Bestiality and BS: Lessons from South Africa's sleazy political climate

South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa unwittingly fell for an old trick used to discredit politicians.
GCIS

There is a famous polling story, commonly attributed to US President Lyndon B. Johnson. Attacking his rival in Texas, where the vote was close, Johnson used the sucker-punch tactic. As re-told by famous American journalist Hunter S Thompson,

The race was close and Johnson was getting worried. Finally he told his campaign manager to start a massive rumour campaign about his opponent’s life-long habit of enjoying carnal knowledge of his own barnyard sows.
“Christ, we can’t get a way calling him a pig-fucker,” the campaign manager protested. “Nobody’s going to believe a thing like that.

I know, Johnson replied. But let’s make the sonofabitch deny it.

South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa just fell for the same trick, albeit a more mundane: "he sleeps around (with humans)”. Whether it was apartheid era “stratkom” style dirty trick at work or the usual dirty game of electioneering, Ramaphosa was forced onto the back foot.

Instead of ignoring or laughing at the claims, he went to court to prevent a Sunday paper from publishing. Then he engaged the issue and revealed a long-past affair of little interest to anyone. How did his advisers think this necessary in the sleazy moral climate created by Jacob Zuma’s ANC?

The challenge for voters is that there are multiple election-related battles happening simultaneously within the ANC. There is a fight for the post-Zuma leadership, fairly obviously.

But there is also Zuma’s own fight for safety from prosecution for alleged fraud, money laundering, corruption and racketeering once he steps down. His chosen candidate – Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma – isn’t attractive to voters, according to polls. The one attribute she can play on is the mantra “we need a woman as president”. That explains why Ramaphosa was attacked as a wife-beater, and when that didn’t stick, as a sequential blesser (sugar daddy).

What the polls say

Leadership polls in the public domain – of all voters, not just ANC voters – suggest that this election is Ramaphosa’s to lose. Among potential voters from all parties, he has overtaken the main opposition Democratic Alliance’s Mmusi Maimane, to lead Dlamini-Zuma by a considerable margin. Dlamini-Zuma seems to be on an ineluctably downward spiral, matched only by her ex-husband. Her campaign urgently needs an injection. Becoming an MP and presumably thereafter a minister is part of the attempt to do just that, as will the rumoured appointment as Higher Education Minister and bestower of more or less free education for all, if it occurs.

But the problem is Ramaphosa. If Dlamini-Zuma needs a bounce, he needs his bubble burst. The ANC’s mid-year policy conference, which begun with Zuma proxies’ braggadocio, gave Ramaphosa a major bounce in the polls to the point where he is on a continued upward trend. The party’s December elective conference is suddenly very close. A repeat performance would secure Ramaphosa’s position; and leave current president Zuma looking very fragile indeed. Cue the smears.

If Dlamini-Zuma remains burdened by “that” name – and focus groups make it clear that the name is a curse, not a blessing – then attacking Ramaphosa for philandering and beating his wife is meant to take the gloss off his campaign and, crucially, influence women voters. Who wants a(nother) president who cheats on his wife? Who wants a president who apparently beat a former wife (despite her strenuous denials)? These are all intended to dent Ramaphosa’s appeal to women voters. Above all, their aim is to reinforce the “we need a woman president” mantra – which is the central and only message of the Dlamini-Zuma campaign.

The 2019 national elections

All this is being fought out in the ANC, even if simultaneously in the full glare of a willing media. But the ANC nowadays is merely a player in the game – a big one, but most certainly not too big to fail.

There is still, in 2019, the real national election where South African citizens go to vote. This may be Zuma’s major miscalculation. All evidence suggests that the national leadership have not learned the lesson of the 2016 municipal elections, which is core to all polling: do not take your voters for granted.

The ANC has failed to find its mythical reset G-spot, and its post-election post-mortem seems to have found nothing needed correcting barring the removal of some peskily ethical ministers. The #Guptaleaks – the thousands of leaked emails exposing the extent of the powerful Gupta family’s capture of the state – and the cabinet re-shuffling plus simple cravenness of the entire ANC project, have worsened since 2016.

