Coronavirus variants, viral mutation and COVID-19 vaccines: The science you need to understand

 

The SARS-CoV-2 virus is mutating. Aitor Diago/Moment via Getty Images

The SARS-CoV-2 virus mutates fast. That’s a concern because these more transmissible variants of SARS-CoV-2 are now present in the U.S., U.K. and South Africa and other countries, and many people are wondering whether the current vaccines will protect the recipients from the virus. Furthermore, many question whether we will we be able to keep ahead of future variants of SARS-CoV-2, which will certainly arise.

In my laboratory I study the molecular structure of RNA viruses – like the one that causes COVID-19 – and how they replicate and multiply in the host. As the virus infects more people and the pandemic spreads, SARS-CoV-2 continues to evolve. This process of evolution is constant and it allows the virus to sample its environment and select changes that make it grow more efficiently. Thus, it is important to monitor viruses for such new mutations that could make them more deadly, more transmissible or both.

People wait for a COVID-19 vaccine during England’s third national lockdown to curb the spread of coronavirus. Gareth Fuller/PA Images via Getty Images

RNA viruses evolve quickly

The genetic material of all viruses is encoded in either DNA or RNA; one interesting feature of RNA viruses is that they change much more rapidly than DNA viruses. Every time they make a copy of their genes they make one or a few mistakes. This is expected to occur many times within the body of an individual who is infected with COVID-19.

One might think that making a mistake in your genetic information is bad – after all, that’s the basis for genetic diseases in humans. For an RNA virus, a single change in its genome may render it “dead.” That’s not too bad if inside an infected human cell you’re making thousands of copies and a few are no longer useful.

However, some genomes may pick up a change that is beneficial for the survival of the virus: Maybe the change allows the virus to evade an antibody – a protein that the immune system produces to catch viruses – or an antiviral drug. Another beneficial change may allow the virus to infect a different type of cell or even a different species of animal. This is likely the pathway that allowed SARS-CoV-2 to move from bats into humans.

Any change that gives the virus’s descendants a competitive growth advantage will be favored – “selected” – and begin to outgrow the original parent virus. SARS-CoV-2 is demonstrating this feature now with new variants arising that have enhanced growth properties. Understanding the nature of these changes in the genome will provide scientists with guidance to develop countermeasures. This is the classic cat-and-mouse scenario.

In an infected patient there are hundreds of millions of individual virus particles. If you were to go in and pick out one virus at a time in this patient, you would find a range of mutations or variants in the mix. It’s a question of which ones have a growth advantage – that is, which ones can evolve because they are better than the original virus. Those are the ones that are going to become successful during the pandemic.

Of the mutations that have been detected, is one of particular concern?

Any single variant or change in the virus is probably not that problematic. A single change in the spike protein – which is the region of the virus that attaches to human cells – is probably not going to be a big threat as the medical community rolls out the vaccines.

The new variant of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, B.1.1.7., was first identified in the U.K. in December. The red object is a spike protein of the coronavirus, and it interacts with the (blue) ACE2 receptor on the human cell to infect it. The mutations of the new variant are labeled, showing their position on the spike protein. Juan Gaertner/Science Photo Library via Getty Images

The current vaccines induce the immune system to produce antibodies that recognize and target the spike protein on the virus, which is essential for invading human cells. Scientists have observed the accumulation of multiple changes in the spike protein in the South African variant.

These changes allows SARS-CoV-2, for example, to attach more tightly to the ACE2 receptor and enter human cells more efficiently, according to preliminary unpublished studies. Those alterations could enable the virus to infect cells more easily and enhance its transmissibility. With multiple changes in the spike protein, the vaccines may no longer produce a strong immune response against these new variant viruses. That’s a double whammy: a less effective vaccine and a more robust virus.

Right now, the public doesn’t need to be concerned about the current vaccines. The leading vaccine manufacturers are monitoring how well their vaccines control these new variants and are ready to tweak the vaccine design to ensure that they will protect against these emerging variants. Moderna, for example, has stated that it will adjust the second or booster injection to more closely match the sequence of the South African variant. We’ll have to just wait and see, as more people receive vaccinations, whether the transmission rates will drop.

