Scopa takes aim at Hawks and NPA

“We want faster results. Society is waiting for consequences.”

By Sune Payne and Moira Levy
2 August 2017

Themba Godi, chairperson of the Standing Committee On Public Accounts (SCOPA), said Eskom, SABC and SAA are priorities for his committee this term. Archive photo: Ashraf Hendricks

Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa) made it clear in a press briefing on Tuesday that the Hawks and the National Prosecuting Authority are not meeting its expectations and it wants to see improved results and “consequences” taken against those who abuse state funds.

With Parliament’s third term barely begun, Scopa chairperson Themba Godi called a press briefing to identify the Committee’s priorities for the upcoming quarter. These include Eskom, the SABC and South African Airways.

Another focus will be National Treasury, including its stalled Integrated Financial Management System to integrate human resource and financial management systems across government. The failed first phase of this project has already wasted expenditure of more than R1 billion.

Another target for Scopa will be the Department of Water and Sanitation, which it described as “in shambles, lacking leadership and literally bankrupt”.

Godi also expressed regret at the departure of former SASSA CEO Thokozani Magwaza and said SASSA “might not be moving in the right direction and at the right speed,” a matter he has raised in a letter to Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng.

Godi stated that Magwaza’s departure has caused anxiety over whether SASSA would fufil its obligation towards the Constitutional Court’s ruling and public desire for the Post Office to handle the distribution of social grants.

Scopa supports harsher sentences for those who are found guilty of mishandling government funds. The Committee wants to engage with the Anti-Corruption Unit for harsher consequences, including amending the power of the Auditor General to create legally binding time frames on accountability.
Asked whether various ministers would be called to Parliament, Godi said, “it is unbecoming of any ministers not to heed the call of Parliament”. The ministers will have to appear before Scopa once dates for this term have been confirmed.

In a statement, Scopa said there are no holy cows and abuse of state funds must result in “investigation, charging and imprisonment, irrespective of which corner of the country they come from or their status in society.”

It said Scopa’s “unyielding focus” is the “fight against corruption and the protection of the public purse.”

Scopa sees itself as Parliament’s lead organ in the fight against corruption, guided by the Constitution, The Public Finance Management Act and the Rules of the National Assembly.

Committee member Dr Mnyamezeli Booi said “our relationship with the security agencies is to continuously emphasis to them that they must do their work.

“We have said to NPA and the Hawks we are expecting more than what you are doing. We want faster results. Society is waiting for consequences.”

He said Scopa’s work does not end with Committee hearings. It follows up and engages with security agencies that it believes are “not working hard enough”.

Godi described Scopa’s “escalating model” in which incidents of wasteful and fruitless expenditure will be escalated to the government minister and if necessary to the Head of Government Business. “If the Head of Government Business does not respond we must then report to Parliament that as a Committee we have no confidence in the minister”.

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Published originally on GroundUp .

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Why South Africa should gird itself for tumultuous times

South Africa’s nuclear deal with Russia is part of the backdrop to the current crisis.
Reuters/Alexei Nikolsky

South African President Jacob Zuma’s latest cabinet reshuffle in the Ministry of Finance is arguably the most controversial of all his executive decisions. It is the seventh cabinet reshuffle since he became president in 2009 and the third since 2014.

Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki only reshuffled their cabinets after general elections. The Zuma era, on the other hand, has been characterised by a high turnover, not only of cabinet members, but also senior public officials and executives in state-owned enterprises.

Zuma’s latest decisions - initially to remove Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene but then four days later to succumb to pressure and replace his new appointee David van Rooyen with Pravin Gordhan - has left everyone speculating as to the real reasons. Gordhan is a much more prudent appointment but a major political concession from Zuma.

What does it tell us about how decisions are being taken?

Some argue that it is indicative of Zuma’s uncontested power in the governing African National Congress (ANC); that he has developed an almost autocratic presidential style.

Another argument is that it is symptomatic of his predicament in the ANC. This line of thinking is informed by the fact that the ANC is weaker than it’s been since coming to power in 1994.

The ANC has been losing membership – more than 450,000 members on Zuma’s watch.

