Facing the threat from North Korea: 5 essential reads

Editor’s note: The following is a roundup of archival stories related to North Korea.

North Korea has launched repeated tests of ballistic missiles, which it claims are now advanced enough to carry a nuclear warhead as far as the United States. Although experts have cast doubt on the veracity of these claims, the international community has sounded the alarm. South Korea in particular is taking steps, with support from the U.S., to defend itself against the threat.

To better understand this intensifying conflict, we turned to stories in our archive.

Basics

1. Especially for younger generations, the origins of this conflict are not always clear. We asked East Asia scholar Ji-Young Lee of American University to take us way back in this Q&A and explain how Korea got divided into North and South in the first place. Along the way she unpacks some myths about the effect the North Korean regime has had on its people:

“Still, not all North Koreans are interested in defecting. According to anthropologist Sandra Fahy, interviewees said they left the North reluctantly driven primarily by famine and economic reasons, rather than political reasons. A majority of them missed home in the North.”

2. By now, most people are familiar with the man at the helm in North Korea – Kim Jong Un. But his motives still mystify world leaders. Foreign policy expert Stephen Dyson of the University of Connecticut writes a brief history of how the U.S. has sought insight into the minds of other strongmen – from Hitler to Khrushchev:

“History tells us that to influence Kim, we must empathize (note: not sympathize) with him. To figure out what makes him tick, Trump and his advisers must first understand how we look to the North Korean leader, peering at us from his very particular vantage point.”

Options

3. What options are on the table for dealing with the threat from North Korea? A good first step would be increasing U.S. cooperation with Asian allies on security issues, writes Flynt Leverett, a former National Security Council and State Department staffer and professor at Pennsylvania State University. But will Trump’s focus on trade get in the way?

“For Trump and ‘inner circle’ advisers like Steve Bannon, the top concern is economic. Trump and his team see U.S. trade deficits, concentrated in Asia, as draining America’s wealth and threatening its national security…Overall, Trump’s Asia strategy is unlikely to boost Sino-U.S. cooperation on regional security.”

4. Another option that the international community has resorted to for years is imposing sanctions to limit the regime’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. But these sanctions have had, it seems, limited effect. John Park at Harvard University interviewed former North Korean business managers who bought components for the regime’s nuclear and missile programs. His findings suggest that sanctions must be revisited:

“As sanctions have become tougher, these local Chinese middlemen have charged higher fees to reflect the elevated risk of doing business with North Korean clients. Instead of hindering procurement activities, we found that sanctions have actually helped to attract more capable middlemen, who are drawn by the larger payday.”

5. And after a cyberattack linked to North Korea penetrated the global banking system last year, analysts are urging U.S. leaders to take the online threat just as seriously. As Frank Cilluffo and Sharon Cardash from George Washington University write:

“North Korea keeps its military capabilities secret, and is particularly cautious about revealing its cyberwarfare capabilities. South Korea’s Defense Ministry estimates that North Korea’s ‘cyber army’ is 6,000 strong. That’s as big as the U.S. military’s Cyber Mission Force is planned to be.”

Danielle Douez, Associate Editor, Politics + Society, The Conversation

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Opposition parties have found the ANC's Achilles heel: Jacob Zuma

President Jacob Zuma celebrates winning the eighth vote of no confidence against him.
Reuters/Mike Hutchings

Just when many thought that President Jacob Zuma’s fate was sealed, he emerged victorious against a motion of no confidence in him - for the eighth time. The fanfare associated with his expected loss was largely in sync with the increasing public discontent with his leadership.

On the day of the no confidence vote political parties slugged it out: the ANC was on the defensive, barraged with the opposition parties’ critique of Zuma, who is blamed for the morass the country finds itself in.

Cautiously couched, and with an eye on winning over ANC MPs who hold the majority of seats in parliament, the opposition’s fusillade sought to delink Zuma from the party. This made sense as a strategy: after all the ANC has abdicated the responsibility of holding Zuma to account for far too long. In tabling yet another motion of no confidence the opposition appropriated this duty.

The latest motion offered the ANC a chance to make a distinction between itself and its ethically compromised president, and to reclaim its position as a leader of society. It created – albeit unwittingly – the opportunity for the ANC to repackage its sullied image.

But it failed to seize the moment. Instead, it settled for a Pyrrhic victory. Those faithful to Zuma took turns in their deification histrionics of political showmanship and demagoguery fixated on imagined “enemies of the state” and the illusion of “regime change” . These falsehoods are peddled to deflect attention from the real dangers to the country’s democracy: a dearth of ethical leadership and the capture of the state under Zuma.

