Explainer: what is ballistic missile defence – and would it stop a missile from North Korea?

The US and several of its allies currently deploy several ballistic missile defence systems that would be used in the event North Korea actually launched an attack.
Reuters/KCNA

North Korea’s test this week of an intercontinental ballistic missile has reignited interest and debate on the feasibility of ballistic missile defence systems, and whether countries such as Australia should seek to acquire them.

But what are these systems, and how do they work? How effective would they be in providing a defence against a potential missile attack?

How do they work?

All ballistic missile defence systems consist of a network of tracking and guidance radars, and the interceptor launchers.

On detecting a ballistic missile launch, the radars track the missile’s trajectory, fire an interceptor to shoot it down, and prepare further interceptors to be launched if the first one misses.

This is referred to as a “shoot-look-shoot” strategy, as opposed to a strategy of saturation – where the defender simply shoots as many interceptors as possible in the hope of achieving a kill.

Modern defence systems use interceptor missiles carrying kinetic kill vehicles. These are warheads that are non-explosive and designed to destroy incoming ballistic missiles by simply crashing into them.

All of the systems mentioned below are intended to work in conjunction with one another. They are integrated to provide the ability to shoot down ballistic missiles throughout their flight path. However, they are also capable of operating independently, although with less effectiveness than if operated in conjunction with other systems.

Missile defence systems in the region

The US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific currently deploy several ballistic missile defence systems. These would be used in the unlikely event that North Korea decided to actually launch a ballistic missile attack.

The first and most prominent is Terminal High Altitude Area Defence, or THAAD, which the US has deployed in South Korea. THAAD is designed to shoot down ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight – that is, as the ballistic missile is re-entering the atmosphere to strike its target.

The second relevant system is Patriot PAC-3, which is designed to provide late terminal phase interception – that is, after the missile has re-entered the atmosphere. It is deployed by US forces operating in the region, as well as Japan.

THAAD and Patriot PAC-3 interceptors at work.

Perhaps the most capable system currently in operation in the region is the Aegis naval system, which is deployed on US and Japanese destroyers. It is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase of flight – that is, when the missile is outside of earth’s atmosphere and transiting to its target.

The Aegis system in action.

What all of these systems have in common is they are theatre ballistic missile defence systems, designed to provide protection against short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the one tested by North Korea this week, fly too high and fast for these systems to engage with.

Aegis has demonstrated some limited capability to engage targets similar to intercontinental ballistic missiles. It was used to shoot down a malfunctioning spy satellite in 2008, but has never been tested against an actual intercontinental ballistic missile target.

The only system expressly designed to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles is the US Ground-based Midcourse Defence. However, this has a very patchy record in testing. By the end of 2017 it will only have 44 interceptors deployed.

How effective are they?

None of these systems is 100% effective, and most have an iffy record in testing. Aegis has succeeded in 35 out of 42 tests, while Ground-based Midcourse Defence has had only ten successes in 18 tests. However, THAAD has been successful in 18 out of 18 tests.

Tests are conducted in favourable conditions – and it is reasonable to expect the success rates to be lower in actual combat use.

The true difficulty lies with intercontinental ballistic missiles. An intercontinental ballistic missile can attain altitudes well in excess of low earth orbit. Those fired on a typical long-range trajectory can exceed 1,200km in altitude. The high-trajectory, short-range test shot North Korea conducted this week attained an altitude of 2,700km.

By way of comparison, the International Space Station orbits at an altitude of around 400km.

However, the altitude intercontinental ballistic missiles attain is only part of the problem. The other major challenge facing ballistic missile defence is the truly enormous speeds that missiles attain during the terminal phase. They often hit or exceed 20 times the speed of sound.

A common comparison used is that ballistic missile defence is akin to shooting a bullet in flight with another bullet. The reality is even more extreme.

For example, a .300 Winchester Magnum (a high-velocity hunting and sniper round) can achieve a velocity of 2,950 feet per second as it leaves the barrel. This equates to 3,237km/h, or 2.62 times the speed of sound. An intercontinental ballistic missile can achieve speeds almost eight times faster than this. As a result, it is almost impossible to reliably defend against such missiles.

This is not necessarily a problem for countries such as Japan and South Korea. Any ballistic missile used by North Korea against them would be a shorter-range ballistic missile that these systems could engage.

However, countries should be mindful that these systems provide limited-to-no capability to defend against intercontinental ballistic missiles. In Australia’s case, the only missiles capable of reaching this far from North Korea are intercontinental ballistic missiles. Thus, even if Australia decided to invest in ballistic missile defence, it would provide little-to-no protection from a potential North Korean nuclear attack.