And a key player in the tripartite alliance, the trade union federation Cosatu, split earlier this year resulting in a drastic drop in membership. The split saw the metal workers’ union Numsa expelled over differences about the federation’s relationship with the ANC.

In addition, seasoned and senior party members have begun to voice their concerns about Zuma. Former president and ANC leader Kgalema Motlanthe’s recently made harsh criticism of his leadership. He also declared that the tripartite alliance was dead.

His comments followed those of another party stalwart, Rev Frank Chikane, who warned that the party faced the danger of losing future elections.

To add to Zuma’s woes, the contest for who takes over from him has begun. Current deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa has put his hat in the ring. And the trade union federation has implied it will support him as Zuma’s successor.

Paranoia

The growing factionalism in the ANC has left Zuma unsure who he can trust, even in his own province KwaZulu-Natal. The result has been signs of growing paranoia, particularly about possible critical or independent voices in the ANC. He considers all as threats to his position.

In the past, Zuma built a stronghold of support, through patronage, in the government’s security cluster – police, state security, military and prisons – which he staffed with his acolytes.

He did the same with the National Prosecuting Authority and some of the parastatals, using the appointments to secure support for himself.

The latest intervention against his minister of finance shows two things:

• how far he is prepared to go to protect his supporters in state-owned enterprises who serve his self interests. Nene had taken a hard line against a disastrous financial decision taken by South African Airways chairperson Dudu Myeni, who is close to Zuma; and
• how important state finances are to him as a tool to develop a personal style of diplomacy with leaders on the world stage. Here deal-making, whether for nuclear electricity or Chinese trade, is the key objective and source of pride for Zuma.

By applying a rational assessment of what the country could afford, Nene had become a “spoiler” for Zuma.

Zuma’s controversial statement that, in his eyes, the ANC comes before South Africa, set the tone. It is not unreasonable to extend this to mean that the ANC and the state provide him with a platform on which he can take decisions based on in his own interests, or those of his closest supporters.

Once a person believes that history is on his side he begins to believe that it legitimises his claim to the resources of the state. In Zuma’s case this became evident in his defence of the use of state resources to build his Nkandla homestead.

Any lack of co-operation by his ministers is regarded as opposition or even betrayal. Non-threatening ministers, such as the new finance minister, David van Rooyen and minerals minister Mosebenzi Zwane, are therefore logical choices.

The end is in sight

Zuma has lost control over who succeeds him as ANC president. This is evident from the fact that the union federation has passed a resolution backing Ramaphosa for the post. This has elevated someone who is outside the Zuma circle to the position of a real contender for power.

It means that the transition has already started and that Zuma could lose his hold on power by not having his favourite take charge.

A decline in ANC support in the local government elections next year will hasten that process. The ANC’s National Conference will follow in 2017, by which time it will be too late for him to turn the tide in his favour.

Ramaphosa’s increasing prominence will increase Zuma’s paranoia about who in his cabinet has already silently joined the Ramaphosa camp. A similar scenario unfolded ahead of the ANC’s Polokwane conference in 2007. That resulted in Zuma ousting Mbeki as ANC president, culminating in Mbeki being recalled as president of the country.

Speculation is rife that more ministers are in Zuma’s firing line. These include Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies and Minister in the Presidency Jeff Radebe.

In effect, a silent rebellion is in the making. In the process most of the ANC’s internal democratic conventions, such as consultation, will be under pressure.

Nene’s dismissal heralds the beginning of a tumultuous period in the ANC.

Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South Africa

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

South Africa and China: behind the smoke and mirrors

The Chinese and South African governments, led by presidents Xi Jingping and Jacob Zuma, cement ties during a meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Reuters/Wang Zhao/Pool

The People’s Republic of China’s relationship with South Africa has deepened significantly in recent years, as shown by a raft of economic and political proclamations.

The year 2014 was dubbed “the year of South Africa in China”. It was followed last year by the “Year of China in South Africa”. Now South Africa has been upgraded to China’s lofty “Strategic Comprehensive Partner”.

