South Africa’s white right, the Alt-Right and the alternative

South Africa’s far right never had a big support base, even under apartheid.
Kim Ludbrook/EPA

There has been a global rise in populism, especially of the right wing variety. In South Africa this has manifested in the increasingly strident Afriforum. This pressure group purports to advance the rights of Afrikaners, the ethnic group most closely identified with the former apartheid regime.

The prime ministers and presidents who ran the country from 1948 until 1994 were all Afrikaners.

Afriforum is usually ignored outside of Afrikaner ranks. But it attracted the ire of South Africans more broadly when two of its leaders, CEO Kallie Kriel and his deputy Ernst Roets, undertook a mission to the US in May this year. Their aim was to convince alt-right figures that white farmers were being targeted for murder.

Afriforum’s Ernst Roets on Fox News.

Roets even secured an interview with Fox News’s Tucker Carlson. The interview on the right wing broadcaster apparently inspired US President Donald Trump to tweet that his administration will investigate the “large scale killing of (white) farmers” in South Africa.

Afriforum calls itself a “civil rights organisation”. Until recently its primary approach was to use the country’s human rights based constitution to launch court cases in defence of white Afrikaans speakers and, at times, of black people amenable to its agenda.

But it has since become the face of white denial about the past, and of defiance of the need for redress in the most unequal country in the world. Afriforum has successfully translated a growing resentment about the loss of Afrikaner control of the state into a political project.

State capture

During the last decade of the country’s 24-year-old democracy a form of Schadenfreude has emerged among white rightwingers. State capture, in the shape of massive corruption, and factional infighting in the governing African National Congress (ANC) have harmed state capacity. Multiple political, economic and constitutional crises have in the minds of white rightwingers confirmed their racist narrative that “black people can’t govern”.

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Read more:
How the law can help change racist minds in South Africa

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An increase in public expressions and incidents of racism suggests a return to an intransigence that’s unapologetic about continuing white privilege and colonial and apartheid abuses. A more antagonistic Afriforum stepped into this moment rife with political opportunity.

Its politics is a cunning combination of Afrikaner nationalist mobilisation from the past with contemporary neoliberal elements and alt-right rhetoric from the US, Australia and Europe. Afriforum is part of the Groter Solidariteit-beweging (Greater Solidarity movement) that includes a trade union, a media house and companies selling education and other services.

According to Solidariteit, its movement has 350,000 members – sizeable in relation to a white population of 4.52 million. Solidariteit and Afriforum are the 21st century versions of the cultural entrepreneurs of the volksbeweging (people’s movement) that constructed and advanced the Afrikaner’s identity a century ago.

This movement, which included Soldariteit’s earlier manifestation as the whites-only Mineworkers’ Union (MWU), rose to state power in 1948 on the back of the promise of an expanded form of colonialism named apartheid.

Class alliance crumbled

Upward mobility due to apartheid benefits caused the Afrikaner nationalist class alliance to split between the middle class verligtes ( “the progressives”) and the working class verkramptes (“the reactionaries”). Verligte reform of apartheid to suit the changing operation of capitalism was detrimental for remaining Afrikaner workers.

It resulted in the formation of the Conservative Party (CP) in 1982. At the referendum 10 years later the verkramptes voted against the continuation of talks for the establishment of a non-racist, non-sexist democracy.

Afriforum hails from this political tradition. Not only is its parent organisation the former Mineworkers’ Union, but the same names appear. For example, Kriel was a youth leader of the Freedom Front Plus, a party that continues the CP legacy with four seats in parliament.

Afriforum is a political expression of what I call neo-Afrikaner enclave nationalism. This is a post-apartheid phenomenon that combines an “inward migration” to white spaces (suburbs, institutions, media) with connectedness to global whiteness. In their discourses racism is recast as “culture”, and heteropatriarchy as “family values”.

It’s channelled through the consumption of products. Individuals become Afrikaners by being consumers of Afrikaner culture, media products and related services, and spaces.

In a historic irony, democracy has brought together what apartheid rent apart. Verligtes and verkramptes meet each other under the sign of the market. Afrikaner identity becomes enacted through consumption.

Enclave nationalists

The tradition that the enclave nationalists draw on has historically only represented about 30% of white people, judging by the CP’s support and the “no” vote of the 1992 referendum. Solidariteit, Afriforum and their verligte media allies are eager to expand their constituencies.