James Dwyer, Teaching Fellow and PhD Candidate, Politics and International Relations Program, University of Tasmania
Read the original article.

ANC policy conference: deeper polarisation and a stalemate for South Africa

President Jacob Zuma at the opening of the ANC’s 5th national policy conference in Johannesburg.
EPA/Stringer

South Africa’s governing African National Congress’s previous four policy conferences have given a very good indication of what the policy resolutions will be at the national conferences that follow. As a result it was possible to anticipate whether changes in policies or continuity would characterise the next five years, several months before the final conference.

Can the same be expected of the ANC’s 5th policy conference?.

The ANC’s National Conference, held every five years, is its highest decision-making body in terms of electing its leaders and adopting policies. A policy conference is held a few months before the national conference to prepare draft policy resolutions after extensive debates.

Traditionally, ANC policy conferences have been dominated by economic policy matters. More recently the issue of organisational renewal has also taken centre stage. At the last two National Conferences (2007, 2012) two sets of candidates (“slates”) dominated the proceedings. The result is that policy matters have increasingly become shorthand – or soundbites – for support for different candidates.

In 2007 then president Thabo Mbeki was regarded as neo-liberal and Jacob Zuma as pro-poor and pro-workers. The same applies this year: radical economic transformation – or white monopoly capital – is a code for Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who President Zuma prefers to succeed him. The code for supporters of Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa is state capture, an inclusive economy and radical socio-economic transformation.

What this means as one analyses the essence of the 2017 policy conference is that focus is no longer primarily on policy. Rather it’s on policy as a means towards a political end – succession.

Challenges facing ANC and South Africa

The boycott by the ANC stalwarts and veterans and the Umkhonto we Sizwe Council overshadowed the first conference days. President Zuma’s opening speech defiantly delegitimised their call for a consultative conference. (The ANC held national consultative conferences only three times in its history, in 1962, 1969 and 1985 while it was banned and mainly in exile at critical stages in its history to resolve important issues). Zuma also challenged his opponents in the ANC and accused them of being responsible for factionalism in the party and its organisational malaise.

ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe, on the other hand, tabled a controversial diagnostic organisational report which could not be suppressed by Zuma’s supporters. The first part of the proceedings was therefore at best a quasi-consultative conference with no tangible results but rather posturing by the two main blocs in the ANC.

ANC and South African presidential hopefuls Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.
Siphiwe Sibeko

Nine discussion documents have been published as the basis of the policy discussions. Do they present an accurate picture of the state of the nation and the policy remedies South Africans expect?

The issues that the ANC as government has to address are well-known but often clouded in managerial jargon. One can reduce them to three overarching challenges.

The ANC is, firstly, engulfed in a crisis of credibility and integrity – even one of legitimacy despite its electoral majority. Unethical governance, egoistic tendencies and a decline in the ethos of service provision are all contributing factors. The policy conference’s organisation renewal mandate is therefore of paramount importance.

Secondly, the ANC has to engage directly with the economic downward spiral – the current recession, credit downgrading and low foreign direct investment. South Africa is also increasingly in competition with new African and other emerging markets. The domestic economy relies on mining as its primary source of foreign currency earnings while its contribution to the GDP continues a long pattern of decline. Agriculture too has been a major source of job creation. But that too is in decline. South Africa’s economy is changing while government policies aren’t keeping abreast.

Thirdly, a social crisis characterised by inequality, unemployment, family dysfunctionality, crime and drug abuse appears to have entered a vicious circle without effective government counter strategies. The gap between rural and urban life experiences is widening while the ANC’s panacea for it – namely land ownership – has not yet produced tangible results.

What do South Africans expect of the ANC and has the conference engaged with these ideals? In a generalised and simplified form, South Africans want to trust the public domain and want to see moral leadership. They want to have hope for the future and are willing to work together even under difficult circumstances. The Mandela era galvanised national pride and South Africans want to return to that. They also want to see a society based on fairness and with democracy that delivers positive results for them.

The ANC’s slogan of “a better life for all” does reflect some of these ideals. The National Development Plan (NDP) in principle also endorsed them. But the devil is in the detail. Both the NDP and the ANC’s strategy and tactics document tabled at the conference depend on a “developmental state” for implementation. The developmental state (as represented by post-war Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and others) is therefore the cornerstone of the ANC’s approach.

But it’s premised on a public sector with strong human and governance capacity as well as widespread consensus on how private-public partnerships can be used to stimulate and coordinate the economy. It also requires consensus on national priorities.

These premises are weak in South Africa and a policy conference is meant to address them.