Why is lowering transmission key?

A drop in transmission rates means fewer infections. Less virus replication leads to fewer opportunities for the virus to evolve in humans. With less opportunity to mutate, the evolution of the virus slows and there is a lower risk of new variants.

The medical community needs to make a big push and get as many people vaccinated and thus protected as possible. If not, the virus will continue to grow in large numbers of people and produce new variants.

How the new variants are different

The U.K. variant, known as B.1.1.7., seems to bind more tightly to the protein receptor called ACE2, which is on the surface of human cells.

I don’t think we’ve seen clear evidence that these viruses are more pathogenic, which means more deadly. But they may be transmitted faster or more efficiently. That means that more people will be infected, which translates into more people who will be hospitalized.

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The South African variant, known as 501.V2, has multiple mutations in the gene that encodes the spike protein. These mutations help the virus evade an antibody response.

Antibodies have exquisite precision for their target, and if the target changes shape slightly, as with this variant – which virologists call an escape mutant – the antibody can no longer bind tightly, as it loses its power to protect.

Why do we need to monitor for mutations?

We want to make sure that the diagnostic tests are detecting all of the viruses. If there are mutations in the virus’s genetic material, an antibody or PCR test may not be able to detect it as efficiently or at all.

To be sure that the vaccine is going to be effective, researchers need to know if the virus is evolving and escaping the antibodies that were triggered via the vaccine.

Another reason that monitoring for new variants is important is that people who’ve been infected might be infected again if the virus has mutated and their immune system can’t recognize it and shut it down.

The best way to look for emerging variants in the population is to do random sequencing of the SARS-CoV-2 viruses from patient samples across diverse genetic backgrounds and geographical locations.

The more sequencing data researchers collect, the better vaccine developers will be able to respond in advance of major changes in the virus population. Many research centers around the U.S. and the world are ramping up their sequencing capabilities to accomplish this.

Richard Kuhn, Professor of Biological Sciences, Purdue University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

Do you see red like I see red?

 

It’s disconcerting to think the way two people perceive the world might be totally different. Mads Perch/Stone via Getty Images

Is the red I see the same as the red you see?

At first, the question seems confusing. Color is an inherent part of visual experience, as fundamental as gravity. So how could anyone see color differently than you do?

To dispense with the seemingly silly question, you can point to different objects and ask, “What color is that?” The initial consensus apparently settles the issue.

But then you might uncover troubling variability. A rug that some people call green, others call blue. A photo of a dress that some people call blue and black, others say is white and gold.

You’re confronted with an unsettling possibility. Even if we agree on the label, maybe your experience of red is different from mine and – shudder – could it correspond to my experience of green? How would we know?

Neuroscientists, including us, have tackled this age-old puzzle and are starting to come up with some answers to these questions. One thing that is becoming clear is the reason individual differences in color are so disconcerting in the first place.

Colors add meaning to what you see

Scientists often explain why people have color vision in cold, analytic terms: Color is for object recognition. And this is certainly true, but it’s not the whole story.

The color statistics of objects are not arbitrary. The parts of scenes that people choose to label (“ball,” “apple,” “tiger”) are not any random color: They are more likely to be warm colors (oranges, yellows, reds), and less likely to be cool colors (blues, greens). This is true even for artificial objects that could have been made any color.

These observations suggest that your brain can use color to help recognize objects, and might explain universal color naming patterns across languages.

But recognizing objects is not the only, or maybe even the main, job of color vision. In a recent study, neuroscientists Maryam Hasantash and Rosa Lafer-Sousa showed participants real-world stimuli illuminated by low-pressure-sodium lights – the energy-efficient yellow lighting you’ve likely encountered in a parking garage.

The eye can’t properly encode color for scenes lit by monochromatic light. Rosa Lafer-Sousa, CC BY-ND

The yellow light prevents the eye’s retina from properly encoding color. The researchers reasoned that if they temporarily knocked out this ability in their volunteers, the impairment might point to the normal function of color information.

The volunteers could still recognize objects like strawberries and oranges bathed in the eerie yellow light, implying that color isn’t critical for recognizing objects. But the fruit looked unappetizing.

