysts, however, did not take it seriously.

But these are unconventional times. There is an unlikely president in the White House. No pundit predicted Brexit. And now, a Labour Party led by an “anti-politician” in Jeremy Corbyn has delivered a hung parliament.

While Theresa May will soon be on her way to Buckingham Palace to ask the Queen’s permission to form minority government, the unlikelihood of a stable coalition government means Britons may be heading back to the polls much sooner than they expected.

A win for anti-politics?

“Anti-politics” is often used to describe:

• a growing distrust of career politicians;
• hatred of partisan politics; and
• disaffection with democracy.

Among its causes is complacency in rich Western nations, as well as disinterest in institutions (especially from the young). Many see anti-politics as a tide sweeping away much that was previously taken for granted.

According to leading UK scholars, anti-politics is not a democratic de-alignment as much as the result of political realignment. In other words, it is not that we are turning off democracy – but that we are turning away from political elites and major party politics.

A recent Australian survey found righteous indignation among its citizens. This anger is directed at parties and politicians who are swayed by the quest for power and seem to break promises without impunity.

One of the significant lessons from the 2017 UK poll is that “anti-politics” voters are no longer welded on to any one party. There is growing volatility in the UK electorate. In the 1960s, less than 10% of voters changed their allegiance between elections. In yesterday’s poll it was closer to 40%.

Thanks to anti-politics, gone are the days when voters supported a political party in the way they might support the family football team.

But how then do we explain the strongest combined major party vote for two decades (Conservative 43 / Labour 40)? Does this suggest a return to two-party politics?

No, because one side – Labour – was playing anti-politics.

Corbyn’s success in context

There is no doubt that no-one expected the dramatic growth in the Labour vote. But there are two stories to tell.

First, the support for Corbyn came against economic and political convention. Labour focused on larger cities and university towns, targeting students, service industries and the public sector. It promised to end austerity, nationalise utilities, increase taxes, and invest heavily in public services. It was an anti-political appeal.

Second, the Labour vote was a big enough to hamper the Conservatives, but not much more.

Despite Labour’s celebration over approximately 30 seats, the 2017 result is only eight seats more than when it lost power in 2010. The reality is that Labour is little closer to the 60-plus seats it needs for power than it was last week. What will make this a potentially insurmountable gap is an unacknowledged divide in the UK electorate.

A deeper UK divide

Recently, UK researchers analysed the 2015 UK election results. They found that anti-politics attitudes spread across all voter groups. But what was really challenging for parties was not a traditional split along class lines, but a growing “bifurcation” in the vote of cosmopolitan and provincial England.

Cosmopolitan voters had benefited more from globalisation, were more outward-looking, pluralist and open to the EU. In contrast, those in provincial regions of economic decline were more inward-looking, illiberal, and negative toward immigration.

Perhaps there are no great surprises here. But what is interesting is that this division had real effects that challenged political parties. In other words, these shifts made it harder for larger parties to develop a platform that spans these “two Englands”.

In 2015, this resulted in cosmopolitan votes for Labour and the Greens. It saw provincial support for UKIP and an element of both for the Conservatives.

This suggests that the Conservatives’ 2015 success was due to being more adept at targeting appeals to both cosmopolitan and provisional electorates, while being more pragmatic around taking nationally consistent positions.

What happened in the 2017 general election?

While the Conservatives won 5.5% more of the vote (but lost a dozen seats), Labour won a 7% swing in cosmopolitan areas that had voted Conservative and “Remain”. While participation was up 2.6% overall (up from 66.1% in 2015), it rose by over 5% in seats Labour won.

On the back of record youth enrolment to vote, Labour surged in the youth vote in cosmopolitan areas. Meanwhile, Conservative London cosmopolitan seats changed hands, while Labour won university seats like Sheffield Hallam from the Liberal Democrats.

Yet the challenge for Labour remains. Its wins were cosmopolitan, with little progress in the provincial areas that it needs for a majority in the future.

Meanwhile, the Conservative appeal to provincial England through an emphasis on Brexit and bringing down net migration were successfully targeted at a collapsing UKIP and winning some SNP seats. But it compromised the Tories’ cosmopolitan wins from 2015.

Here lies the challenge for all large party leaders: how do they connect with prevailing moods in both cosmopolitan and provincial areas when they diverge in such opposite directions?

What might this mean for Australia?

It is not unreasonable to suggest Australia may be seeing its own version of the “bifurcation” challenge.

Australian demographer Bernard Salt has already identified a tale of two nations. And as Ken Henry recently observed, the Australian population continues to grow beyond the capacity of existing capital cities and puts pressure on economic performance and infrastructure planning. This can only contribute to “two Australias” that are divided by geography, economic opportunity and even identity.