Opposition parties took advantage of this. They might not have won the vote of no confidence. But they came away emboldened for trying.

Opposition parties gaining the upper hand

The opposition parties are getting smarter in exploiting the ANC’s vacuous leadership. In the latest motion of no confidence debate, they managed to frame the narrative in a way that reminded ANC members about the nobility of the historical foundation of the party, and the reason for its existence. In other words, the opposition parties were teaching the ANC about the ANC.

This featured prominently in the speeches of Democratic Alliance’s Mmusi Maimane, Economic Freedom Fighters’ Julius Malema, and United Democratic Movement leader Bantu Holomisa.

The danger for the ANC in not being decisive about Zuma is that, over time, the opposition parties may usurp its political capital and project themselves as genuine custodians of its foundational values. In fact, this appears to be their strategy. Some in the ANC are aware of this which probably explains why 26 of them put the public interest first and voted for the motion.

This is what’s required if the party is going to survive in the long term. Acting in the public interest is a strategic political investment.

Despite the fact that some ANC broke ranks, the motion failed to pass. Of the 384 MPs who voted, 177 said they do not have confidence in Zuma – 46% of the total votes. In all 198 (52%) maintained their confidence in Zuma, while 9 (2%) abstained. Statistically, the motion was lost by 6%. When abstentions are factored in, by 4%.

Immediately after Speaker of National Assembly Baleka Mbete ,announced the results, Zuma couldn’t wait to ascend the podium in a style reminiscent of his ascension to the ANC’s throne in 2007 after President Thabo Mbeki had earlier sacked him as the Deputy President of the Republic.

A victory, but at what cost

It is all celebrations in the Zuma coterie. The vote means that the network of his kindred spirits – those at the centre of the capture of the state and profiting from the public purse handsomely – is protected.

But aren’t these celebrations about a trifle? A closer look at the votes reveals something interesting: at least 26 ANC MPs agreed with the opposition parties that Zuma should step down as the president of the Republic. The celebrations are therefore more likely to be a requiem for the possible atrophy of the ANC, whose indecisiveness makes it complicit in creating this peril.

Indeed, as leader of the governing party and of the country Zuma should be worried about the outcome. His legitimacy in his own party has plummeted. Coupled with the negative sentiments about him in broader society, the picture is now gloomier for the ANC. He won the vote and secured the throne. But, at what cost?

The outcome of the no confidence vote has laid bare a fractured ANC. Each time Zuma survives, the ANC loses the battle of regaining people’s trust.

The opposition parties are aware of this, and are exploiting it. Their strategic political gaze hasn’t simply been about reaching the required threshold to oust the president – after all they don’t have sufficient numbers in parliament.

Instead, their motions of no confidence are about obliterating the political credibility of the ANC, using Zuma’s disastrous leadership as a means to this end. They exploit, to their strategic political advantage, the increasing perception that the people of the country are being ignored and are misunderstood by the ANC government. This, in a democracy that came about as a result of the sacrifices of the people, some of whom paid the ultimate price during the liberation struggle.

What emerged in the debate wasn’t about the public interest. Rather it was about protecting the oligarchy. This is surreal. Parliament as the legislative authority is supposed to represent the interest of the people. Hasn’t it sunk into the political conscience of the ANC, after 23 years of its governing the country, that leadership of public affairs should always be driven by the public interest?

In a democracy public discontent is understood as an opportunity to listen closely to what the people want. The ANC will be punished severely at the polls if it continues to fail to understand this.

Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of Technology
Read the original article.

China is the key to avoiding nuclear 'fire and fury' in North Korea

The news of an exchange of threats between the U.S. and North Korea is reported in Tokyo on Aug. 9, 2017.
AP Photo/Shizuo Kambayashi

U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un are playing a dangerous game of brinkmanship.

North Korea got the world’s attention – and Trump’s – when it successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time on July 4. In response, the United Nations approved new economic sanctions against North Korea which, predictably, inspired a bellicose response from the rogue regime.

Trump threatened that further provocations will be met with “fire and fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world has never seen before.”

In response, North Korea issued a threat of its own – missile strikes on the U.S. territory of Guam.

With tensions escalating, it is important to be realistic about how we can get out of this mess.