Volunteers could also recognize faces – but they looked green and sick. Researchers think that’s because your expectations about normal face coloring are violated. The green appearance is a kind of error signal telling you that something’s wrong. This phenomenon is an example of how your knowledge can affect your perception. Sometimes what you know, or think you know, influences what you see.

This research builds up the idea that color isn’t so critical for telling you what stuff is but rather about its likely meaning. Color doesn’t tell you about the kind of fruit, but rather whether a piece of fruit is probably tasty. And for faces, color is literally a vital sign that helps us identify emotions like anger and embarrassment, as well as sickness, as any parent knows.

It might be color’s importance for telling us about meaning, especially in social interactions, that makes variability in color experiences between people so disconcerting.

Looking for objective, measurable colors

Another reason variability in color experience is troubling has to do with the fact that we can’t easily measure colors.

Having an objective metric of experience gets us over the quandary of subjectivity. With shape, for instance, we can measure dimensions using a ruler. Disagreements about apparent size can be settled dispassionately.

The spectral power distribution of a 25-watt incandescent lightbulb illustrates the wavelengths of light it emits. Thorseth/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

With color, we can measure proportions of different wavelengths across the rainbow. But these “spectral power distributions” do not by themselves tell us the color, even though they are the physical basis for color. A given distribution can appear different colors depending on context and assumptions about materials and lighting, as #thedress proved.

Perhaps color is a “psychobiological” property that emerges from the brain’s response to light. If so, could an objective basis for color be found not in the physics of the world but rather in the human brain’s response?

Cone cells in the eye’s retina encode messages about color vision. ttsz/iStock via Getty Images Plus

To compute color, your brain engages an extensive network of circuits in the cerebral cortex that interpret the retinal signals, taking into account context and your expectations. Can we measure the color of a stimulus by monitoring brain activity?

Your brain response to red is similar to mine

Our group used magnetoencephalography – MEG for short – to monitor the tiny magnetic fields created when nerve cells in the brain fire to communicate. We were able to classify the response to various colors using machine learning and then decode from brain activity the colors that participants saw.

So, yes, we can determine color by measuring what happens in the brain. Our results show that each color is associated with a distinct pattern of brain activity.

Researchers measured volunteers’ brain responses with magnetoencephalography (MEG) to decode what colors they saw. Bevil Conway, CC BY-ND

But are the patterns of brain response similar across people? This is a hard question to answer, because one needs a way of perfectly matching the anatomy of one brain to another, which is really tough to do. For now, we can sidestep the technical challenge by asking a related question. Does my relationship between red and orange resemble your relationship between red and orange?

The MEG experiment showed that two colors that are perceptually more similar, as assessed by how people label the colors, give rise to more similar patterns of brain activity. So your brain’s response to color will be fairly similar when you look at something light green and something dark green but quite different when looking at something yellow versus something brown. What’s more, these similarity relationships are preserved across people.

Physiological measurements are unlikely to ever resolve metaphysical questions such as “what is redness?” But the MEG results nonetheless provide some reassurance that color is a fact we can agree on.

Bevil R. Conway, Senior Investigator at the National Eye Institute, Section on Perception, Cognition, and Action, National Institutes of Health and Danny Garside, Visiting Fellow in Sensation, Cognition & Action, National Institutes of Health

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

Mbeki and Obasanjo: case studies in the use of soft power in Africa's interests

 

Former presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki share a light moment at a meeting of the G8 and developing nations in Tokyo in 2000. EFE-EPA/Michel Euler

The concept of soft power has been part of the parlance of international relations for three decades. Soft power actors use non-coercive and persuasive means to achieve their objectives. Attraction rather than force is their preferred language.

The application of soft power remains focused on states because of their primacy in international politics. But, the increasing influence of non-state actors dictates a need to review this approach. Non-state actors on the international stage include international organisations, NGOs, multinational corporations, terrorist groups and individuals.

It is against this backdrop that I studied the power of attraction of non-state actors. I focused on the soft power credentials of former African presidents – Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria, 1999-2007) and Thabo Mbeki (South Africa, 1999-2008).