And the governing African National Congress (ANC) has made no bones about how it feels. Its 2015 National General Council discussion document identifies a new “Cold War” in which

the exemplary role of the collective leadership of the Communist Party of China in this regard should be a guiding lodestar of our own struggle.

Such statements have left observers wondering whether the ANC-led government is making a geopolitical turn toward China. Such sentiments have been emboldened by bureaucratic obfuscation that’s prevented the Dalai Lama from visiting South Africa on three different occasions and the Chinese government funding an ANC training school.

China’s economic relationship with South Africa has added further fuel to the fire. China has been South Africa’s largest trading partner since 2010, with a total trade volume of R270 billion in 2013. The announcement during the China-Africa summit that China will be committing a further R90 billion to South Africa, will only confirm sceptics’ fears of growing subjugation.

Knowing which side your bread is buttered

Reactions to China’s engagement tend to overlook one important fact. While, at least ideologically, the South African government may be thumbing its nose at traditional western partners, economically, multiple international engagement is the order of the day.

Europe and the US continue to be significant trading partners. Foreign direct investment from these regions far surpasses what comes in from China. In fact, India is the only BRICS country - Brazil, Russia, India and China - in the top five sources of foreign direct investment in South Africa.

Additionally, the US, UK and Germany are still the top overseas visitors to the country.

Those of an economically pragmatic bent may be scratching their heads as to why the South African government needs to engage with China at the expense of engagements with western partners.

This is, in fact, by no means the case. South Africa may be taking sides at an ideological level. But at the level of international economic engagement, it is business as usual. In an instance of what Patrick Bond refers to as the “talk left, walk right” approach, the South African government uses the language of anti-Western imperial hegemony while simultaneously being deeply engaged in the logic of global markets.

In fact, when it comes to international political economy, no one “talks left and walks right” more than the Chinese themselves. The country’s integration into the global market system, the rise of a consumer-orientated middle class, and its outward-bound commodity forays to support both domestic and international consumption make China a dominant player in global capitalism. Significantly its currency, the renminbi, has just been accepted by the IMF as a world currency.

China’s engagement in Africa is an extension of this process, a fact which many in the Euro-American world, and even Africa, seem unable to digest.

Nothing highlights this more clearly than the recent announcement of the Chinese-driven Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The new bank includes most major global players, including South Africa. Notable absentees are Japan and the US. It has eclipsed the BRICS New Development Bank, presenting itself as a champion of the global South.

South African and Chinese aspirations have much in common if we look at China from the perspective of a formidable global market player, rather than simply as an authoritarian single-party state. Both are deeply integrated within global markets while at the same time being engaged in domestic ideologies which are inherently antagonistic to these markets. In this respect, they are part of a broader post- Cold War economic pragamatism in which domestic and even foreign policies - be they left, right or centre - are subordinate to the market imperative.

Ross Anthony, Director of the Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Look to China for the main beneficiary of America's likely retreat from Africa

Presidents of Kenya, Guinea, US and Nigeria’s Vice President at the G7 Summit.
Angelo Carconi/EPA

Anti-terrorism and transactional relationships are likely be the main features of US President Donald Trump’s Africa policy. But if Trump’s proposed cuts to the state department hold, the US will be less and less of a presence on the continent, according to Prof Gregory F Treverton, who directed the US National Intelligence Council in the Obama Administration.

Treverton, who is currently Professor of Practice at the University of Southern California, is a world authority on security and intelligence. I put a number of questions to Treverton who visited South Africa recently to deliver the keynote address at a South African Council on International Relations conference on South Africa’s relations with Africa.

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Why is Donald Trump’s foreign policy so incomprehensible?

I wish I knew! It’s a continual struggle between, on the one hand, the true believers, the American firsters who are anti-trade and anti-engagement in what they see as an unfriendly world, and on the other more traditional conservative Republicans.

The pattern has been that the more traditional conservative Republicans, like the Secretaries of State and Defence, tug policy in a more familiar direction, only to have the president blow the process up with a tweet condemning the Paris climate agreement or labelling Germany an unfair trader. The intensity of the struggle is reflected in the continuing haemorrhage of leaks, all from the very top of the administration.

