Cyril Ramaphosa's Marikana massacre "apology" is disingenuous and dishonest

South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa’s apology for Marikana has ignited controversy.
EWN/Dr Jack

South Africa’s Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, has “apologised” for his actions in the run up the Marikana massacre when police killed 34 striking mineworkers on August 16, 2012. His supposed apology during a speech at Rhodes University on May 7, 2017 – reportedly followed advice by struggle stalwart Winnie Madikizela-Mandela that he make amends and visit Marikana.

But, was it a proper apology?

Ramaphosa only referred to “language” he used in emails to fellow Lonmin directors, which he said “may have been unfortunate” and “not appropriate”.

But, to the best of my knowledge, no one has ever requested an apology for “language”. The concern is about his actions and their relationship to the killings.

Ramaphosa added that it was never his intention to have 34 mineworkers killed, but this again skirts the issue. Nobody suggested he was responsible for the 34 deaths, which followed after police opened fire on protesting miners and employees of Lonmin Mine in Marikana.

The argument is that his intervention made bloodshed more likely and that he could probably have stopped the killings had he acted differently. His critics (me included) are very clear that his failure to insist on negotiations led to the deaths.

Some fact checking is in order.

What the Marikana Commission found

The evidence in the Marikana Commission of Inquiry showed that Ramaphosa interceded at two specific moments. We need to separate these if his culpability is to be accurately assessed. Of course he may have been involved on other occasions, but we don’t know about these.

• The first intervention was on August 12 2012, when he contacted then minister of police, Nathi Mthethwa, successfully lobbying him to send more police officers to Marikana.

In his recent weekend apology, Ramaphosa claimed:

Ten workers had been killed and my role was to stop further deaths.

In fact, at the time he spoke with Mthethwa, only two workers, both security guards, had been killed. The commission felt that, in contacting the police minister, Ramaphosa had acted responsibly, and this is not an unreasonable conclusion.

• The second intervention was on August 15, the day before the massacre. We know about this through the flurry of emails that Ramaphosa authored and received. These don’t contain any evidence that he was acting benevolently.

By now there were about 800 police on the ground at Marikana, so no need to lobby for more. The focus of his new role was to persuade Susan Shabangu, then minister of mineral resources, that the Marikana miners were not engaging in a labour dispute but “a dastardly criminal act”.

The significance of this is that if the conflict could be redefined, decisive police action could be justified. Ramaphosa was opposed to negotiations, which could have prevented further loss of blood. Instead, he supported the position of Lonmin and the South African Police Service, which would inevitably lead to deaths. Nobody planned for exactly 34 deaths, but deaths were anticipated, and Ramaphosa’s supposed apology is silent on this.

The case against Ramaphosa

We don’t know the full extent of Ramaphosa’s knowledge about the operation planned for August 16. But, given his position as a director of Lonmin and willingness to act in its interests, it’s unlikely he was unaware of “the plan” (which included use of lethal force).

Certainly two of Lonmin’s vice presidents, Barnard Mokwena and Mark Munroe, were in the loop before the operation got underway. Thus, in my view there’s a prima facie case for charging them with being accessories to murder.

Would they really have kept Ramaphosa in the dark? One reason we don’t know the answer is that Lonmin’s role was inadequately investigated by the commission. The company’s representatives, including Ramaphosa, also only spent short periods at the commission’s witness desk.

South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa at the Farlam Commission, in 2014.
Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko

In my opinion, there’s enough evidence to charge Ramaphosa under the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, a possibility flagged at the inquiry by counsel for injured and arrested persons, Dali Mpofu.

It’s possible that because he was pushing for a murder charge against Ramaphosa, Mpofu lacked the time to pursue this lesser crime. In one of his emails, Ramaphosa tells his Lonmin colleagues:

[d]iscussion with Minister Susan Shabangu –- I called her and told her that her silence and inaction about what is happening at Lonmin was bad for her and the government.

Given that, as acknowledged by the commission, Ramaphosa was a senior member of the governing ANC with enough weight to place pressure on the minister of police, the final words in the statement could be considered a threat. Whether or not Shabangu was influenced by Ramaphosa is not critical in terms of the law -– making the threat (just like offering a bribe) is illegal.

Elsewhere, Ramaphosa seeks to convey that he was a friend of the workers. But, as chairperson of Lonmin’s transformation committee he was responsible for the company’s failure to abide by its commitment to build 5,500 houses for employees, instead completing only three dwellings. Moreover, he benefited materially from the low wages that were the main grievance raised by the striking workers

Ramaphosa had been general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers and, later, as secretary general of the African National Congress he had led his party in talks that brought an end to apartheid. He was a skilled negotiator perfectly positioned to bring a peaceful settlement to the dispute, but instead he aligned himself with Lonmin and the police in their attempt to crush the strike using lethal force.