The two have made important contributions to the continent this century through promoting peace, democracy, pan-Africanism and regional integration.

The study captures the essence of their soft power. It also engages how it has rubbed off on their respective countries – during and after their presidencies.

I examined Obasanjo’s and Mbeki’s traits, ideas and policies. In particular I focused on their contribution to pan-Africanism and the idea of the African Renaissance. I argue that they successfully used their soft power and international clout to make significant contributions in Africa and beyond.

Obasanjo as a soft power president

After Obasanjo’s civilian administration ended in 2007, he attracted widespread criticism within Nigeria. This is perhaps best captured by Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka’s description of him as a “master of hypocrisy”.

But, this underplays some of his accomplishments. The period between 1976 and 1979 when he was the military head of state is lauded by some as the most dynamic era of Nigeria’s foreign policy. And during his civilian administration (1999–2007) Nigeria was catapulted from a pariah state (due to gross human right abuses by successive military regimes) to a significant regional and, to a lesser extent, global player.

Thanks to Obasanjo’s idiosyncratic soft power, Nigeria, once neglected in global affairs, witnessed an influx of high profile visits, including US presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Its voice was better heard in such bodies as the Commonwealth, Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Obasanjo was notable for his courage and decisiveness, particularly when it came to colonialism and, later, apartheid. His toughness on these issues, and his promotion of regional integration, had remarkable success.

A foreign policy that embraces genuine promotion of democracy and peacemaking generates soft power.

Obasanjo enhanced his, and by extension Nigeria’s soft power through his successful peacemaking and promotion of democracy. The former, in places such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. The latter, in São Tomé and Príncipe, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire.

In Liberia, he was instrumental in ending the war. Obasanjo also facilitated the resignation of President Charles Taylor who was granted asylum in Nigeria. He played an active role in the transition to democratic rule that ushered in President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson in 2006.

In São Tomé and Príncipe, Obasanjo ensured the reinstatement of President Fradique de Menezes following a military coup in 2003.

His reformist ideas, set out in the Memorandum of Understanding of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, was adopted by the African Union summit in 2002.

The memorandum has four cornerstones. These are security, stability, development and cooperation as prerequisites for good governance on which African states would be measured.

It is thus clear that Obasanjo’s towering personality and international stature have enabled Nigeria to shape African institutions. He is thus a wielder of soft power.

Since leaving office, Obasanjo has continued to exhibit this soft power through conflict mediation and humanitarian interventions, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2008–2009) and Côte d'Ivoire (2011).

But, a number of shortfalls blot his soft power credentials. These include his unilateral decisions and apparent disdain for the rule of law while in power.

Mbeki’s legacy

Mbeki was influenced by some of Africa’s great political minds, as well as pan-African thinkers, during his years in exile in the UK.

For example, while studying at Sussex University in England in the mid-1960s, he engaged the ideas of pan-Africanist luminaries Aimé Cesaire, Frantz Fanon, Leopold Senghor and W.E.B. Du Bois. Arguably, all these individuals influenced Mbeki’s views as seen in his pursuit of pan-Africanism and African Renaissance.

Mbeki has often been labelled an “African intellectual” and “African philosopher king”. There is no gainsaying that his administration had the most impact of any post-apartheid government in international affairs – even more so than Nelson Mandela.

This was evident in his push for South-South solidarity and reform of old international institutions such as the UN Security Council. The African Union, despite its weaknesses, provided the platform for him to promote peace and security in Africa.

Exercising his soft power attribute (persuasion), Mbeki used shuttle diplomacy to garner the support of other African states, the Group of Eight and the Association of Southeast Asian States to establish the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the African Peer Review Mechanism. He was noted as a major peacemaker on the continent. This is best shown by his administration’s peacemaking and peacekeeping in Burundi, the DRC and Sudan.

Mbeki was often called upon to mediate and find lasting solutions to conflict in Africa. In 2004, the African Union asked that he proffer a political solution to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. He was actively involved in mediation to end conflicts in Comoros, Rwanda, Sudan, Eswatini and Zimbabwe.

Some of the interventions turned out to be a mere plastering of wounds as countries such as the DRC and Sudan remained fragile.