Alt-right rhetorical devices are employed. Prejudice, half-truths and distortions are combined with insults and threats of violence. For example, in a 31-minute late night monologue on YouTube Roets attacked law professor Elmien du Plessis for criticising Afriforum’s US visit.

He concluded by quoting Jewish writer Victor Klemperer, who wrote that if the tables were turned after the Holocaust he,

would have all the intellectuals strung up, and the professors three feet higher than the rest.

It’s relevant to mention that Du Plessis is a white Afrikaans-speaking woman. As other examples also show, the ranks of patriarchal whiteness are again closing in defiance of racial and gender justice. The policing of the boundaries of the Afrikaner identity has been stepped up.

As happened during apartheid, alternative voices are delegitimised. Afriforum and its allies actively seek to suppress positions that contradict theirs. Gauging the extent of dissidence among Afrikaans-speaking whites is difficult. Many no longer identify as Afrikaners. Many are getting on with their contributions to make South Africa’s democracy work.

Most would be loathe to organise as Afrikaners. But, given responses that show that many among their compatriots and in the outside world see the white right as representative of all white Afrikaans-speakers, the time may have come for those in support of justice and equality to be more vocal in keeping the record straight.

Christi van der Westhuizen, Associate Professor, Sociology, University of Pretoria

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

Land reform debate: what's missing according to South African farmers

Land is a contentious and emotive issue.
Jon Hrusa/EPA

Land reform remains one of South Africa’s most pressing unresolved issues. Attempts to address skewed ownership and economic participation patterns, the result of many years of exclusion and dispossession of black South Africans, have been unsuccessful since 1994. The present government has now turned to possible changes to the Constitution to deal with these failures.

But recent public hearings into these possible changes have highlighted the importance of understanding identity and relationships between groups – not just economics or material wealth – for resolving sensitive issues such as these. The hearings show that fixing the problem of land reform isn’t as simple as dealing with legal necessities, or simply parcelling out land to new owners.

Land reform is much more complex because it involves issues of identities and intergroup relations, as my recent study of agricultural land owners’ views shows. The study is based on extensive interviews conducted with 40 land owners in the Limpopo province of South Africa.

I found that land owners don’t see land as only of economic value. It carried deep symbolic value too. Land (and the ability to own and develop it) is closely related to owners’ identities and their sense of belonging.

The study also showed that land owners were critical of reform initiatives that seem to be motivated by what they perceived to be political agendas rather than agricultural ones. They thought differently about land reform when they believed they were perceived as “farmers” rather than just as representatives of a race.

Land owners, the study revealed, can see the potential of reform for establishing lasting relationships. This suggests that the solution to land reform in South Africa lies in relationships between groups, not just in dividing up material goods. What is more, owners appeared more willing to try reform at a community level than at a level where government officials are involved. This was because people depended on each other in communities.

A final important finding was that land owners felt the current debate portrayed them as being opposed to reform rather than cooperative. This interpretation arises partly from landowners’ own prejudices (this includes racial, class and ideological prejudices) and partly from the way in which certain land reform narratives are publicly constructed.

The research

Unfortunately much of the current discussion about land reform is conducted in ways that suggests only winners and losers, “us and them”, inclusion and exclusion. For example, talk about “returning the land to our people” can unintentionally imply that those who currently own land are not “our people”.

There is probably no single formula that will transform the entire debate, but there are a few things everyone can do. And they are not only the responsibility of political leaders.

First, the public discussion needs to make land reform a South African problem rather than a racial problem. People have shown that it is possible to adopt more inclusive identities when there is a shared dedication to such an identity. The way in which South Africans of all backgrounds rallied around the 1995 Rugby World Cup winning team bears witness to this. This is an example of people uniting behind an overarching identities.

Second, the discussion should emphasise that the solution will come when people depend on each other. Research has shown that if competing groups face problems that have dire consequences for all of them (and all acknowledge these consequences), and if the solution lies in cooperation, conflicting social identities matter less.

Shifting the debate

Some may argue that these suggestions are naïve. They may be correct. But the debate can’t continue in the same old way. Something has to change in the interests of future generations of South Africans.

The conflict associated with land reform will not be addressed by simply redistributing land according to whatever targets are chosen. If reform disregards how South Africans relate to each other in terms of their social identities, the underlying conflict will remain long after any reform process is concluded.