Shortcomings

The main shortcomings in the ANC’s approach to policy are twofold. The first is that it concentrates almost exclusively on policy objectives but very little on policy strategies: how to achieve them; how to manage and coordinate policies. Government officials are often without a policy roadmap.

The second is that the ANC’s historical legacy places on limits its policy imagination. “Colonialism of a special type” is still the point of departure of the latest strategy and tactics document. A neo-colonial form of it is contemplated but even this makes exploration of options beyond its confines very difficult. At the same time socio-economic conditions in South Africa are changing radically. This includes urbanisation and the growth of the black middle class.

The National Policy Conference hasn’t recommended significant policy changes. The leadership changes in December 2017 might herald new policies. But this policy conference doesn’t provide South Africans with any basis of what might be possible. It has been too preoccupied with leadership succession.

The outcome is probably a deeper polarisation within the ANC and a consolidation of “two ANCs” with no pivotal decision making centre. This effectively amounts to a stalemate. This will be experienced in both the NEC and the national cabinet.

The National Conference is the only remaining constitutional mechanism that can make a difference. But the 18 months after December and before the 2019 general election might be too short to rescue the ANC.

Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South Africa

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

South Africa's problems lie in political negligence, not its Constitution

Many are questioning South Africa’s constitutional democracy amid high poverty and unemployment.
Reuters/Mike Hutchings

South Africa is witnessing another wave of disillusionment with the constitutional arrangement that followed the end of apartheid in 1994. As the country advances towards the third decade of democracy the sentiment is that the constitution is an obstacle to meaningful economic transformation. It’s roundly criticised for putting a brake on much needed wealth redistribution, following centuries of colonialism and apartheid oppression of the black majority.

President Jacob Zuma has even alluded to the need to amend the constitution to enable accelerated radical land reform.

Why, indeed, has the country not made the kinds of social and economic advances that were promised in the negotiated settlement and incorporated in the 1996 constitution?

South Africa’s constitution is admired globally. It incorporates hard fought for political and civil rights, and a generous range of social and economic rights that can be enforced by courts. Why then do so many South Africans, mostly black, still live amid widespread poverty? Why do they continue to live in segregated spaces that reinforce apartheid geography?

With a constitution locating equality and dignity as its preeminent principle, why do so many women and children still suffer from such disturbing levels of violence? Why is unemployment so alarmingly high in the face of vivid affluence and consumerism?

These questions go to the heart of the South African dilemma, namely, persistent economic inequalities and poverty. Some even perceive this as the failure of the South African constitutional project.

But has the constitutional project failed? And is the country’s constitution the problem? I believe not. The provisions in the constitution, if properly implemented and enforced, have the capacity to change the lives of the majority of South Africans.

What’s failed

There are many reasons for the country’s inability to realise the rights set out on the constitution. They include a lack of political will on the part of all spheres of government (national, provincial, and local), bureaucratic indifference or incompetence, corruption and mismanagement.

Other problems concern either ineptitude of the so-called Chapter 9 institutions, established to strengthen the country’s constitutional democracy, including the Human Rights Commission and the Gender Commission. And the failure of government to implement their recommendations.

The reasons also relate to the failure of government to implement court decisions.

But a narrow focus on only law and the courts will yield only limited results and constrict the transformative possibilities of the constitution.

The ability of the constitution to change the lives of the majority of South Africans is particularly true if enforcement involves a broad spectrum of societal actors. This includes government, the corporate community and civil society, the media and the various professions, the trade union movement and religious bodies.

The range of social and economic rights in the constitution include the right of access to education, health care, food, water, social security, a clean environment and housing. Many have been litigated, often with judgements in favour of the applicants. But often the judgements haven’t been properly been implemented and enforced.

The most successful cases have been those where the plaintiffs have worked closely with civil society advocates to ensure that the court’s decision is implemented. A good example is the Treatment Action Campaign case that forced government to roll out anti-retroviral medication to HIV positive pregnant women in public hospitals.

The property hot potato

Arguably the land question is the most pertinent in South Africa. Not surprisingly the section of the constitution that’s viewed as the greatest impediment to “radical” economic transformation is Section 25 – the so-called property section.

The right to property ownership is often seen as protecting the interests of white property owners over poor black South Africans. Is this fair?

I don’t believe so.

The protection of the right to property should protect everyone in a market economy. And most people want their property protected. But these protections don’t preclude the possibility of addressing the colonial and apartheid legacy of land theft from black South Africans.