Nevertheless, Mbeki facilitated the Lusaka ceasefire agreement and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. The accords aimed to end the DRC and Burundi’s conflicts, respectively.

Indeed, the calls for Mbeki’s mediation reflect recognition of his idiosyncratic soft power.

Mbeki’s administration demonstrated remarkable commitment to provide aid to Africa. The African Renaissance Fund was established in 2000 to disburse aid to fellow African states. This offered an alternative to Western aid laced with debilitating conditions.

Mbeki continued to play a significant role after his presidency. He was appointed chair of the African Union’s efforts to bring peace to Sudan and South Sudan in 2009. This culminated in South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

The most significant factors that undermined his credibility were his quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe and HIV/AIDS denialism.

Due to their soft power resources, Obasanjo and Mbeki made their mark on pan-Africanism and conflict resolution in Africa. Their ideas remain deeply ingrained in the African Union.

Oluwaseun Tella, Senior Researcher, Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of Johannesburg

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

Trump's legacy in Africa and what to expect from Biden

 

Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari and US president Donald Trump during a press conference at the White House in 2018. Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Donald Trump was propelled to the US presidency by promising to rewrite globalisation rules. This included restricting trade when it directly hurt the US, clamping down on immigration, and reducing commitments to the global order. His administration’s “America First” foreign policy also meant disengaging from its obligations to Africa, which he infamously referred to as “shit-hole countries”.

Historically, the US foreign policy approach to Africa could be classified as benign neglect. This was characterised by a general lack of interest in the continent in the pre–World War II era. After World War II, US policy involved engaging or disengaging with individual countries, mostly defined in terms of counteracting the Soviet Union’s attempt to gain influence in the region.

A serious and sustained US–Africa engagement began under the Clinton administration. It subsequently deepened with significant bipartisan support. Indeed, the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations saw a remarkable continuity in both the Congress and the White House on the US agenda in Africa.

Africa’s share of annual US foreign assistance funding increased over the past two decades. Although US development and security aid to Africa grew, part of the increase was in support of President George W. Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched in 2003. Under President Obama US aid allocated to Africa fluctuated between $7 billion and $8 billion annually.

Trump’s election signalled a radical break with this consensus. His approach represented, in part, a return to the pre-Clinton era. Notwithstanding the administration’s rhetoric, however, Africa continued to receive roughly $7 billion in annual US aid allocations in its first three years.

US-Africa trade fell to approximately $41 billion in 2018, down from a high of $100 billion in 2008. On the whole, African countries have continued to export natural resources, such as petroleum and metals, to the US. Since 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act has been the main channel through which trade is conducted. It provides tariff-free access to 6,900 products from 39 countries.

In our paper, we show how the Trump administration’s policies affected Africa in detrimental ways.

Malign neglect of Africa

Under Trump’s administration, investment policy was driven by the push to open up markets for US goods and services. Its trade policy favoured bilateral, rather than multilateral, agreements. This shift, if sustained, could have undermined the growth of smaller countries, such as Lesotho. This is because such economies may not be of enough economic interest to the US to warrant a separate trade deal.

There were also punitive measures against countries that went against the administration’s expectations of reciprocal “free” trade. For instance, Rwanda was suspended from tariff free access to the US market after it introduced substantial duties on imports of second hand clothes. This came on the back of lobbying by second hand clothing exporters association in the US.

The administration’s largely uninterested stance may also have had detrimental effects on US foreign private investment to Africa. US foreign direct investment in Africa decreased from $50.4 billion in 2017 to $43.2 billion in 2019. This 14% decline came at a time when other countries like China were increasing their investments in the region.

The administration also crippled the capacity of the State Department and its international assistance agency by failing to fill essential positions in these agencies and through budget cuts. Such actions strained relationships and cut lines of communication.

Trump’s “Muslim” travel ban denied entry to nationals of a number of Muslim-majority countries, including several African ones. Imposed under the banner of US security, it had the effect of further reinforcing negative images of the continent as a place of insecurity and danger.