The ANC is still the “mothership” – the famous liberation party, settled deep in the heart and subconscious of many South Africans. But the same lovers of history are judging the present, and will vote accordingly. They did so in 2016. The warning seems to have passed unheeded.

The cloak and dagger cleverness being unleashed by all sides in the ANC struggle assumes one thing – that the party will win in 2019. Polls suggest that at the moment, the ANC remains the majority party. But that is voter sentiment right now – it does not measure voter intention in 2019. Moreover, winning and being a majority party are very different – just ask the ANC in Johannesburg post-2016, for example. A recent IPSOS poll found the following:

Ipsos

Nice guys don’t win

Maimane’s coy slip of his own poll – that the ANC was polling below 50% – may represent a 2016-2018 downward trend. If that happens attacks on Ramaphosa will come from the main opposition DA as well. This doesn’t mean the DA will win. Maimane neatly said nothing of how his party was faring – but the messy business of bartering their way to provincial power via unshaky coalitions may be the future for an ANC that has truly toppled itself from the moral high ground.

Ramaphosa is clearly trying to chart a more moral and honest path than his predecessor. Where Zuma faced a rape trial and repeated evidence of infidelity, Ramaphosa initially fell for the sucker-punch (hence the failed interdict against The Sunday Independent) and then took the route of quiet dignity.

If Ramaphosa can lose that initial twitchiness, maintain the dignity, but toughen up for far worse muck that will be thrown at him, the country’s most famous buffalo farmer may yet prevail.

David Everatt, Head of Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Gordhan urges South Africans to be informed about Eskom

Simple booklet explaining Eskom Inquiry has been published

By William Yoder
13 September 2017

On Tuesday evening, the University of Cape Town Graduate School of Business hosted a public talk on Eskom and state capture and launched a booklet – Eskom Inquiry Reference Book – a simply written booklet on Parliament’s public enterprise inquiry for use by civil society, journalists and citizens. The speakers were Professor Anton Eberhard of UCT’s Graduate School of Business and Pravin Gordhan, former Minister of Finance. The event was attended by about 200 people.

Gordhan spoke first. “If we put it bluntly, this is part of a story of R150 to R200 billion disappearing from our financial system” over the past three years, he said.

Gordhan said people need to be aware of the extent of the issue as the “cost is not to the middle class but to the poor”.

Both Gordhan and Eberhard referred to allegations of collaboration between the Zuma administration and the Gupta family. Eberhard said, “Eskom is now in trouble. Its revenues are stagnant, its costs are rising, and its debts need to be financed.”

Eberhard said: “The arguments for breaking up Eskom are becoming powerful.”

Referring to the booklet authored by Eberhard and Catrina Godinho, Gordhan said it is crucial that an informed South African public send the message that “you can’t get away with stealing all your life. One day, you will be held to account”.

“There is a whole industry masking the truth from South Africans,” said Gordhan, referring to fake news articles and twitter accounts dedicated to the denial of Eskom corruption.

Both speakers expressed hope that Parliament will begin to hold to account Eskom and those attempting to capture state assets.

Parliament’s inquiry into public enterprises has been postponed until October. Gordhan said the delays are unfortunate but people should not immediately condemn the inquiry.

---

Published originally on GroundUp .

---

Parliament in court over its high paid bouncers

New elite security team displaces long-serving parliamentary protection officers

By Moira Levy
13 September 2017

Security dressed in white shirts remove EFF Members of Parliament from the National Assembly at the State of the Nation Address in February 2017. Photo: Screen capture from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M2ZBq408C2I">video</a> by Branko Brkic

A protracted case to be heard by the Labour Court reveals that Parliament now requires its “Chamber Support Officers” (CSOs) to be skilled in crowd control and public order policing. This is an entirely new role for the Parliamentary Protection Service (PPS). It confirms that the South African Police Service (SAPS) is now expected to perform an “assertive” and “proactive” role in the legislature.