Grinding poverty is forcing many young South Africans into scavenging.
Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko

Section 25 allows for land to be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest. The definition of public interest includes “the nation’s commitment to land reform and to bring about equitable access to all SA’s natural resources”. The clause sets out the terms (“just and equitable”) for compensating owners of land earmarked for expropriation. Most significantly, Section 25 provides that

property is not limited to land.

Section 25 also provides for land reform through restitution and redistribution. It does this by enabling “a person or community whose tenure of land is insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices” to tenure that is legally secure, or of comparable redress, as provided for in legislation.

In addition, government is mandated to take affirmative action, within its available resources, to

foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.

These provisions create great possibility for addressing land shortage, security of tenure and other deprivations as a result of South Africa’s colonial and apartheid history.

Failure to act

That successive South African governments have clearly not implemented the provisions of section 25 shows political negligence, a betrayal of its own policies and a failure of governance.

Section 25 provides government with a clear directive that must be matched with a solid commitment to act. Section 237 of the constitution directs that “all constitutional obligations must be performed diligently and without delay”.

The government clearly has not satisfied its constitutional obligations – and must do so with substantive thought and with urgency.

The Constitutional Court has on several occasions heeded the government to take action. For example, in the Tongoane case in 2010 Justice Ngcobo noted the priority that land restitution and security of tenure must be given. He noted:

We are mindful that Parliament’s legislative plate is overflowing. These matters, have, however now become pressing and should be treated with the urgency that they deserve.

In light of government’s failure to fulfil its side of the bargain, it would be foolhardy to consider amending the constitution without considering the findings of the Motlanthe Commission. Set up by the National Assembly, the commission will investigate the impact of key laws passed by the South African parliament since 1994 with a special focus on eradicating economic inequality. It could provide a blueprint for government action if, as expected, it sets out recommendations on social and economic rights, including land.

While the untold misery and deep humiliation that people endured under colonialism and apartheid cannot be fully compensated, they may have their rights to dignity and equality restored through government laws and other actions. If government doesn’t act, then civil society actors and key institutions should consider interventions that may force its hand.

It’s not the constitution’s failure to deliver “radical economic” transformation, but a lacklustre government that has forgotten its promises – first adopted in the Freedom Charter and then again in the constitution.

Penelope Andrews, Dean of Law and Professor, University of Cape Town

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Months after fire Hout Bay explodes

People from Imizamo Yethu who are in temporary shelters say the City must make good on its promises

By Thembela Ntongana
3 July 2017

Residents protest the lack of progress reblocking Imizamo Yethu. Photo: Ashraf Hendricks

Protests in Imizamo Yethu in Hout Bay continued for the third day on Monday. Residents displaced by the devastating fire earlier this year have spent months in a temporary relocation area (TRA) on a sports field and are now demanding better living conditions. Protesters said they would not stop until Mayor Patricia de Lille addressed them.

The City had said reblocking of the informal settlement would take three months and it was essential in order to prevent future fires.

From the outset, there were people who said they did not trust the City to complete the reblocking in the prescribed time. They referred to people who moved in 2004 to make way for roads for the community but who are still living in TRAs.

 A protester carries corrugated iron sheets used for housing to block a road. Photo: Ashraf Hendricks

Residents say protests on Monday started at 3am when hundreds of people cut down trees and used their house building starter kits, which have been standing at the sports field for months, to barricade the road. A metro police van at one of the TRAs was turned upside down and another one was torched.

Monica Makhonxa, who lives in a TRA with her two granddaughters, said she was meant to go to the hospital for treatment but there was no one to take her because of the protests. However, she said, “I feel their pain. I also stay here and it is not a nice place to stay. It is wet and cold.”

Another resident, Thembela Makhiwane, who stays with four of her children, said, “I was willing to stay in this small place for three months because I wanted myself and my children to go back to a safer community … But no work has been done to the area.”

Chairperson of the Imizamo Yethu Movement Mkhululi Ndude said the City promised water, electricity and roads. “Now we are demanding those promises.”

Ndude lives with his wife and three children. “We are tired of empty promises. We told them [the City] we want a memorandum of agreement. They still have not provided us with one,” he said.

Police use stun grenades to disperse protesters outside the SAPS office. Photo: Ashraf Hendricks

De Lille arrived on Monday but police told her it was not safe.

Ward councillor Bheki Radebe had difficulties containing the crowd.

News that the mayor had come and gone did not go down well with residents. Protesters demanded that before any further negotiations can take place, several people arrested earlier in the day must be released.

Residents went to the police station to protest, singing songs and blocking the door to the police station. Police started shooting rubber bullets and fired stun grenades. More arrests followed.
Later, seven people were elected to go and meet with the mayor. De Lille returned and addressed the residents. But Thembela Makhiwane said that residents felt it was the same things she said four months ago.