What needs to happen

For an apology from Ramaphosa to have credibility, there should be full disclosure of everything he knows. This has not yet happened.

Furthermore, the following should happen:

• Full compensation to be paid, without further delay, to miners who were injured or wrongfully arrested and to the families of workers who were killed;
• Adequate funding for investigations by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate into which police officers should be prosecuted for the Marikana massacre deaths;
• Charging the police whose case files are now with the National Prosecuting Authority; and
• The immediate dismissal of Police Commissioner General Riah Phiyega, who was suspended after the commission found she lied during her testimony.

The Claassen Inquiry, appointed by President Jacob Zuma, recommended her sacking over six months ago, yet she continues to collect a large salary more than four years after a massacre in which she played a pivotal part.

Ramaphosa’s “apology” makes one wonder whether he’s in denial or just a desperate politician with presidential ambitions. But his expressed regret was dishonest and disingenuous, and will not remove the stain that Marikana placed on his reputation.

Peter Alexander is the author of various publications on Marikana, most recently an assessment of the Farlam Commission of Inquiry published in the Journal of Southern African Studies.

Peter Alexander, Centre for Social Change, University of Johannesburg

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

White monopoly capital: good politics, bad sociology, worse economics

Many would like to consign the polarising debate about “white monopoly capitalism” (WMC) in South Africa to the margins. They argue that its proponents are nothing more than Marxist ideologues or mischievous political manipulators

But, even if we query the integrity of the term WMC, its introduction into South Africa’s contemporary discourse is indisputably good for the country’s politics.

Above all, it’s an urgent reminder that the inequalities of wealth, income and opportunity in this country are not only extreme but still highly racialised. It forces people to ask why, even under a black government, a white minority continues to dominate the most productive parts of the economy.

The extremes of racialised inequality in the country are not just an affront to social justice but are also politically explosive. Granted, the implementation of employment equity and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has somewhat ameliorated racialised patterns of wealth and ownership. But, no one should be surprised when black people at the bottom of the heap get angry. Neither should people be surprised that there are politicians who, for reasons good and ill, are willing to exploit that anger and mobilise around it.

For the last twenty years, mainstream politics has talked a lot about addressing the extremity of inequality, but has done little about it. The governing African National Congress (ANC) has indulged in much egalitarian rhetoric while the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) has targeted “equality of opportunity”.

In practice, both have embraced the mantra that a rising tide in the economy will lift all boats. But, today the tide has long been out. The boats are stuck in the mud. And it’s taken the rise of the radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) to shake the major parties out of their complacency by espousing a revolutionary assault upon WMC.

That’s a major plus for the country’s politics. A serious conversation about the continued racialisation of wealth, inequality and poverty is needed. Yet the problem for the EFF, and those who simplistically target WMC, is the dismal nature of their sociology.

Monopoly capital under apartheid

White monopoly capital was at its most cohesive and concentrated during the late phases of apartheid. In 1981, over 70% of the total assets of the top 138 companies were controlled by state corporations and eight privately owned conglomerate. These spanned mining, manufacturing, construction, transport, agriculture and finance.

Further concentration followed the mounting political crisis of the 1980s. Foreign companies disinvested and sold their assets locally. Unable to invest abroad during late apartheid, the conglomerates invested their excess capital by buying local assets that were often distant from their core business.

By 1990, just three conglomerates – Anglo-American, Sanlam and Old Mutual – controlled a whopping 75% of the total capitalisation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Given the overwhelmingly domestic and white nature of the ownership of these companies, as well as the astoundingly high level of concentration of capital in a handful of conglomerates, we could fairly – even usefully – refer to “WMC”. But things have changed considerably since then.

Changing corporate landscape

The democratic era that started with the ascension to power of the ANC in 1994 has seen major changes in a corporate structure which had historically revolved around a minerals-energy-complex dominated by the major conglomerates.

The opening of the economy to the global market post-apartheid, led to major processes of “unbundling”, as conglomerates shed their “non-core” assets in search of “shareholder value”. By 2016, Anglo-American’s share of market capitalisation on the JSE had shrunk to as low as 15%.