In short, any nonmilitary solution will rely on China choosing to apply its massive economic leverage over the North Korean regime. This is a point that Trump clearly recognizes. In July, he tweeted that Chinese trade with North Korea “rose 40 percent in the first quarter,” highlighting China’s reluctance to punish North Korea for its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

While the poor quality of the data hinders a detailed analysis, Trump’s overall sentiment is correct. China has increased its trade with North Korea in recent years and done little to forestall North Korea’s nuclear ambitions besides backing the most recent round of U.N. sanctions. China’s foremost objective seems to be promoting greater stability from its volatile neighbor.

Yet a quick look at the data, however murky, shows just how much leverage China has, if it wishes to use it.

North Korea’s primary patron

In general, exports from one country to another can be mostly explained by the distance between them and the sizes of their markets, a pattern that holds for China and North Korea.

Geographically, they share a long border, which makes China a natural, though not inevitable, partner for trade. As a case in point, North Korea also shares a long border with South Korea, but these countries have almost no trade between them. In addition, North Korea shares a small border with Russia, with whom it has little, though ever-increasing, trade, as I discuss below.

China’s large market, proximity and – most importantly – willingness to trade with North Korea has led to a situation in which North Korea has become highly dependent on trade with what has become its primary patron. About half of North Korean exports and imports go directly to and from China and most of the rest of its trade is handled indirectly by Chinese middlemen.



North Korea’s dependence on its neighbor has grown hand-in-hand with China’s increasing economic dominance of East Asia, which gained momentum 15 years ago when China joined the World Trade Organization. Since then, both Chinese gross domestic product as well as its annual trade with North Korea have increased nearly tenfold, to around US$11 trillion and $6 billion, respectively.

North Korea imports nearly everything from China, from rubber tires to refined petroleum to pears, with no single category dominating. Meanwhile, coal constitutes about 40 percent of North Korean exports to China, followed by “non-knit men’s coats.”

Time to use that leverage?

However, recent events – such as the use of front companies by Chinese firms to evade sanctions imposed on North Korea and China’s reluctance to cut off energy supplies to the country – have led to some uncertainty about the extent to which China is willing to use this economic leverage to rein in North Korea’s military ambitions.

On one hand, China claims that coal imports from North Korea have recently been stopped as part of an effort to punish the regime for recent missile tests and the suspected assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the estranged half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. If true, this would be an important signal of China’s willingness to support U.S. concerns about the missile program as it would represent a loss of about a third ($930 million) of North Korea’s import revenue.

However, there is evidence that coal shipments in fact never ceased. And, in any case, China may have dramatically increased its imports of iron ore from North Korea to offset the lost coal revenues.

This is consistent with the idea that China carefully considers the resources and revenue that are available to the North Korean regime at any moment, and uses trade as a lever to control them. In this way, China walks a fine line between providing too many resources, and thus allowing the regime to prosper, and not enough resources, such that North Korea is in danger of collapsing. Ultimately, trade may be used as a lever to do some light scolding, but China’s overwhelming concern is preventing North Korea’s collapse.

Further evidence that China has tight control over the North Korean economy comes from a recent report from C4ADS. The research group found close, and often common, ownership ties between most of the major Chinese companies who do business with North Korea. This suggests that trade with North Korea is highly centralized and thus easily controlled.

Russia: North Korea’s other ‘friend’

China is not the only country that North Korea trades with, though the others currently pale in comparison. Other top export destinations include India ($97.8 million), Pakistan ($43.1 million) and Burkina Faso ($32.8 million). In terms of imports, India ($108 million), Russia ($78.3 million) and Thailand ($73.8 million) currently sell the most to North Korea.

Russia in particular may soon complicate U.S. efforts to isolate the regime. While still small, Russian trade with North Korea increased 73 percent over the first two months of 2017 compared with the same period of the previous year.

But whereas China is legitimately worried that an economic crisis in North Korea could lead to a flood of refugees or all-out war, Russia likely sees engagement with North Korea in much simpler terms, namely as an additional way to gain geopolitical advantage relative to the U.S.

A way out?

Nearly all experts agree that there is no easy way to “solve” the North Korea problem. However, one plausible approach is to encourage South Korea and Japan to begin to develop nuclear weapons programs of their own, and to only discontinue these programs if China takes meaningful steps to use its trade with North Korea to reign in the regime.