Meanwhile, some states (hit hard by globalisation) have turned to provincial, protectionist and issue-based politicians. And, as national votes become harder to span, the notion of slim majority as mandate will become even more problematic.

Many argue that former prime minister John Howard’s ability to win traditional Labor voters was at the heart of his sustained electoral success.

However, the challenge for today’s Australian leaders is more complex than it was during the Howard era. Not only must they manage competing ideologies in their parties and span diverging nations, they must also respond to a volatile electorate that is decidedly “anti-politics”.

Brenton Prosser, Senior Fellow, Australian National University and Gerry Stoker, Fellow and Centenary Professor, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of Canberra

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

“K” word rant sparks protest

17-year-old learner has been suspended from school

By Nompendulo Ngubane
9 June 2017

Pietermaritzburg Girls’ High School parents accompanied by members of Cosatu and Nehawu outside the school on Thursday following a racists rant by a learner went viral on social media. Photo: Nompendulo Ngubane

A racist rant by a Grade 11 learner at the Pietermaritzburg Girls’ High School which went viral on social media this week has sparked widespread outrage. Some parents accompanied by members of Cosatu and Nehawu protested outside the school on Thursday.

The 17-year-old white learner, whose identity is known to GroundUp, is heard using the “K” word while referring to black learners after they allegedly misspelt her name. In a voice note, which has been making its rounds in a WhatsApp group since Sunday, the learner is heard using the “K” word twice.

She has since been suspended from school, but was allowed to write her exams at the Department of Education’s regional office. On Thursday, a learner attending the protest who asked not to be named said that her name has two dots on one of its letters. “After she realised her name was misspelled, she got angry and called black students by the ‘K’ word. The voice note went viral on Sunday and it got other students and parents angry.”

Parent protesting outside the school demanded that the school resolve the matter.

A parent, who asked not to be named, said, “We are devastated about how the school is handling the matter so far. The students are not told anything. Instead they are told to stop whining. This child is taking us back to what our forefathers fought for. The school must fix this. We can’t stand racism and no one deserves it.”

The Department of Education spokesperson Muzi Mahlambi said that the Department had taken steps in a bid to avoid incidents of this nature from recurring.

“The student will be suspended while the matter is being investigated. If the student is found out to be at fault, the school and the Department will take further steps. We cannot ignore such behaviour,” said Mahlambi.

Nehawu regional secretary Zamisile Giyane said that since the incident, the school has increased security.

“All we want is for them to fix this as this school has heavy weight in Pietermaritzburg. We respected this school so they have to clean up this mess. We will fight this until something is done,” said Giyane.

In a statement, the school’s governing body “condemned in the strongest terms” the racist language used by the learner.

“We are attending to the matter with the urgency and importance it deserves. We cannot confirm the identity of the party involved as she is a minor. Please respect this … The acting principal, a departmental official and the School Governing Body chairman have addressed all learners and staff at the school, to make it clear that action is being taken. The correct procedures and disciplinary actions are being followed. We do not tolerate racism,” it read.

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Published originally on GroundUp .

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Protests in Colombia and South Africa reveal link between inequality and popular uprisings

Ongoing anti-government demonstrations in Brazil. The Women’s March on Washington. Protesters in Morocco demanding the right to protest and dissent. Philippine citizens marching against President Rodrigo Duterte’s drug war. Hungarian rallies for freedom of information and expression.

As protests, demonstrations and clashes escalate across the world, global discontent seems to be reaching levels not seen since the fallout of the 2008-2009 financial meltdown.

What is driving this wave of popular mobilisation?

Well, inequality, at least in part. When national hopes are raised by new national opportunities and then, in certain sectors of society, dashed by ongoing structural inequality, we see popular protest break out.

Colombia and South Africa offer good examples.

Both countries have highly entrenched inequality, with class, ethnicity, and skin colour defining from birth the opportunities available to their citizens. According to the World Bank, Colombia and South Africa are among the top 10% of the world’s least equal countries.

They are also both in the midst of profound national transitions, with South Africa trying to move beyond the apartheid era and Colombia seeking peace after half a century of armed conflict.

Colombians: loud, and not afraid

Since 2012, Colombia has seen frequent, numerous protests undertaken for varying reasons by different groups. These include peasants, educators, Afro-descendants and indigenous people, coca-leaf farmers and truck drivers, among other constituencies.

This is a relatively new phenomenon for the country. Though Colombia saw its share of protests in the 1960s, the emergence of armed violence over the following decades stifled further citizen mobilisation.

Generally speaking, violence muffles and trumps moderate voices. Thanks to Colombia’s 50-year internal conflict, voices and movements not aligned with either the state or the guerrillas were weak throughout the latter half of the 20th century.

That has changed since the government demobilised Colombia’s paramilitaries in 2006 (a process that, some argue, remains incomplete) and, in late 2016, signed a peace deal with FARC guerrillas.