In addition, foreign money poured in, some to purchase unbundled assets, some to invest in an expanding financial sector. Yet some simply sought to make short term returns from high interest rates. Correspondingly, the role of the banks and private investment institutions increased. By 2010, financial institutions (14%) – along with mining houses (37%) accounted for over half of market capitalisation of the JSE by 2010. The economy was now dominated by a minerals-energy-finance-complex.

Alongside the growing financialisation of the economy, there has been a shift in racial patterns of ownership. At the end of apartheid, companies listed on the JSE were almost wholly owned by white South African investors. But, by 2016, (if we accept the calculations done by Alternative Prosperity) white South African ownership was down to just 22%.

Julius Malema leads a protest by the Economic Freedom Fighters to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko

Meanwhile, foreign ownership had leapt to 39%, black direct ownership (mainly through BEE schemes) to 10% and black indirect ownership (largely through pension funds) to 13%, with another 16% uncategorised.

Such statistics are always a matter of controversy. President Jacob Zuma recently insisted that black ownership of the JSE was as low as 3%. Yet the trend towards both greater foreign ownership and increased black ownership is indisputable. Three major issues follow.

Evolving ownership patterns

Large scale capital in South Africa is less monopolised and more diversified in its ownership than it was under apartheid (even if major corporates continue to dominate). It follows that the country needs to grasp how the nature of capitalism is changing. For a start, the growth in black pension funds reflects the strong upward movement of black people into the higher ranks of the public service since 1994.

Even if we continue to refer to “monopoly capitalism” in these circumstances, it makes far less sense to refer to it, uncritically, as “white”. Yes, it’s probable that the major stake of foreign investment is ultimately owned (largely indirectly via institutional investments) by foreigners who are white. But, does this suggest that we would prefer that they were yellow or brown? Surely that takes us on to very shaky territory? Should we categorise the Gupta empire – the politically-connected family at the centre of state captures – as “brown monopoly capitalism?”

Critics such as Prof Chris Malikane, the economic adviser to Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba, have objected that the growth of black investment on the JSE is not significant. That’s because, they argue, black pension funds are largely controlled by white asset managers. And black direct investments via BEE schemes are largely funded through debt owed to white capital. These are certainly very real issues. But, is the main issue here the racial patterns of ownership and control – or the growing power of financial institutions and their lack of accountability?

All this means that it’s simply too crude, too simplistic and too out of date to depict the economy in broad brush terms as under the domination of white monopoly capital. The reality is more complex. It follows that suggestions that the decolonisation of the economy demands the nationalisation of WMC is profoundly bad economics.

The troubled experiences of South Africa’s state-owned enterprises such as South African Airways, Eskom and PetroSA do nothing to inspire confidence. What the economy might gain in terms of direct state ownership would be confounded by flight of capital and know-how. Class rule by capitalists would be replaced by class rule by state managers who would be no more accountable to ordinary citizens than their predecessors.

Innovative solutions needed

South Africa needs to devise far more inventive solutions than nationalisation to tackle the brutally unequal nature of its economy. Citizens need to pose profound questions about how to make international capital more accountable. They must ask questions about how to make the country’s corporate elite more accountable and how state capital can work productively with private capital while remaining responsive to local communities. And, yes, about how present patterns of corporate ownership can be not only de-racialised but democratised.

Yes, it’s a nice idea to think of overthrowing “white monopoly capital”, but we need to think very carefully of what we might replace it with!

Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Solomonic wisdom needed to settle tiff over God in South Africa's public schools

The place of religion in South Africa’s public schools is set to come under scrutiny when two groups battle it out in court later this month.

From 15 to 17 May the Gauteng High Court will hear the long awaited case, Organisasie vir Godsdienste-Onderrig en Demokrasie (OGOD) v Laerskool Randhart & Others.

OGOD’s Afrikaans name translates into “Organisation for Religions Education and Democracy” in English. According to its website, OGOD endeavours to promote fact-based education about religions of the world. It also seeks to eradicate religious indoctrination in South African public schools and promote a democratic, secular society based on human rights.

The organisation is taking on six public schools to prohibit them from identifying themselves as Christian and to outlaw their Christian practices. It also wants the court to declare that it’s unconstitutional for “any public school” to commit or permit any religious observance.

The legal basis for the suit is that these schools have breached the National Policy on Religion and Education by conducting religious observances and other religious activities. This, OGOD claims, is unconstitutional as it violates the right to equality and religious freedom. It argues that these schools cannot, for example, teach that non-believers will go to hell. The organisation also insists that pupils cannot be required to pray and sing Christian songs.