Gert Young, PhD graduate at the Department of Political Science; Senior Advisor: Higher Education, Stellenbosch University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

South Africa's ruling ANC can no longer count on union ally to win elections

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa addressing the 13th Cosatu conference.
Sowetan/Thulani Mbele

South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), may have to fight next year’s general election without hundreds of thousands of votes which its trade union ally has delivered in the past. This isn’t because its alliance partner won’t organise votes for the ANC but because it can’t.

The ANC’s union ally, the Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu), held its conference recently. In a now familiar ritual, it suggested it might not support the ANC next year. It then declared it would – but would expect policy concessions in exchange for support.

No-one except a few reporters looking for material took this seriously. Cosatu regularly insists that its support for the ANC is conditional on the governing party adopting union-friendly policies. But, having stamped its foot, it always supports the ANC. This was so when the ANC was run by former President Jacob Zuma, who many in Cosatu opposed . It’s likely to be even more so now that it is led by President Cyril Ramaphosa, a former Cosatu unionist for whom it campaigned at last year’s ANC conference, and who received a rousing welcome when he addressed the latest conference.

A useful past

Union support at election time has, since the end of apartheid in 1994, been a huge asset for the ANC.

For some years after democracy’s advent, unions were the most organised force in South Africa. Cosatu, as the largest union federation, would use its organisation to mobilise its members – over 2 million at its peak – and their families to support the ANC. No one is sure how many votes it got out for the ANC but it may well have run into millions. In theory, Cosatu backing it next year means that the ANC can rely on those votes again.

Again in theory, this would not only help the ANC to a comfortable majority. It would cement the implied bargain which has governed relations between the ANC and Cosatu since 1994. Its terms are that Cosatu would, despite complaining, allow the ANC to set economic policy as long as the ANC allowed it a veto over labour law changes. Cosatu would also continue campaigning for the ANC as long as the implied bargain held firm. A byproduct was that some Cosatu leaders would end up in parliament and government on the ANC ticket.

But in practice, both the votes which Cosatu mobilised and the implied bargain are in danger.

A deeper malaise

On the first score, Cosatu is no longer the organisational hub it was when it mobilised the ANC vote. Its membership has dropped to 1.6 million.

Part of the reason is that it expelled its biggest union, the National Union of Metalworkers of SA, which has over 300 000 members. This prompted other splits and the formation of a rival Federation of SA Trade Unions, which has cost Cosatu members. Another reason is the constant loss of jobs in the smokestack industries which used to be Cosatu’s stronghold.

But the membership loss is also a symptom of a deeper malaise. The past few years have seen a weakening of the union movement as the gap between leaders and members has widened, and unions’ ability to mobilise members has declined.

The weakening of the union movement also reflects the country’s economic growth path: the gap between insiders who can enjoy the economy’s benefit and outsiders who can’t has remained. Union leaders have been absorbed into the insiders, leaving their members outside.

This doesn’t mean the end of strike action. Union members feel the economic pinch and so they need wage increases. They still enjoy the power to down tools to push for them. But it does mean the virtual collapse of unions’ ability to mobilise members behind campaigns. A general strike called by Cosatu in 2017 to protest against an unpopular ANC leadership was a flop as union members ignored the call.

Inevitably, Cosatu’s ability to mobilise voters on the ANC’s behalf has also declined. This must have been a factor in the ANC’s electoral setback in 2014 in Gauteng, the economy’s heartland, and in its countrywide decline in the 2016 local elections.

It may well mean that, while Ramaphosa is far more popular among voters than Zuma, the ANC will not reap as many rewards at the polls from the change of leadership as it expected. It may also mean that, since the ANC has no source of organisation which can replace Cosatu, it may never be able to recover much of the electoral ground it has lost and may face continued decline once the post-Zuma effect wears off. Cosatu’s decline could change South Africa’s electoral map.

Reduced bargaining power

So, while the national debate often assumes that unions are no longer politically important, Cosatu’s decline may be exerting a major impact on politics by making it much harder for the ANC to retain support.

If this is bad news for the ANC, it may signal further declines in Cosatu’s influence. While its alliance with the ANC is partly the product of a shared history, the ANC’s incentive to preserve Cosatu’s labour law veto has declined because it can no longer deliver millions of votes.

It may be no accident that laws limiting the right to strike are before Parliament. Whatever the merits of these changes, they do mean that the implied bargain is no longer operating fully because they reduce union bargaining power.

So the question is not whether Cosatu will help the ANC win elections, but whether it still can. The signs suggest it cannot – to its own and the ANC’s cost.

Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of Johannesburg

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

ANC STATEMENT ON PETROL PRICE INCREASES - YOU DECIDE

Here is an article "Petrol price increase “indefensible”: ANC" published by Inside-Politics.org during September 2012 regarding some of the ANC statements on petrol increases, unemployment and more. 

“The ill-considered and uncaring decision to increase the petrol price only confirms the NP government does not have the interests of the majority of South Africans, who are poor and struggling desperately to make ends meet, at heart. If the government persists in pressing ahead with these indefensible price hikes, they will be inviting a similar reaction to that when VAT was increased. Now is the time for them to establish the tradition of a government that cares for and consults with its citizens”. [16 September 1993; ANC Statement; “ANC demands suspension of petrol price increase”]

 “The situation is desperate and requires urgent attention from a strong government willing to give strong leadership. The National Party has failed to give this leadership and has led the country into its most severe economic crisis. They have no plan to create jobs and curb unemployment and they will not admit that this is the main cause of the crime and violence which is wrecking our homes, our neighbourhoods and our country. The NP government does not take responsibility and has no plan”. [April 1994; “Speakers notes for election speech on Jobs”]

 “The NP advertises that its record shows it is “fit to govern”. That claim has been finally contradicted from inside the heart of the NP Government itself – witness yesterday’s annual report from the state Auditor General. It catalogues a spending spree, in which the Public Service dissipated taxpayers’ money irregularly:

• State Departments spent R155.7 million during the year on unauthorized transactions.
• The Public Works Department alone spent an unauthorized R 154 million over the past 4 years, and further sums were spent by the SADF and the Departments of Health and of Population.
• The SADF’s R474 million Special Defence Account had “material deficiencies, and fell short of required standards”.

• R31 million allegedly ‘invested in covert projects is now irrecoverable.
So much for the official record of the National Party’s competence in government. It is a record devoid of any sense of responsibility towards the taxpayers, and of total inability to manage matters competently. Our money has been squandered recklessly, mismanaged, misappropriated and misspent. It is time for a change – not just of direction but especially of management!” [8 March 1994; ANC Statement; “Mismanagement of the Nations funds”]

“Privatisation of telecommunications networks in any form is not acceptable to the ANC. We would oppose this privatisation even if it had been conducted openly and the best price secured. The secrecy of this deal leaves a host of unanswered questions in addition to the amount Vodacom paid. Who authorized this sale? Did it go Cabinet? What precedent does it set for future dealings with public assets? The whole process lacks the transparency essential to Government dealings. The precedent now set for cellular mobile phones are deeply disturbing. The Government cannot privatize mobile services and lock South Africa into the World’s most sophisticated telecommunications technology, with a bill in excess of R3,5 billion, when the South African people need schools, housing, water, health services and basic telephones”. [13 September 1993; ANC Statement; “Mobile network giveaway starts privatization process”]

“The Beeld newspaper report that at least 50 people have died in government hospitals apparently because of inadequate trauma facilities makes disturbing reading. Possibly more have died or are in danger. The crisis in health care needs to be addressed urgently, especially during this period of transition. Our public sector services are disorganised, overcrowded, and not able to cope with this crisis. We find it totally unacceptable that a health system that is supposed to be saving lives is not fulfilling this responsibility. Part of the problem is the disorganisation within the public sector. Because of lack of proper planning, patients in need of urgent care are kept waiting for too long. However, the hospital sector cannot be looked at in isolation, as the entire system needs to be reviewed. A strong foundation needs to be built at primary level to reduce the burden on tertiary facilities, and planning must be tailored to meet the needs of all the people of South Africa. It has to be structured with proper consultation with all relevant roleplayers. The ANC calls for a further investigation and urgent action with regard to this crisis. Unless urgent steps are taken now, the entire health system is in danger of collapsing”. [27 August 1993; ANC Statement; “Latest deaths in state hospitals”]

“With this forecast on the impact of Aids in the future, there is no doubt that drastic action must be taken now, to prevent the disastrous implications. Despite these serious consequences, the National Party government spends less per capita on aids than other countries in the world with comparable or lower GNP’s. There must be stronger political commitment during this transition period and in the future to combat this deadly disease”. [1 December 1993; ANC Statement; “World Aids Day”]

“Members of the SAP have to endure terrible working conditions, lack of adequate training and the poor salaries.” [25 August 1993; ANC Statement; “The demands of POPCRU”]

 Source

For more on the petrol price escalation read the story published by BUSINESS INSIDER

South Africa won't become less violent until it's more equal

South African police on patrol in Hout Bay, Cape Town, following requests for more intervention by locals.
EPA-EFE/Nic Bothma

The release of crime statistics in South Africa always triggers great angst among ordinary citizens, and obfuscation on the part of the South African authorities. This year was no exception.