The Trump administration periodically expressed concern about the supposedly nefarious and negative impacts of Chinese engagement on the continent. Yet the impact of its own policies has been to reduce US influence in the region and further “open up the playing field” for Chinese actors.

The loss of US hegemony on the continent is evidenced by the diversifying of Africa’s foreign direct investment sources. It is also visible in shifts in its trade with key foreign partners, and increased diplomatic representation of other countries in Africa.

Biden’s administration

Joe Biden’s administration will likely result in some change and some continuity in Africa policy. Official ties are expected to become more diplomatic and certain policies – such as the so-called “Muslim travel ban” – may be reversed. But some significant questions remain as to its direction.

By and large, US policies towards Africa will likely be driven by a relatively narrow geopolitical gaze. This views the continent as a source of insecurity and site for humanitarian assistance. Combined with the scale of domestic problems arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and the perceived imperative to contain China, Africa will likely elicit only occasional strategic interest.

US focus on its national security imperatives will remain a primary policy area. New partnerships and initiatives – with Nigeria and Mozambique, for instance – are informed in large part by Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies there. The Trump administration greatly expanded the use of American air and ground strikes in hot-spots like Somalia. This is a policy that Biden is likely to continue, even if operations are scaled back somewhat.

Great power competition with China plays a significant role in US-Africa relations. The Trump administration’s “Prosper Africa” plan, meant to double US-Africa trade and investment, was presented as an American response to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”. However, Prosper Africa lacked the funding to accomplish its goals. In reality, it amounted to a coordination and consolidation of the different strands of US bureaucracy on the continent.

Biden’s administration will likely continue the existing discursive pattern of great power competition. But the focus, given his policy history, may move to revitalising multilateralism and supporting the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.

With regard to trade, the big question facing the new administration will be the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which expires in 2025. Though tariff free access retains bipartisan support, the Trump administration was in the process of moving towards bilateral engagement, as evidenced by its ongoing attempt to create a “model” free trade agreement with Kenya.

Such free trade deals would change the nature of the US-Africa trade partnership in two main ways. They would give further emphasis to reciprocal trade concessions, and would likely require further watering down or elimination of policies designed to help nascent economic sectors in African countries, particularly manufacturing.

Finally, the US-Africa relationship has been characterised by “signature” initiatives. George W. Bush’s had the President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief , Obama’s had “Power Africa” and Trump touted Prosper Africa. Biden will likely seek to continue this tradition, though exactly how remains to be seen.

Francis Owusu, Professor, Iowa State University and Padraig Carmody, Professor in Geography, Trinity College Dublin

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

South Africa mulls future of its military to make it fit-for-purpose

 

Some hard decisions need to be taken about the future of the South African National Defence Force. Nic Bothma/EFE-EPA

South Africa’s parliament has opened discussions about how to redesign the country’s lumbering military to make it fit-for-purpose for the 21st Century. To kick-start the process, a parliamentary committee charged with oversight over the military hosted a mini-symposium addressed by military leaders and experts, academics, political parties as well as civil society. Politics Editor Thabo Leshilo asked Lindy Heinecken, a military sociologist, for her insights.

Historically, a review of the country’s defence has been informed by a white paper or a defence review produced by the Ministry of Defence. What informs the parliamentary process?

The 1996 White Paper on Defence established a broad policy framework for defence in the country’s new democracy from 1994, while the 1998 Defence Review outlined the appropriate size, structure, force design and tasks of the South African National Defence Force.

But, as the force became increasingly drawn into peacekeeping and internal roles - such as fighting crime, the balance between what it is trained, funded and equipped for became misaligned.

In 2015 a new Defence Review was produced given the changes in the strategic environment, and the forces’s state of critical decline, resulting mainly from operational overstretch.

While comprehensive, the 2015 review did not specify what the design and structure of the force should look like. This was left to the politicians, military leadership and ultimately society to decide upon. Five years later, there is still no clear direction and the military continues to muddle along.

What is wrong with the military that needs fixing?

Some hard decisions need to be taken on the future of the defence force. Besides the misalignment of its resources, design, equipment and its additional roles, the military has also been hobbled by misappropriation of funds.

