Mbeki and Obasanjo: case studies in the use of soft power in Africa's interests

 

Former presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki share a light moment at a meeting of the G8 and developing nations in Tokyo in 2000. EFE-EPA/Michel Euler

The concept of soft power has been part of the parlance of international relations for three decades. Soft power actors use non-coercive and persuasive means to achieve their objectives. Attraction rather than force is their preferred language.

The application of soft power remains focused on states because of their primacy in international politics. But, the increasing influence of non-state actors dictates a need to review this approach. Non-state actors on the international stage include international organisations, NGOs, multinational corporations, terrorist groups and individuals.

It is against this backdrop that I studied the power of attraction of non-state actors. I focused on the soft power credentials of former African presidents – Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria, 1999-2007) and Thabo Mbeki (South Africa, 1999-2008).

The two have made important contributions to the continent this century through promoting peace, democracy, pan-Africanism and regional integration.

The study captures the essence of their soft power. It also engages how it has rubbed off on their respective countries – during and after their presidencies.

I examined Obasanjo’s and Mbeki’s traits, ideas and policies. In particular I focused on their contribution to pan-Africanism and the idea of the African Renaissance. I argue that they successfully used their soft power and international clout to make significant contributions in Africa and beyond.

Obasanjo as a soft power president

After Obasanjo’s civilian administration ended in 2007, he attracted widespread criticism within Nigeria. This is perhaps best captured by Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka’s description of him as a “master of hypocrisy”.

But, this underplays some of his accomplishments. The period between 1976 and 1979 when he was the military head of state is lauded by some as the most dynamic era of Nigeria’s foreign policy. And during his civilian administration (1999–2007) Nigeria was catapulted from a pariah state (due to gross human right abuses by successive military regimes) to a significant regional and, to a lesser extent, global player.

Thanks to Obasanjo’s idiosyncratic soft power, Nigeria, once neglected in global affairs, witnessed an influx of high profile visits, including US presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Its voice was better heard in such bodies as the Commonwealth, Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Obasanjo was notable for his courage and decisiveness, particularly when it came to colonialism and, later, apartheid. His toughness on these issues, and his promotion of regional integration, had remarkable success.

A foreign policy that embraces genuine promotion of democracy and peacemaking generates soft power.

Obasanjo enhanced his, and by extension Nigeria’s soft power through his successful peacemaking and promotion of democracy. The former, in places such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. The latter, in São Tomé and Príncipe, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire.

In Liberia, he was instrumental in ending the war. Obasanjo also facilitated the resignation of President Charles Taylor who was granted asylum in Nigeria. He played an active role in the transition to democratic rule that ushered in President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson in 2006.

In São Tomé and Príncipe, Obasanjo ensured the reinstatement of President Fradique de Menezes following a military coup in 2003.

His reformist ideas, set out in the Memorandum of Understanding of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, was adopted by the African Union summit in 2002.

The memorandum has four cornerstones. These are security, stability, development and cooperation as prerequisites for good governance on which African states would be measured.

It is thus clear that Obasanjo’s towering personality and international stature have enabled Nigeria to shape African institutions. He is thus a wielder of soft power.

Since leaving office, Obasanjo has continued to exhibit this soft power through conflict mediation and humanitarian interventions, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2008–2009) and Côte d'Ivoire (2011).

But, a number of shortfalls blot his soft power credentials. These include his unilateral decisions and apparent disdain for the rule of law while in power.

Mbeki’s legacy

Mbeki was influenced by some of Africa’s great political minds, as well as pan-African thinkers, during his years in exile in the UK.

For example, while studying at Sussex University in England in the mid-1960s, he engaged the ideas of pan-Africanist luminaries Aimé Cesaire, Frantz Fanon, Leopold Senghor and W.E.B. Du Bois. Arguably, all these individuals influenced Mbeki’s views as seen in his pursuit of pan-Africanism and African Renaissance.

Mbeki has often been labelled an “African intellectual” and “African philosopher king”. There is no gainsaying that his administration had the most impact of any post-apartheid government in international affairs – even more so than Nelson Mandela.

This was evident in his push for South-South solidarity and reform of old international institutions such as the UN Security Council. The African Union, despite its weaknesses, provided the platform for him to promote peace and security in Africa.

Exercising his soft power attribute (persuasion), Mbeki used shuttle diplomacy to garner the support of other African states, the Group of Eight and the Association of Southeast Asian States to establish the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the African Peer Review Mechanism. He was noted as a major peacemaker on the continent. This is best shown by his administration’s peacemaking and peacekeeping in Burundi, the DRC and Sudan.

Mbeki was often called upon to mediate and find lasting solutions to conflict in Africa. In 2004, the African Union asked that he proffer a political solution to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. He was actively involved in mediation to end conflicts in Comoros, Rwanda, Sudan, Eswatini and Zimbabwe.

Some of the interventions turned out to be a mere plastering of wounds as countries such as the DRC and Sudan remained fragile.

Nevertheless, Mbeki facilitated the Lusaka ceasefire agreement and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. The accords aimed to end the DRC and Burundi’s conflicts, respectively.

Indeed, the calls for Mbeki’s mediation reflect recognition of his idiosyncratic soft power.

Mbeki’s administration demonstrated remarkable commitment to provide aid to Africa. The African Renaissance Fund was established in 2000 to disburse aid to fellow African states. This offered an alternative to Western aid laced with debilitating conditions.

Mbeki continued to play a significant role after his presidency. He was appointed chair of the African Union’s efforts to bring peace to Sudan and South Sudan in 2009. This culminated in South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

The most significant factors that undermined his credibility were his quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe and HIV/AIDS denialism.

Due to their soft power resources, Obasanjo and Mbeki made their mark on pan-Africanism and conflict resolution in Africa. Their ideas remain deeply ingrained in the African Union.