Today, that great limiting factor that prevented the state from realising its promises to citizens – armed conflict – has disappeared. Gone, too, are Colombians’ fear of reprisal, and their patience for the government’s inability to meet their most basic needs.

Take the city of Buenaventura as an example. For the past three weeks, this very poor port city has seen non-stop protests and a general strike, as Afro-descendants and indigenous residents renounced the discrepancy between the development of large, foreign-funded infrastructure projects and the fact that essentials, such as potable water and basic health care, remain scarce.

Buenaventura also has high levels of crime, including assassinations of citizens by armed groups, and an official unemployment rate of 18% (the national average is 8.9%).

The indignation and frustration of citizens toward the government is at least in part a response to a history of opportunism, corruption, armed violence and racial and economic inequality in Buenaventura – itself a legacy of weak institutions in Colombia’s interior regions – which has not improved with the arrival of peace.

Buenaventura is a striking case of state abandonment, but it is not alone: across the country, Afro-descendants and indigenous populations are subjected to such treatment.

Even as a recent agreement ended the protests in Buenaventura with the government promising to invest US$150 million in the community, a national strike by teachers all but shut down Colombia’s cities earlier this week. Popular discontent cannot be resolved in a day.

Signing of the Buenaventura agreement.
Jorge Idárraga, Author provided

South Africa: protest capital of the world

South Africa, with its frequent and plentiful protests, is often dubbed “the protest capital of the world”.

Apartheid, the legally enforced regime of racial separation, subjected more than 80% of the country’s population to systematic oppression for four decades. Black and mixed-race citizens regained their legal rights in 1994, but inequalities still run deep in South African society.

It should come as no surprise then that protests have increased markedly since the end of apartheid, from miners’ strikes to university student movements and marches demanding the resignation of President Jacob Zuma. Many of those marching are South Africa’s people of colour, the poor and the disenfranchised.

These recent uprisings are often referred to as “service delivery protests”, meaning that they seek to reclaim the promises of the country’s 1996 constitution regarding health, unemployment, education, roads, sanitation and housing.

But they are also driven by outrage at the state’s inability to tackle South Africa’s existing – and widening – inequalities. Most of the protests invoke the failed promise of the “rainbow nation”, which vowed to deliver a post-racial and equal society. Instead, South Africans find themselves with the remnants of a myth that has failed to deliver all the promises made: racism, poverty, opportunities and deep inequalities persist.

Frustrated aspirations

The marches taking place in Colombia and South Africa, like those in Morocco, Brazil, the Philippines, Hungary and the United States, share a key feature. They all reflect the contestation of power and citizen demand that the state fulfil the promises enshrined in the constitution.

Inequality gives fuel to this discontent, because where it is salient, social mobility is an empty promise. When citizens are – or feel – disenfranchised by virtue of their race, class, gender or geography, and they perceive an unacceptable gap between their constitutionally guaranteed rights and the real-world realisation of these rights, they get frustrated.

In polities that are in transition, such frustrations may or may not overlap with unhappiness about inadequate or failing state capacity. Effectively moving beyond apartheid and building peace are huge challenges that require not just inspirational rhetoric but a real commitment from governments. In both Colombia and South Africa, the perception that governments are coming up short will continue to dash citizens’ expectations of a better future.

Anger over truncated social mobility can be heightened by cultural globalisation. Today, the aspirations of individuals whose dreams would once have been largely limited to what they observed around them are shaped by global exposure and access.

In this sense, globalisation has been a positive force. It has supported the emergence of the indigenous rights movement, women’s rights, transnational activism and the growth of the human rights, political and environmental frameworks.

Globalisation has, in some cases, also made repression less likely, due to state obligations under international human rights treaties. With increasing integration into the globalised community, the unease and frustration of disenfranchised citizens is likely to increase.

The future of protest

If Colombia or South Africa fail to discern the ways in which inequality is driving citizens to protest and effectively respond to that discontent (as Colombia promised to do in Buenaventura), confidence in state institutions and the state itself will decrease.

That’s a recipe for more protest and, potentially, an escalation of violence.

History reminds us that groups denied adequate, institutionalised democratic participation can come to see the state as illegitimate, leading to revolt. The Syrian civil war came in the wake of protests against the Assad regime’s failure to provide water.

Prevalent inequality also damages trust and social cohesion, making unified national progress nearly impossible. If South Africa hopes to maintain its belief in a post-racial society, and if Colombia is to actually achieve reconciliation, it’s time to start truly tackling inequality.