Not only does this introduce a new policing style in the institution which implies a significant shift in the culture of the “People’s Parliament”, but it also leaves long-serving parliamentary protection officers feeling marginalised and discriminated against.

In its court papers, Parliament has stated that it requires its CSOs to be sourced from SAPS so that they are able to “undertake physical intervention” when necessary. In this sense, they perform a different role to Parliament’s “general protection officers” who are required to act “passively” in the House or on off-precinct duties.

A total of 72 applicants represented by Bagraim attorneys, all members of the PPS including some who have served Parliament for up to 25 years, lodged a complaint with the Labour Court arguing that they earn less and work longer hours than the recently appointed CSOs, who have no experience of Parliament at all.

They describe the disparity in earnings between the old and new protection staff as “capricious” and “arbitrary” wage discrimination. The long-standing protection officers are claiming that in terms of the Employment Equity Act, a difference in terms and conditions of employment between employees doing the same or substantially the same work amounts to unfair discrimination.

Parliament, however, has said in its response that its CSOs must be able to deal with high intensity security situations and emergencies and be able to “effectively handle disruptions in the House (including the safe removal of Members)”.

They also need to be physically fit, remain calm “in pressure situations” and be able to work long hours.

According to Parliament’s argument, the CSOs, all of whom are former members of SAPS, introduce three new functions to the PPS. Firstly, they “undertake physical intervention with and the removal of unruly Members from the House”. Secondly, they play an “active security role” when accompanying parliamentary staff and Members to off-site parliamentary events. Thirdly, they provide the kind of support to Committees, on- or off-precinct, that used to be the duty of SAPS.

This is significant because the role of PPS has always been the “protection of life, property and specified information” in Parliament through the provision of safety and security support, control of entry and exit from the Chamber, and emergency preparedness, including at key events. The introduction of the so-called CSOs implies that Parliament has added a new militarism to it parliamentary protection function.

Members of the PPS were not the only ones who found themselves unprepared and taken by surprise when in 2014 vociferous EFF Members of Parliament began disregarding the instructions of the Presiding Officer and parliamentary protocol by disrupting the House proceedings. Yet it appears they are now suffering the consequences.

Parliament’s response to finding itself no longer in control of the National Assembly was to bolster its security forces. A resolution was passed in July 2015 to enhance the capacity of PPS. According to the court papers, PPS staff was told at the time that to expedite this process, phase one would involve the appointment of SAPS members as “PPS did not have the necessary capabilities.”

It was not made clear what these “necessary capabilities” were and Parliament immediately dispensed with its comprehensive existing HR procedures. Instead, it hand-picked 37 appointees from SAPS, offered them significantly higher salaries and within weeks effectively had in place a new “elite” unit.
With their new title of CSOs, but known colloquially as bouncers, they were soon seen in action, clearing the house within minutes of a ruling from the chair and with a brutal style of policing reminiscent of a time that many had hoped had long passed. For this they earned annual salaries of up to R150,000 more than the long-serving team of parliamentary protection service officials.

A total of 66 new positions were created, of which 37 were first filled from the ranks of SAPS.
In papers before the court, claims of nepotism have been directed at former policeman Deon van der Spuy, the head of the PPS, who is said to have head-hunted his erstwhile colleagues from SAPS.
Head-hunting is not new to Parliament, and has become more common of late. In this case it was initiated by the Secretary to Parliament. It was argued by Parliament that the applicants needed to be selected from the ranks of SAPS.

The remaining 29 posts were earmarked for internal staff, who would be required to undergo a process of training and mentoring, presumably to gain sufficient skills in crowd control as well as the physical strength and the demands required to deal with the kind of riotous behaviour that could emerge in the House.

This has also been challenged by the existing PPS staff, 65 of whom have applied for the 29 vacant posts. They say many of them come from a background in SAPS anyway.