The National Treasury highlighted in a briefing to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence that growing personnel expenditure was the main issue incapacitating the defence force, leaving little money for capital and operational expenditure. This has left the military with ageing equipment, and hardly any funds for maintenance. Meanwhile, the deployment of the military has increased substantially, both internal and externally.

The over expenditure on personnel stems from imbalances in the force design and structure. Over time, instead of having 40% personnel in the short term service (2-5yrs), 40 % in the medium term service (up to age 45yrs), an only 20% in the long term service (until 60yrs), 87% of the regular force personnel ended up serving on medium to extended long-term tenures.

This, together with the failure to implement effective personnel exit mechanisms, has led to deviation from the ideal situation of expenditure being 40% on personnel, 30% on capital, and 30% on operations. Personnel costs are now reportedly almost 80% of the defence budget.

Added to this, personnel expenditure has been driven up to unsustainable levels by increases in pay and benefits that have not been budgeted for, rank inflation and the stagnation of junior and middle ranking personnel. This means that people sit in posts for long periods at the top of their scale, or end up being promoted to a higher rank, beyond the post profile. Other anomalies are a high ratio of general officers and a failure to rightsize the forces in accordance with mission demands. These problems are eroding the defence force’s capital and operating budget.

There is a pressing need for the military to address its human resource management systems.

Going forward, this means accelerating the exit of unfit, overage, unhealthy and supernumerary personnel over the short to medium term. The longer term should see the military shedding all overage personnel, reversing rank inflation and rebalancing the force. This means looking at the ratio of officers to other ranks, and the ratio of support to combat personnel.

This is a difficult political decision. It entails putting former soldiers out onto the streets, with little other than military skills, making it hard for them to get jobs.

More attention needs to be paid to exit mechanisms for the short and medium terms in order to prepare them for a second career. Another problem is that there are not enough young people transferring from the full-time forces into part-time and reserve forces. This affects both the numerical and functional flexibility of the military in times of crises, when it suddenly needs extra personnel, such as during the Covid-19 crisis.

Why is there need for national consensus on the military?

Before the military can address these challenges, there is a need to reach national consensus on what type of defence force the country wants. At present there is a chasm between what the military leadership believes it should be doing, according to the constitution, what the government and politicians demand, and what the public considers important.

Transformation cannot happen without a clear understanding of the military’s future role. Without this, military leadership cannot design, plan, or train personnel for their future roles and missions.

The defence force cannot fulfil its obligations within the current organisational and budgetary constraints.

What should the future military look like?

The defence force is caught in a time warp. It still operates with a mindset and equipment geared for the 20th Century. It has not made the transition into the 21st Century in terms of how to combat future threats, and the use of technology as a force enabler and multiplier. Many tasks, like intelligence gathering and surveillance, can now be done by unmanned aerial vehicles, which are cost effective. But, there is no money for these.

Any restructuring should consider what the future military should look like. But right now, some pressing decisions need to be taken on whether to shut down the military, or channel it towards more pressing issues that affect the safety and security of the country’s citizens.

Given the current budgetary constraints, scaling down to playing only a developmental role is possibly the way to go. This means focusing only on border and maritime security, disaster relief and public order functions.

At the same time, there must be capacity to respond to other pressing geo-strategic security concerns unfolding on the country’s borders, and beyond, that may require a military response.

Does the country have the money to afford the military it needs?

The simple answer is “no”. But, the reality is that there needs to be a balance between the agreed mandate and budget. Within the current context, the mandate is budget driven, not the other way round, unless the security dynamics change dramatically. It is like taking a risk with an insurance policy, what to secure and what not.

Another way to cut costs is to reduce personnel expenditure to fit sustainably into a smaller funding allocation. This is a difficult political decision, but preferable to the military sliding into further decline.

The current impasse makes it the perfect time to march the defence force in a new direction in accordance with what the country needs, can afford, and deliver. Now, more than ever before, robust debate is needed on the future of South Africa’s military.

Lindy Heinecken, Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

 

 

Read this article  - WHAT A DIFFERENCE TWENTY YEARS HAVE MADE

 http://dillydee.blogspot.com/2014/05/south-africa-what-difference-twenty.html