Didn’t the post-Second World War liberal international order need a shake up?

Yes, and perhaps in that sense we’ll end up thanking Trump, if, and this is a big if, we get through the next years without a major crisis or too much broken crockery. Some of Trump’s complaints, like (America’s Western) allies bearing too little of the burden, have been true for a long time. And the reaction by Americans to the sense that they pay too much for the “public goods” of international economics and security has been going on for a long time.

Polls routinely show that Americans think the country spends on foreign aid 20 or 30 times what it actually does. So, too, the questioning of what we all too easily call the “liberal international order” has been growing over time.

You suggested that Russia under Vladimir Putin, is a declining power. Doesn’t the evidence point in the other direction?

It surely is a declining power, though Putin has played a weak hand extraordinarily well. It is in demographic decline, and far from modernising the Russian economy, Putin has only deepened its dependence on hydrocarbons. My fear is that as the country declines, it will be all the more tempted to turn to what tools it retains – cyber attacks and nuclear sabre-rattling.

How do you think Trump’s Africa policy will turn out?

In testifying before Congress, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson probably was as clear as the administration could be given its disarray. Africa was in the “turning to other countries” category, and he began with the fight against terrorism. He did, though, mention the economic opportunities in Africa, mostly in the sense of business that might be done. I suspect those will continue to be the emphasis.

So does this mean that anti-terrorism and transactional relationships will be the main features of Trump’s Africa policy?

I think they will continue to be the main drivers, for better or worse, though not the only drivers. The country will have to respond to major humanitarian crises whether the administration wants to or not. And some of the legacy programmes of the last two administrations, like the African Growth and Opportunity Act, or the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief have had bipartisan support, so we’ll see how they fare in the congressional budget process.

And, if this is so, what are the long-term implications of this for US relations with the continent?

If Trump’s proposed cuts to the State Department and USAID hold, the US will be less and less of a presence on the continent. The main beneficiary, diplomatically, will be China, followed by the Europeans and perhaps even Russia, though it doesn’t have much to contribute except arms sales.

If there is any silver lining, perhaps it will be that Africans, and particularly South Africans, will realise they have to take more initiative on their own.

When it comes to the US itself, you raised the possibility that it might break up? Where you speaking in abstract terms, or is this a real possibility?

I meant it mostly as a metaphor and as a touchstone for thinking about the future. I don’t think it’s likely, but it does have to be considered.

What is certain is that the next few years will be a kind of a guerrilla war, one mostly fought in the courts, between the US federal government and the “blue” (read Democratic Party-controlled) states, led by California, over climate change, immigration and other issues.

What does the Trump presidency mean for these ideas?

So far it seems bound to increase the divide in America. Trump has talked and acted entirely to please his base. He has played on fear, fanning it by portraying the country in dire straits surrounded by a hostile world. So far that base – especially older and often poorer white Americans – seems to have been satisfied by word, words they see as validating them.

But we’ve known from the beginning that Trump can’t deliver on his promises: those “good” low-skilled jobs in manufacturing or mining (as he has portrayed them) aren’t coming back. So we’ll see, but I expect that realisation to only deepen the anger and disaffection.

The co-hosts of the conference Treverton addressed were the Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study (JIAS) and the Wits School of Public Management.

Peter Vale, Professor of Humanities and the Director of the Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study (JIAS), University of Johannesburg

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

What the Djibouti military base tells us about China's growing role in Africa

China hasn’t been known for establishing military bases in Africa – or even beyond its immediate sphere of influence. This is changing following its decision to build a military base in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. The base will be next door to the United States Africa Command.

China will be able to use the base to improve the way it manages its peacekeeping operations and humanitarian efforts in Africa, as well as its regional maritime operations.

How should this be understood in terms of China’s global positioning? And what are the implications of its expanding military footprint in Africa?

The brief answer is that there has not been a sudden change in China’s role and foreign policy profile on the continent. Instead, the change has been gradual and incremental. This is particularly evident from an international peacekeeping perspective.