Quite unlike the rapid CSO appointments, the process of filling the remaining posts has so far been more typical of Parliament. It began in August 2015 and towards the end of 2015 was suspended, in part due to strike action by parliamentary staff, but apparently also due to financial constraints.

This does raise the question: did such financial constraints apply when the 37 SAPS appointees were taken on by Parliament, at salaries above those budgeted for all existing PPS officers except for one Controller.

In taking their case to the Labour Court, the applicants state: “The appointed CSOs who have far less service and experiences [than that of the applicants] and perform only part of the functions of the job description of a Protection Officer are earning substantially higher salaries than that earned by the applicants.”

The result has been tension and unhappiness within the PPS, which is now divided between recently appointed members of SAPS and long-standing protection officers who say they are now being excluded by their manager from functions they used to perform. This amounts to unilateral changes to their job descriptions.

In their court papers they declare that their “human dignity is severely tarnished by these baseless, unfair and unreasonable wage disparities and they [are being] discriminated against based on their longer years of experience”.

They have said from the start that they want to be remunerated and provided the same terms and conditions of employment as the newcomers. Alternatively, they are asking for compensation for being discriminated against. This they want applied retrospectively to the date of the bouncers’ appointments.
Produced for GroundUp News by Notes from the House

---

Published originally on GroundUp .

---

South Africa needs to sober up to save itself from sickly state-owned enterprises

South Africa needs to decide if it will continue to waste public money on its national carrier, or incur the costs of letting SAA go bankrupt.
Shutterstock

The South African government is said to be seriously considering selling its stake in telecommunication firm, Telkom, in order to save the troubled South African Airways (SAA). This has brought back debates about what is the right thing to do around the country’s state owned enterprises. Sibonelo Radebe asked Seán Muller to weigh up the options.

What does financial support to SAA actually involve?

There are two basic forms of assistance government has provided to SAA. The first “government guarantees”, in which the Treasury provides a guarantee to support SAA’s borrowing from private lenders. These guarantees mean that if SAA is unable to pay its debt costs or repay the full loan when required, the Treasury must pay. As of February 2017, SAA held R19.1 billion in government guarantees. These pose a risk to public finances, but strictly speaking do not require any funds immediately.

The second type is a “cash injection”, where Treasury directly transfers cash to SAA. This is what is more commonly known as a “bailout”.

In the current case the lines between these two forms of support are blurred. One of Treasury’s reasons for giving SAA cash is apparently to prevent it defaulting on all debt that is called in by SAA’s creditors.

Is selling a Telkom stake and redirecting the money towards saving SAA a good idea?

There are two aspects to this question. First, is injecting more public money into SAA a good idea? Second, is selling government’s stake in Telkom a good idea?

It is hard to see the case for putting further public money in SAA. At various points it may have made sense to do this in order to stabilise SAA as a public enterprise, or prepare it for large scale privatisation. However, this scenario has been repeated so many times that the argument is no longer credible.

Of course, the government has an obligation to prevent the harm that would result from a state-owned enterprise going bankrupt. The direct effects via SAA’s operations, and indirect effects on the economy and investor sentiment in relation to state owned enterprises, could be severe. The failure to implement a successful turnaround strategy at SAA, which appears to be linked to the determination to keep Dudu Myeni as board chair, has placed South Africans in a bind: either the country wastes public money, or it incurs the costs of letting SAA go bankrupt.

With regards to Telkom, it is useful to remember that government previously committed to only bailout state-owned enterprises using funds raised through the sale of state assets. There are two advantages of this approach. First, it focuses minds on the consequences of state owned enterprises failure – as is happening in the case of SAA. Second, it means that the main national budget is not affected, so Treasury can still meet its commitments like the planned budget deficit.

But there is no good case for bailing out SAA. At best, it is simply to avoid an even worse scenario in which SAA’s guarantees are called in by creditors. Wherever the money comes from, the social cost is significant and arguably unjustified.