Oluwaseun Tella, Senior Researcher, Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of Johannesburg

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

Trump's legacy in Africa and what to expect from Biden

 

Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari and US president Donald Trump during a press conference at the White House in 2018. Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Donald Trump was propelled to the US presidency by promising to rewrite globalisation rules. This included restricting trade when it directly hurt the US, clamping down on immigration, and reducing commitments to the global order. His administration’s “America First” foreign policy also meant disengaging from its obligations to Africa, which he infamously referred to as “shit-hole countries”.

Historically, the US foreign policy approach to Africa could be classified as benign neglect. This was characterised by a general lack of interest in the continent in the pre–World War II era. After World War II, US policy involved engaging or disengaging with individual countries, mostly defined in terms of counteracting the Soviet Union’s attempt to gain influence in the region.

A serious and sustained US–Africa engagement began under the Clinton administration. It subsequently deepened with significant bipartisan support. Indeed, the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations saw a remarkable continuity in both the Congress and the White House on the US agenda in Africa.

Africa’s share of annual US foreign assistance funding increased over the past two decades. Although US development and security aid to Africa grew, part of the increase was in support of President George W. Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched in 2003. Under President Obama US aid allocated to Africa fluctuated between $7 billion and $8 billion annually.

Trump’s election signalled a radical break with this consensus. His approach represented, in part, a return to the pre-Clinton era. Notwithstanding the administration’s rhetoric, however, Africa continued to receive roughly $7 billion in annual US aid allocations in its first three years.

US-Africa trade fell to approximately $41 billion in 2018, down from a high of $100 billion in 2008. On the whole, African countries have continued to export natural resources, such as petroleum and metals, to the US. Since 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act has been the main channel through which trade is conducted. It provides tariff-free access to 6,900 products from 39 countries.

In our paper, we show how the Trump administration’s policies affected Africa in detrimental ways.

Malign neglect of Africa

Under Trump’s administration, investment policy was driven by the push to open up markets for US goods and services. Its trade policy favoured bilateral, rather than multilateral, agreements. This shift, if sustained, could have undermined the growth of smaller countries, such as Lesotho. This is because such economies may not be of enough economic interest to the US to warrant a separate trade deal.

There were also punitive measures against countries that went against the administration’s expectations of reciprocal “free” trade. For instance, Rwanda was suspended from tariff free access to the US market after it introduced substantial duties on imports of second hand clothes. This came on the back of lobbying by second hand clothing exporters association in the US.

The administration’s largely uninterested stance may also have had detrimental effects on US foreign private investment to Africa. US foreign direct investment in Africa decreased from $50.4 billion in 2017 to $43.2 billion in 2019. This 14% decline came at a time when other countries like China were increasing their investments in the region.

The administration also crippled the capacity of the State Department and its international assistance agency by failing to fill essential positions in these agencies and through budget cuts. Such actions strained relationships and cut lines of communication.

Trump’s “Muslim” travel ban denied entry to nationals of a number of Muslim-majority countries, including several African ones. Imposed under the banner of US security, it had the effect of further reinforcing negative images of the continent as a place of insecurity and danger.

The Trump administration periodically expressed concern about the supposedly nefarious and negative impacts of Chinese engagement on the continent. Yet the impact of its own policies has been to reduce US influence in the region and further “open up the playing field” for Chinese actors.

The loss of US hegemony on the continent is evidenced by the diversifying of Africa’s foreign direct investment sources. It is also visible in shifts in its trade with key foreign partners, and increased diplomatic representation of other countries in Africa.

Biden’s administration

Joe Biden’s administration will likely result in some change and some continuity in Africa policy. Official ties are expected to become more diplomatic and certain policies – such as the so-called “Muslim travel ban” – may be reversed. But some significant questions remain as to its direction.

By and large, US policies towards Africa will likely be driven by a relatively narrow geopolitical gaze. This views the continent as a source of insecurity and site for humanitarian assistance. Combined with the scale of domestic problems arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and the perceived imperative to contain China, Africa will likely elicit only occasional strategic interest.

US focus on its national security imperatives will remain a primary policy area. New partnerships and initiatives – with Nigeria and Mozambique, for instance – are informed in large part by Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies there. The Trump administration greatly expanded the use of American air and ground strikes in hot-spots like Somalia. This is a policy that Biden is likely to continue, even if operations are scaled back somewhat.

Great power competition with China plays a significant role in US-Africa relations. The Trump administration’s “Prosper Africa” plan, meant to double US-Africa trade and investment, was presented as an American response to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”. However, Prosper Africa lacked the funding to accomplish its goals. In reality, it amounted to a coordination and consolidation of the different strands of US bureaucracy on the continent.

Biden’s administration will likely continue the existing discursive pattern of great power competition. But the focus, given his policy history, may move to revitalising multilateralism and supporting the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.

With regard to trade, the big question facing the new administration will be the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which expires in 2025. Though tariff free access retains bipartisan support, the Trump administration was in the process of moving towards bilateral engagement, as evidenced by its ongoing attempt to create a “model” free trade agreement with Kenya.

Such free trade deals would change the nature of the US-Africa trade partnership in two main ways. They would give further emphasis to reciprocal trade concessions, and would likely require further watering down or elimination of policies designed to help nascent economic sectors in African countries, particularly manufacturing.

Finally, the US-Africa relationship has been characterised by “signature” initiatives. George W. Bush’s had the President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief , Obama’s had “Power Africa” and Trump touted Prosper Africa. Biden will likely seek to continue this tradition, though exactly how remains to be seen.

Francis Owusu, Professor, Iowa State University and Padraig Carmody, Professor in Geography, Trinity College Dublin

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.