Threatening to introduce new nuclear powers to the world is clearly risky, however stable and peaceful South Korea and Japan currently are. But China is highly averse to having these economic and political rivals acquire nuclear capabilities, as it would threaten China’s ongoing pursuit of regional control. In short, this is a sensitive pressure point that could be used to sway the Chinese leadership.

One way or another, China must become convinced that the costs of propping up the North Korean regime through trade are higher than the costs of an increased probability that the regime will collapse.

This is an updated version of an article originally published on July 6, 2017.

Greg Wright, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Merced

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Affirmative action around the world

Educafro, a Brazilian black activist movement, protested in 2012 to demand more affirmative action programs for higher education.
AP Photo/Eraldo Peres

As reports have surfaced of the Trump administration’s intent to investigate affirmative action admissions in higher education, the debate over whether and how race should be considered in college admissions has emerged with renewed vigor.

In the past four years, United States Supreme Court cases like Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and Fisher v. University of Texas-Austin have addressed this debate head on.

In what The New York Times called “a blinkered view on race in America,” justices in the 2014 Schuette case ruled 6-2 (with Justice Elena Kagan recusing herself) that voters could eliminate affirmative action policies in state public education. Two years later, however, in the Fisher case, they ruled that the University of Texas-Austin’s affirmative action policy was constitutional, affirming that the goal of a diverse student body within selective colleges and universities is a “compelling interest” in the U.S.

Now it has emerged that President Trump’s Justice Department will be investigating a yet-to-be-decided complaint challenging Harvard University’s affirmative action admissions policies, brought by a coalition of Asian-American groups.

So, is affirmative action in higher education on its way out? If you look beyond the U.S. and take a global perspective, the answer is no.

A global perspective

Our research has shown that about one-quarter of the world’s countries have some form of affirmative action for student admissions into higher education. Many of these programs have emerged over the last 25 years.

These policies may go by various names – affirmative action, reservations, alternative access, positive discrimination – but all are efforts to increase the numbers of underrepresented students in higher education.

A wide variety of institutions and governments on six continents have programs to expand admission of students from minority groups on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, class, geography or type of high school. Several use a combination of these categories.

And given that U.S. policies are older than most, much of the cutting-edge thinking on affirmative action is now coming from other parts of the world.

Affirmative action around the world

Though affirmative action policies as we know them have been in place in U.S. higher education since 1978, they are not the oldest: India’s policies for lower-caste students take that prize.

South Africa’s many, and varied, alternative access programs not only admit underrepresented students – especially black female students – but they also provide special courses and mentoring to facilitate those students’ success.

The French are even more reluctant than many Americans to consider race directly, but some selective institutions have increased students of color by targeting neighborhoods or particular schools located in priority education areas. Areas are classified as Zones d’Education Prioritaires – priority education zones – based on several criteria, including high percentages of immigrant students for whom French is a second language, students performing below grade level and low-income students. Students from these zones are eligible to compete to be part of special admissions programs, which are designed to give them greater access to selective higher education.



India is less coy about who is being targeted, coining the rather blunt term “other backward classes” as an official designation for one set of recent beneficiaries of affirmative action in higher education. India continues to recognize the importance of caste discrimination, but also includes economic criteria when defining other backward classes. They exclude, for example, individuals whose family income or property exceeds certain limits.

Brazil has been developing affirmative action programs in its most prestigious public universities over the past two decades. The issue is often framed by human rights and social justice concerns; the Brazilian government first introduced the potential need for affirmative action as a “right thing to do” after years of denial of racial inequalities in the country.

Beyond race

Whereas the earliest forms of affirmative action focused on race and ethnicity, programs that started more recently are likely to include women. The inclusion of women has been particularly pervasive in the wave of policies that emerged around the world in the 1990s and 2000s. Affirmative action for women is now the most prevalent form of affirmative action for students in higher education.

Countries that have some kind of affirmative action related to gender in higher education admissions are now spread across world regions, and include eight countries in Africa, seven in Europe and four in North America and the Caribbean.

Affirmative action based on geography (the place a student comes from) appeals to policymakers reluctant to give race, ethnicity or caste such a prominent and explicit role. Such policies are now catching on around the world: In addition to France, universities in Sri Lanka, for example, use geographic district as a targeted category because it’s less controversial than ethnicity or language.

Looking beyond US borders

In short, affirmative action is alive and well – and on the rise – around the world. Indeed, some of the most creative discussions and innovations are happening outside the United States.

This is an updated version of an article originally published on Nov. 13, 2014.