Some have suggested that there are additional costs because Telkom is now a profitable enterprise and represents a government success story, but this is debatable. South Africa’s ICT development has been unsatisfactorily slow and arguably one reason is that government’s stake in Telkom meant that it ended up protecting a firm with monopoly power in fixed line infrastructure.

Contrary to an increasingly popular narrative, the fact that Telkom has become profitable by moving into the mobile space and slashing employment does not make it either a privatisation, or a state ownership, success story. From this perspective, government selling its stake could be a good thing for ICT development in the medium to long run.

What does the consideration say about ANC’s attitude towards privatisation?

There is an obvious tension between the claim that SAA cannot be privatised, while effectively privatising government’s remaining stake in Telkom. Such inconsistencies are characteristic of ANC policy in the last two decades. This is partly due to differences within the alliance and partly the result of policy incoherence, along with a failure to act on advice and implement decisions.

The National Development Plan and the Presidential Review Committee on State-Owned Entities both provided fairly clear direction, but many recommendations appear to be inconvenient for the president and those around him – who appear to see state owned enterprises as vehicles for personal enrichment rather than economic development.

Clearly the Telkom model works. Should it be replicated?

It is actually not at all clear that the Telkom model “works” in the sense of advancing economic growth and development in the broader public interest. It was arguably the wrong model for the country’s ICT sector.

However, even if it had been the right model for that sector, simply replicating it would be a bad idea. State ownership, privatisation and regulation strategies need to take into account the characteristics of particular sectors. What works for telecoms will be different to what works for energy or for airlines.

And what do you make of the state of Eskom?

The state of Eskom is of grave concern. Load shedding and price increases, combined with more energy efficiency options for businesses and consumers, have led to much lower electricity demand than originally forecast.

Meanwhile, Eskom is bringing massive new coal power stations online that have vastly exceeded their original budgets. The result is that Eskom faces a “death spiral” where it needs to increase prices to prop up revenue and bolster its finances, but doing so leads to customers reducing demand (through increased efficiency and implementing alternative options like decentralised solar power).

Eskom holds up to R350 billion in government guarantees and is in an increasingly precarious situation. If one adds the lingering possibility of an unnecessary and ill-advised nuclear deal into the mix, the fear is that Eskom could end up in a similar state to SAA now.

SAA may be a waste of public funds, but the threat it poses can probably be contained. That would not be true of Eskom. The main debate between many analysts now is not whether a crisis is looming but whether there remains any chance of avoiding it, given repeated failures to make and implement critical policy decisions.

And so, what should happen to SAA and Eskom?

In the absence of a clear developmental mandate for SAA, and it being repeatedly bailed out with public money that could be better used elsewhere, the objective must be to minimise the cost of SAA to citizens: if privatisation is the best option then so be it. Eskom is a much more strategically critical enterprise and its problems are more complex, so privatisation would just create a range of different problems. Each state owned enterprises requires tailor-made solutions but one thing they all require is basic good governance, which is not currently in place.

Seán Mfundza Muller, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of Johannesburg

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

'Exposés about South Africa's deputy president point to ulterior motives

South Africa’s Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa says his emails were hacked.
GCIS

The recent media “revelations” about South Africa’s Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa’s several alleged extramarital affairs are the classic approach to creating doubt about a prominent person’s integrity.

They also call into question his claim to be a suitable moral or ethical alternative to President Jacob Zuma’s corrupt administration. The latest accusations are meant to attack the very foundation of his campaign to lead both the ANC and the country. Ramaphosa admitted to having had an affair a decade ago.

This is not the first time that prominent ANC personalities have been placed in a situation similar to Ramaphosa’s. In the past accusations were made against Kgalema Motlanthe, a former ANC secretary-general and deputy president, and against Blade Nzimande, general-secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Minister of Higher Education. The SACP is in a governing tri-partite alliance with the ANC and labour federation Cosatu.

More specific reports of alleged infidelity have appeared against Police Minister Fikile Mbalula and Jeff Radebe, minister in the Presidency. Marius Fransman, the ANC’s Western Cape leader, has been suspended for five years for sexual misconduct.