Beijing’s views and approach towards United Nations peacekeeping have changed significantly since China joined the UN in 1971. A major shift took place after the end of the Cold War and, over the years, it’s gradually taken a more positive stance and indicated a greater willingness to contribute.

Today China contributes peacekeepers in substantial numbers to operations in South Sudan, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In doing so, it’s deliberately sending a message that its rising profile is not a strategic threat to other major powers. Instead, it wants to be regarded as a friend to developing nations and be more responsive to global expectations. This includes the need to reduce tensions and conflicts.

China’s role in Africa can be understood from three broad perspectives: to assert its position as a global power, craft a positive image of itself, and to promote its national interests.

A global player

China increasingly intends to show that it is a global power. The new base in Djibouti should be viewed in this context. It’s in line with China’s views on international peacekeeping. This is that peacekeeping is way of exerting greater influence on international affairs through the UN.

Unlike the US, which has numerous military bases around the world, China has exercised its global presence through peacekeeping operations. As a result, Beijing has emerged as a significant actor in international peacekeeping operations – in Africa and elsewhere.

Its commitment to this can be seen from the fact that it’s the only country that significantly contributes both troops and money to UN peacekeeping operations.

Secondly, China’s expanding role in UN peacekeeping over the last two decades has helped it craft a more positive and constructive global image and reputation. It has used peacekeeping deliberately, and systematically, as a diplomatic instrument aimed at projecting China as a responsible global power. Its approach to peacekeeping has also allowed it to respond more quickly to African requests or challenges. And it’s worked as a confidence building measure with both African governments and the African Union.

Thirdly, China’s emerging role in Africa is part of an evolving and pragmatic reorientation in Chinese policymaking circles, specifically where Beijing’s political interests and related investments are at stake. China is Africa’s largest trading partner, and its strategic and material interests have become more integrated and entangled with African concerns.

Chinese soldiers deployed for UN peacekeeping missions at their military base in Qinyang, Henan province, China.
EPA/Michael Reynolds

But its growing involvement in peacekeeping has become more difficult to reconcile with its historical commitment to non-interventionism. This is particularly clear in the case of South Sudan.

Strategic interests

Africa’s youngest nation has presented both challenges and opportunities for China. It has had to soften its historical arm’s length approach to facilitate a political solution to the ongoing conflict in South Sudan. But it has also needed to secure its strategic interests, especially the production of oil.

In this volatile and turbulent environment, Beijing felt compelled to make a substantial peacekeeping contribution to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. This included deploying combat troops.

But it also had to assume a number of new political roles, such as mediating between warring parties and engaging in multilateral peace talks. This put Chinese foreign policy principles under pressure and steered its involvement in international peacekeeping operations in a new direction.

China’s peacekeeping experience in South Sudan suggests that it tacitly recognises that some kind of intervention is sometimes needed to protect its strategic interests.

Although China’s involvement in peacekeeping in South Sudan should not be overstated in terms of its scope and extent, it does seem to signal the beginning of a far more assertive role in Africa’s peace and security issues.

At the same time, as much as China is being forced to adopt high risk strategies in cases of overseas investment, as in South Sudan, its approach can still be defined as being carefully impartial. It remains true that China’s increased involvement in political dynamics in South Sudan doesn’t sit easily with its long held policy of non-intervention.

A new colonialism?

Will China’s presence in Africa – including its military footprint in Djibouti – turn into a new form of colonialism in Africa?

I believe this is highly unlikely. China remains acutely aware of the pitfalls associated with the politics of interventionism, especially in developing nations. It wants developing countries to regard it as a friend in global politics.

But it wouldn’t be surprising if China started to apply at least a measure of military (hard) power alongside diplomatic (soft) power if it believes its economic interests are under threat.

African leaders must be realistic about developments such as the Djibouti military base. They can’t welcome China’s presence – and investments – as an acceptable alternative to America, while opposing Beijing’s use of diplomatic – and even military – means to protect its interests.

Theo Neethling, Professor and Head: Political Studies and Governance in the Humanities Faculty, University of the Free State

This article was originally published on The Conversation.