Michele S. Moses, Professor of Educational Foundations, Policy and Practice, University of Colorado and Laura Dudley Jenkins, Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

War of attrition against South Africa's President 'Zupta' is in full swing

Protesters march ahead of a vote of a no confidence against President Jacob Zuma.
Reuters/Mike Hutchings

The first big surprise was that Baleka Mbete, the speaker of the National Assembly, ruled in favour of the opposition parties’ request for a secret ballot in the eighth vote of no confidence against the president of South Africa.

Writing from memory, this is the first time that this speaker’s rulings have ever gone against Luthuli House, the headquarters of the governing African National Congress (ANC), or the preference of the party’s chief whip, Jackson Mthembu. The significance is that a vote of no confidence is a three-line whip: where the caucus decision is binding on all MPs of a particular party. A secret ballot enables dissenting MPs to sidestep threats of party disciplinary action.

Her ruling will also recall memories that President Jacob Zuma dumped her to back Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as his preferred successor. In short Mbete apparently perceives her career, as chairperson of the ANC, has nothing more to gain from remaining beholden to Zuma.

This is another interesting example of how Zuma’s power is unravelling.

Her ruling gave rise to intense media speculation about how many MPs from the ANC would vote with their conscience, as ANC MPs Pravin Gordhan and Makhosi Khoza had publicly urged. The Economic Freedom Fighters and others in opposition claimed that they had a list of 60 ANC MPs who would vote for the motion of no confidence. The result proved that they were kidding themselves.

The huge build-up in media hype made the result anti-climactic. Nonetheless, that there was only a margin of 21 to defeat the eighth no-confidence motion is unprecedented. It also shows the biggest erosion yet of Zuma’s support in the ANC caucus. At least 30 ANC MPs must have voted to remove Zuma from his presidency.

It’s not the parliamentary caucus, but the ANC’s elective conference which will elect Zuma’s successor in four months’ time, and its composition will be subject to fierce tussling. Still, the caucus contains a weighty cross-section of ANC players. The shift is therefore significant in terms of the Cyril Ramaphosa versus Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma contest to replace Zuma.

The power of the party

Does the vote imply that a majority of ANC MPs would vote for Dlamini-Zuma as opposed to Ramaphosa? This is not clear: many ANC MPs would agree with the caucus argument – you cannot vote with the opposition for an opposition motion.

In Westminster-style democracies a no-confidence debate is an annual fixture in the parliamentary calendar. But for a united front of opposition parties and civil society associations like Corruption Watch to organise mass marches and demonstrations outside parliament and across the country is certainly not routine. The smaller religious groups and pro-Zuma factions of the ANC who organised demonstrations against the no-confidence motion show mobilisation of their groupings as well.

South Africa is a Westminster-derived democracy, so this situation brings precedents to mind. While votes of no confidence have not directly removed any British Prime Minister from office, one such narrow vote did lead to Tory caucus leaders telling Neville Chamberlain to step down in 1940 before he was voted out. Similarly, it was Tory leaders withdrawing their support from Margaret Thatcher which compelled her to resign in 1990.

In South Africa, the national leadership structure of major political parties such as the ANC and main opposition Democratic Alliance dominate and control their parliamentary caucuses more than in the UK or other Commonwealth countries. Their national conferences also have greater significance.

In view of the media coverage, it is important to emphasise that the Gupta family conglomerate, which is at the heart of state capture allegations, is merely the wealthiest example of networks of “tenderpreneurs” – businessmen who enrich themselves through government tenders, often dubiously. They are found across national government, the provinces and municipalities. There are many others and the work of investigative journalists will no doubt uncover them.

But the Gupta web of influence is certainly the one that’s received the greatest attention. Malema’s coining of the name “Zupta” aptly and pithily captures the fusion of the Zuma and Gupta families, the neo-patrimonialism which sucks out public funds for private enrichment.

Crumbling empire

This eighth vote of no confidence shows that civil society has organised a war of attrition against both Zuma and his system of subverting the procurement mechanisms in the public sector. This push back against corruption to defend the institutions of state will continue until Zuma is no longer in office. It is pivotal. The Auditor General has already expressed concern that there haven’t been any consequences to his reporting on fraud and corruption in public sector accounts.

The good news is that the Gupta empire seems to be crumbling. For one thing they can no longer laugh all the way to the bank – in an unprecedented move in the country all the banks have, one by one, dropped this particular lucrative corporate client.

Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western Cape

This article was originally published on The Conversation.