According to OGOD’s heads of argument, these schools are targeted specifically because they:

• adopt a single faith approach to religious observances,
• endorse Christianity,
• advertise themselves as Christian, and
• have scripture reading and prayers, among other actions.

It’s interesting to note that most South Africans identify as religious. The bulk of them, 85,6%, are overwhelmingly Christian. Muslims are 2%, Hindus 1% and Jews 0.2%. The rest belong to other faiths.

For their part, the six schools argue that although they are majority Christian, they also accommodate other religions, in keeping with the prescriptions of their school governing bodies.

They counter that the relief sought by OGOD is drastic, and would effectively eliminate religion at all public schools in the country.

South Africa and secularism

This case is extremely complex, with a variety of arguments about the proper place of religion at all public institutions. OGOD’s stated objective to make South Africa a democratic and human rights based society is laudable. But, its claim to be doing so under the auspices of secularism is not uncontroversial.

That is because South Africa is not a strictly secular country. South Africa doesn’t have the similar strict separation between religion and the state as found in the United States, for example. It also doesn’t adhere to strict forms of secularism found in countries such as France where merely wearing a Muslim headscarf sparked controversy.

Yet, the absence of strict secularism doesn’t mean that South Africa is a theocracy. Secularism comes in many forms and has several ideological presuppositions of its own. South Africa adheres to a “soft” form of secularism, to the extent that it has some separation between religion and state. But, this separation also allows for cooperation between the law and religion.

This much has also been made clear in the National Policy on Religion and Education. It’s this very document that OGOD wants to ensure is being implemented correctly. The policy proposes a cooperative relationship between religion and the state. This means that both the principle of separation and the possibility of creative interaction between state and religion are affirmed.

Such a “non-establishment” approach was also recently supported in the case of Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education. The Constitutional Court declared corporal punishment in schools unconstitutional. Although it found religious motivations could not serve as a justification for corporal punishment in schools, former Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs stated:

(religion and religious people) are part of the fabric of public life and constitute active elements of the diverse and pluralistic nation contemplated by the Constitution.

By recognising the need to accommodate both the religious and secular beliefs within the framework of managing a diverse society, section 15 of the constitution doesn’t require a strict separation between state institutions and religious observances. Examples include oaths of public office, the country’s national anthem and interfaith prayers at official funerals.

Section 15(2) of the Constitution allows for religious observances when all the constitutional requirements are met. Such observances must:

• follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities,
• must be conducted on an equitable basis, and
• their attendance must be voluntary.

Religious observances have also been protected by courts where pupils in public schools wanted to wear religious attire.

Promoting a cooperative relationship

South African law and case law clearly protect the right to religious freedom (section 15) and equality (section 9). These are upheld when all religions are treated the same in public schools. In light of the allowance of religious observances under section 15, and the fact that South Africa is not a strictly secular state, religion is allowed in public schools.

On the other hand, public schools cannot claim to be promoting religious freedom on an equal basis if they cater for some religions only, or for the majority religion only. If a school wishes to allow religious observances, it needs to provide the same opportunities for all religions. It also needs to ensure that attendance is voluntary and in line with the constitution.

This court case has the potential to affect the right to religious freedom in public schools and other state institutions. It needs to be decided with the utmost sensitivity to the nature of religion and its importance in the lives of its adherents.

Due regard must also be given to the fact that South Africa is a religiously diverse country. Otherwise, the outcome may have far-reaching discriminatory effects for religious freedom in the future.

Georgia Alida du Plessis, Research Fellow in Public Law, University of the Free State

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Zuma's attack on capital is digging South Africa into a deeper hole

South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress, is adopting a dangerous political approach used in failing states like Algeria, Zimbabwe and Venezuela. Its aim is to deflect attention from its policy failures and from numerous scandals surrounding President Jacob Zuma, his family and the politically connected Gupta network.

The approach was allegedly crafted by Bell Pottinger, a London based public relations firm. It focuses on two concepts.

The first is the term “white monopoly capital”. The phrase broadly refers to control of the economy by apartheid beneficiary capitalist oligopolies at the expense of South Africa’s black majority.

Accompanying it is the term “radical economic transformation”. This is defined differently by various senior government officials. But is understood to mean rapidly changing the economy’s ownership, control, and production patterns in favour of the previously disadvantaged.

However, beyond damaging South Africa’s social fabric, framing the country’s current economic impasse in such a dichotomous politically charged way has negative consequences.