It would be inappropriate to generalise about all of them. And, with the available information, the Ramaphosa case appears to be an example of the tried-and-tested trick of spreading rumours about or exposing infidelity.

It is noteworthy that Ramaphosa’s defence mentions this directly, and that state institutions are being used (by the pro-Zuma group) to neutralise his election campaign:

It represents an escalation of a dirty war against those who are working to restore the values, principles and integrity of the African National Congress and society.

Ramaphosa is considered a frontrunner among the contenders to replace Zuma - ahead of the president’s preferred successor, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

Gunning for Ramaphosa

The campaign to discredit Ramaphosa has gone through several stages:

• first, an attempt was made to compromise him by placing blame for the Marikana massacre on him.
• Then he was discredited as a puppet of business who is being manipulated by “white monopoly capital”.
• These were followed by the claim that he was being manipulated by a “white clique” that manage his election campaign and that he was, therefore, not genuinely “black”.
• He was also accused of having beaten his ex-wife. But, she refuted the allegation.

The latest line of attack seeks to advance the view that his moral outrage against Zuma’s corruption and unethical leadership is compromised by his own immoral extramarital relations. Importantly, he admitted to having had an affair a decade ago.

But, the campaign to discredit Ramaphosa appears to not be getting the desired effect. The general sentiment among ANC spokespersons and those of Cosatu is one of dismay. Ramaphosa’s family and acquaintances have also dismissed the latest accusations against him.

The fact that some refers to events about eight years ago, and the fact that they openly challenge Ramaphosa’s character, point to possible ulterior motives.

Message to detractors

An important aspect of the current Ramaphosa case is that it is an indirect message to Zuma’s opponents. Zuma is making it clear that he still has sufficient access to intelligence agencies to expose the skeletons in their cupboards. It will likely dampen the emerging rebellion in the ANC. An example of such rebellion was seen during the recent motion of no confidence against him in Parliament. It saw 35 ANC MPs defy orders to toe the party line in the motion brought by the opposition.

If it’s seen in the same light as the Hawks’ investigations into former finance minister Trevor Manuel and his deputy Jabu Moleketi; and then former South African Revenue Service Commissioner Pravin Gordhan, about SARS intelligence and Treasury management; it sends a message to Ramaphosa supporters: to tread carefully in the future.

The fact that the ANC leadership nomination process has commenced, and that intense contestation can be expected ahead of the party’s national elective conference in December, the possibility of serious incidents shouldn’t be excluded.

Political assassinations already underway in KwaZulu-Natal might increase.

Serious setbacks

Another important symptom of the motive behind the Ramaphosa case is the fact that Zuma has experienced a set of serious setbacks lately. These include that:

• the Guptas, the business family and his friends at the centre of state capture, are suffering a meltdown;
• there are new parliamentary investigations into state capture;
• the demise of his key supporters in government agencies (like Brian Molefe, Ben Ngubane, Hlaudi Motsoeneng, Berning Ntlemeza);
• the South African Broadcasting Corporation is increasingly exhibiting independence;
• the ANC’s parliamentary caucus is rebelling against him;
• he has suffered several negative court judgments; and
• the UK public relations company Bell Pottinger’s woes have also discredited Zuma’s mantra of “white monopoly capital”. The British public relations company employed by the Gupta business empire got embroiled in ANC internal politics. It has since been sanctioned for its role in promoting the racially divisive “white monopoly capital” narrative sponsored by the Guptas, Zuma’s friends at the core of state capture allegations.

Warning to the media

The months leading towards the ANC’s December conference will be a trying period for the South African mainstream media. They are a lucrative target for abuse by the two main ANC election campaigns.

Leaks, planted information, fake news and attempts to lure journalists to support either faction are all very likely possibilities. The Ramaphosa case has been the first major test for the media. Clear editorial policies, uncompromised ethical practices and exceptional professionalism are what will see the media through. It cannot afford mistakes or miscalculations in the next four months.

Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South Africa

This article was originally published on The Conversation.