Fabio Andres Diaz, Researcher on Conflict, Peace and Development, International Institute of Social Studies

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

J Edgar Hoover's oversteps: Why FBI directors are forbidden from getting cozy with presidents

Former FBI Director James Comey testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington.
AP Photo/Carolyn Kaster

Douglas M. Charles, Pennsylvania State University

How are U.S. presidents and FBI directors supposed to communicate?

A new FBI director has recently been nominated, former Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray. He will certainly be thinking carefully about this question as he awaits confirmation.

Former FBI Director James Comey’s relationship with President Donald Trump was strained at best. Comey was concerned that Trump had approached him on nine different occasions in two months. In his testimony to Congress, Comey stated that under President Barack Obama, he had spoken with the president only twice in three years.

Comey expressed concern about this to colleagues, and tried to distance himself from the president. He tried to tell Trump the proper procedures for communicating with the FBI. These policies have been enmeshed in Justice Department guidelines. And for good reason.

FBI historians like myself know that, since the 1970s, bureau directors try to maintain a discrete distance from the president. This tradition grew out of reforms that followed the often questionable behavior of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who served from 1924 to 1972.

Over this long period, Hoover’s relationships with six different presidents often became dangerously close, crossing ethical and legal lines. This history can help us understand Comey’s concerns about Trump and help put his testimony into larger context.

As the nation’s chief law enforcement arm, the FBI today is tasked with three main responsibilities: investigating violations of federal law, pursuing counterterrorism cases and disrupting the work of foreign intelligence operatives. Anything beyond these raises serious ethical questions.

From FDR to Nixon

When Franklin Roosevelt became president in 1933, Hoover worked hard to develop a close working relationship with the president. Roosevelt helped promote Hoover’s crime control program and expand FBI authority. Hoover grew the FBI from a small, relatively limited agency into a large and influential one. He then provided the president with information on his critics, and even some foreign intelligence, all while ingratiating himself with FDR to retain his job.

President Harry Truman didn’t much like Hoover, and thought his FBI was a potential “citizen spy system.”

Hoover found President Dwight Eisenhower to be an ideological ally with an interest in expanding FBI surveillance. This led to increased FBI use of illegal microphones and wiretaps. The president looked the other way as the FBI carried out its sometimes questionable investigations.

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and Director of FBI J. Edgar Hoover.
Wikimedia Commons/Abbie Rowe

But when John F. Kennedy became president in 1961, Hoover’s relationship with the president faced a challenge. JFK’s brother, Robert Kennedy, was made attorney general. Given JFK’s close relationship with his brother, Hoover could no longer bypass his boss and deal directly with the president, as he so often did in the past. Not seeing eye to eye with the Kennedys, Hoover cut back on volunteering political intelligence reports to the White House. Instead, he only responded to requests, while collecting information on JFK’s extramarital affairs.

By contrast, President Lyndon Johnson had a voracious appetite for FBI political intelligence reports. Under his presidency, the FBI became a direct vehicle for servicing the president’s political interests. LBJ issued an executive order exempting Hoover from mandatory retirement at the time, when the FBI director reached age 70. Owing his job to LBJ, Hoover designated a top FBI official, FBI Assistant Director Cartha “Deke” DeLoach, as the official FBI liaison to the president.

The FBI monitored the Democratic National Convention at LBJ’s request. When Johnson’s aide, Walter Jenkins, was caught soliciting gay sex in a YMCA, Deke DeLoach worked directly with the president in dealing with the backlash.

One might think that when Richard Nixon ascended to the presidency in 1968, he would have found an ally in Hoover, given their shared anti-Communism. Hoover continued to provide a wealth of political intelligence to Nixon through a formal program called INLET. However, Hoover also felt vulnerable given intensified public protest due to the Vietnam War and public focus on his actions at the FBI.

Hoover held back in using intrusive surveillance such as wiretaps, microphones and break-ins as he had in the past. He resisted Nixon’s attempts to centralize intelligence coordination in the White House, especially when Nixon asked that the FBI use intrusive surveillance to find White House leaks. Not satisfied, the Nixon administration created its own leak-stopping unit: the White House plumbers – which ended in the Watergate scandal.

Not until after Hoover’s death did Americans learn of his abuses of authority. Reform followed.

In 1976, Congress mandated a 10-year term for FBI directors. The Justice Department later issued guidelines on how the FBI director was to deal with the White House and the president, and how to conduct investigations. These guidelines have been reaffirmed, revised and reissued by subsequent attorneys general, most recently in 2009. The guidelines state, for example: “Initial communications between the Department and the White House concerning pending or contemplated criminal investigations or cases will involve only the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General.”

These rules were intended to ensure the integrity of criminal investigations, avoid political influence and protect both the Justice Department and president. If Trump attempted to bypass these guidelines and woo Comey, that would represent a potentially dangerous return to the past.

Douglas M. Charles, Associate Professor of History, Pennsylvania State University

This article was originally published on The Conversation.