Firstly it distracts attention from the private sector’s real sins. This makes it more difficult to objectively hold business to account for its own nefarious activities. These include tender fraud, collusion, price fixing, fronting, illicit capital flows and tax evasion. Framing the discourse as “white monopoly capital” muddies the waters. It becomes unclear whether exposing private sector crimes is merely a politically motivated assault, or an attempt to uphold the law.

Secondly the ongoing rhetoric will further damage the chances of economic recovery. This is because it will deter long-term domestic and international investment. It will also encourage companies to move their capital elsewhere and use complex tax avoidance mechanisms.

Thirdly trumpeting vacuous slogans is also unlikely to raise the prospects of credible policies that will deal with the country’s structural challenges.

Populist slogans don’t fix structural challenges

Over the last two decades South Africa has failed to modernise its labour and education systems. This has meant limited success in rolling back poverty, inequality and unemployment. As a result the country has one of the highest unemployment rates and gini coefficients in the world.

The structural problems in the education system have resulted in poorly prepared senior school and university graduates. This is despite the number of children attending school increasing exponentially since compulsory education was introduced in 1994.

Consequently, the country is poorly positioned to take advantage of the “fourth industrial revolution”. This is broadly understood as a range of new technologies that fuse the physical, digital and biological worlds.

Making things worse is the failure to adopt industrial policies to diversify the country’s export mix away from commodities to more sophisticated beneficiation and manufacturing activities. Commodities such as gold, platinum and coal, thus continue to comprise a significant portion of the country’s export earnings.

Although the services-based sectors have given rise to an emerging middle class, this new wealth is largely debt-fueled and consumption driven. This limits savings, capital accumulation and class mobility for most of the population.

What’s at stake

In mid-2017 the rating agency Moody’s will review South Africa’s sovereign credit rating. This comes after two recent downgrades by global credit rating agencies S&P and Fitch.

A great deal hangs on Moody’s decision. If it downgrades the government’s rand-based bond credit rating two notches to junk status, the country will be expelled from the World Government Bond Index. This will compromise its credibility as an investment destination. It will stimulate significant capital flight as international bond funds with investment-grade mandates are forced to sell off South African sub-investment grade bonds.

The rand will then depreciate and the trade deficit will widen. The central bank could then be forced to hike interest rates to curb inflationary pressures. Unemployment will rise and the government’s fiscal slack will be further depleted.

A downgrade of the rand denominated bonds would spark economic instability, and potentially significantly weaken the country’s private sector. The country’s politically connected elite could respond to this crisis by seeking to consolidate political power. This could be achieved using “radical economic transformation” to decimate the vestiges of “white monopoly capital.”

In the wake of the recent downgrades, some politicians have been peddling an illusion that the country’s current woes are simply “short-term pain for long-term gain” for the majority of South Africans.

But the experiences of numerous countries have shown that there is no gain from going down the populist economic path – only state failure.

There are tentative signs that this risk is beginning to take hold among some ANC leaders. Even Zuma’s newly appointed Finance Minister began watering down the term “radical economic transformation” at the recent World Economic Forum Africa gathering. Instead he opted to use the phrase “inclusive growth”.

What needs to be made clear is that the debate around “white monopoly capital” and “radical economic transformation” is about much more than statistics and definitions. It is about the ownership and control of both public and private capital by a politically connected elite. Thus it comes with the potential risk of turning South Africa’s entire economy into a centrally controlled patronage network.

Sean Gossel, Senior Lecturer, UCT Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town and Misheck Mutize, Lecturer of Finance and Doctor of Philosophy Candidate, specializing in Finance, University of Cape Town

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Zuma abroad while South Africa is burning

While the country is wavering on the verge of total anarchy with violent protests, the country’s president went to visit another state in Africa instead of paying attention to the restoration of law and order in the country.

Jacob Zuma is currently visiting Tanzania to strengthen mutual relations with the country.

It follows Zuma’s refusal this weekend to visit Vuwani, fearing that he would be mocked in the same manner following a meeting recently held in Bloemfontein.

In Richards Bay, police vehicles were pushed by bulldozers while apparently millions of rands of damage at the port incurred.

In Eldorado Park, residents clash with police for a second day, regarding the high unemployment and lack of housing.

In Coligny, white houses have been burned down after the court granted to two farmers bail, schools are disrupted, and pupils cannot attend.

In Natal, some schools were burnt by informal dwellers.

Vuwani remains a violent district over the incorporation of the area into another municipality.
Port Elizabeth is being rocked by riots and roads are blocked.

In virtually all of the areas affected by violence, it seems that the police are unable to maintain law and order.

Read the original article in Afrikaans on Die Vryburger
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