In a press statement, De Lille said, “I am prioritising this matter and I am personally leading this and unblocking any issues.” She appealed to the police to arrest any “criminal elements”.

A statement from the City said: “The mayor committed to speeding up all phases of the reblocking project to ensure that all phases continue at a faster pace and simultaneously. … The mayor is meeting with senior management in the City at the moment and will then have another follow up meeting with the community leadership to update them later this evening.”

A burnt out vehicle in Imizamo Yethu. Photo: Ashraf Hendricks

---

Published originally on GroundUp .

---

Gupta-owned company demands R10 million for defamation

Re-Action Consulting’s claims about Optimum were widely known and probably true

By Nathan Geffen and Lilly Wimberly
3 July 2017

Optimum Coal Mine has failed to pay the final tranche to finish building this clinic in Hendrina, Mpumalanga, pictured here during its construction. It is now 95% complete. Photo supplied

The Gupta-owned company Optimum Coal Mine has issued a summons for R10 million against a small company. Optimum alleges Re-Action Consulting, which builds public health clinics, has published false and defamatory statements in court papers.

The Daily Maverick, AmaBhungane, News24, TimesLive, and even GroundUp, have between them published numerous widely circulated highly damaging claims about the Gupta family, their companies, agents and representatives, including Optimum. So did the Public Protector in the report State of Capture. Yet, as far as we are aware no litigation is active against these institutions for defamation by the Guptas or their companies (we’ve confirmed this with Daily Maverick and AmaBhungane).

Re-Action is litigating to get Optimum wound up for being unable to pay its debts. This came after Optimum failed to pay approximately R4 million to Re-Action for the building of a clinic in Mpumalanga Province as part of Optimum’s social and labour commitments under the Mining Charter.

Optimum’s response has been to sue Re-Action for statements in the latter’s founding affidavit that merely repeat allegations that have already appeared in the media and are well-known to the public. Optimum’s summons to Re-Action is dated 11 May, well after these allegations had appeared in the media or Public Protector’s report, and over a month before GroundUp reported that Re-Action is litigating against Optimum. Yet Re-Action’s founding affidavit, albeit a document that is in theory available to members of the public if they go and get it from the High Court in Johannesburg, has almost certainly been read by no more than a handful of people involved in the court case.

The amount Optimum is demanding is also out of kilter with South African defamation cases: R1 million in special and R9 million for general damages. An advocate who specialises in defamation explained to GroundUp that to win special damages, the plaintiff must provide proof that the statements caused measurable suffering, such as contracts lost. General damages are subjective and difficult to quantify, such as a loss to reputation or “pain and suffering”. Courts are conservative when it comes to awarding general damages. The advocate said that he is unaware of any cases where more than R250,000 has been awarded.

Optimum did not respond to a request for comment.

Defamation cases are extremely hard for the plaintiff to win in South Africa. Since most or all of the claims (see below) are likely true and in the public interest (a standard defence against defamation claims), it is improbable that Optimum will convince a court to find in its favour.

The allegedly defamatory statements in Re-Action’s court papers that Optimum is suing for include (quotes lightly edited for length and to correct typos):

• The Gupta family has “faced much criticism for their involvement in business transactions which are the subject matter of scrutiny and investigation by the press, public and the relevant authorities” that are “to the detriment of the country”.
  
• “Optimum has been dogged by controversy since being purchased by the Gupta controlled Oakbay Resources and Energy Limited”.
  
• “As of 5 December 2016, Mr Johan Burger of FirstRand Bank Limited admitted that the accounts had been closed because of FirstRand Bank Limited’s suspicions that Oakbay Resources and Energy Limited have been guilty of money laundering.”
  
• The “lack of a bank account will ensure [Optimum or Oakbay] will inevitably and invariably become financially distressed.”
  
• The founding affidavit references the Public Protector’s State of Capture report’s description of how Eskom colluded with the Gupta family to purchase Optimum at a reduced price, and how Tegeta funds are being laundered offshore instead of being paid to Optimum.
  
• Gupta-owned “Tegeta Resources & Energy was interposed as an intermediary between Eskom and [Optimum] in order to artificially inflate the price of coal sold to Eskom.”
  
• The founding affidavit refers to allegations of Optimum’s misappropriation of its R1.3 billion rehabilitation fund.
  
• “The media is rife with articles related to the Respondent’s precarious financial position …”.
  
• A liquidator should be placed in control of Optimum to prevent further misappropriation of money.
  

---

Published originally on GroundUp .

---