In their latest release of crime statistics, the South African Police Service seem to have tried to downplay crime rate increases (and exaggerate crime rate decreases), by using the wrong population estimates. The police incorrectly used the June 2018 population estimates in their analysis of the 2017/18 crime rates. This is not the first time they have made this kind of bungle.

But their motivation is clear. Applying the correct population estimates suggests that the country saw the biggest per capita annual murder rate increase since 1994. Last year’s figures suggested that the murder rate had stabilised. But these were unfounded, as the murder rate has now risen to 36 per 100,000. The last time it was this high was in 2009. The increase is cause for serious concern.

Even the new minister of police Bheki Cele expressed shock at the numbers, describing South Africa as being close to a “war zone”. He admitted that the country’s police force “dropped the ball”.

South Africa’s annual murder rate per 100,000.
Author supplied

A logical response might be that there is a need for more policing. According to Cele:

We have lost the UN norm of policing which says one policeman to 220 citizens. One police officer is now looking at almost double that.

But this isn’t the answer. A sensible response to South Africa’s rising crime rates would be twofold: a problem-solving approach that would require a close analysis of what’s causing crime to rise in a given area. Then they’d need to devise a plan that takes into account all the contributory factors – and involves everyone affected in addressing it.

And, secondly, the country’s leaders must address inequality. South Africa is a highly unequal society. It has one of the highest gini-co-efficients (a measure of inequality) in the world. Research shows that inequality and crime go hand in hand.

The question of police numbers

Police leaders reported that their staff numbers have gone down by 10,000 since 2010. They argued that they had 62,000 fewer police than were needed.

Police agencies all over the world often claim that, to reduce crime, they need bigger budgets and more officers. But the evidence that these two things automatically lead to more effective crime prevention is far from clear.

Take the issue of police numbers. Short-term and extreme spikes in police numbers (such as in response to terrorist threats) do seem to reduce crime. But a review of a number of studies on the relationship between policing levels and crime rates suggested that the impact of more police is generally small. The paper also noted that part of the problem was that there have been few rigorous experiments on, for example, extra police resources being allocated randomly.

Bigger budgets also have mixed outcomes. This is because, very often, a significant proportion of spending on police is ineffectual. Police resources often aren’t targeted, even though there’s evidence that doing so produces good results.

This isn’t hard to do: crime is highly concentrated in hot spots that are often surprisingly small and quite stable over time. With the right focus, resources could be directed to these areas. But mostly they aren’t.

Targeted approach

What works best is a problem-solving approach. This involves focusing narrowly on understanding specific crime problems in specific places, and using not only police but drawing on the knowledge and resources of all parties, including other government departments and local communities.

For example, particular factors might be contributing to a spike in robberies in a particular area. These could include a large cohort of bored young people in the community, paths that are fertile ground for attacks because they are dark and overgrown, or unlit parks near a derelict building.

More police patrols wouldn’t necessarily be the best solution. The underlying problems would need to be addressed. This might include creating a partnership between property owners, the agencies in charge of parks and lighting administration, schools and parents, and the communities that use the spaces.

One concern with a targeted approach is that crime is simply pushed elsewhere. But evidence suggests that the displacement effect is usually limited and that, in fact, nearby areas often enjoy a diffusion of benefits.

Inequality

There’s a more fundamental problem that needs to be solved on a national scale before South Africa’s crime levels can be reduced: inequality.

Research shows that inequality is arguably the single best predictor of whether a country will experience high or low levels of crime and violence. Inequality

• makes property crime more attractive and profitable;
• drives frustration, hostility and hopelessness; and,
• undermines trust, community engagement and the functioning of social and institutional structures.

South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world.

Where to from here

Murder levels nationally have been at about this level or higher (above 30 per 100,000, which is considered very high by global standards) since at least the 1970s. High levels of violence are not a matter of police resources. They are a structural feature of this society.

This is not to say that the police are blameless. Among other things they should be doing more to solve cases. But addressing the key drivers of crime and violence requires that South Africa builds a much larger social partnership. It has no hope of becoming a fundamentally less violent country until it becomes a more equal one.

Anine Kriegler, Researcher and Doctoral Candidate in Criminology, University of Cape Town

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.